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ABSTRACT 
Newell, Alan S., December 14, 1979 History 
A Victim of Monopoly: Samuel T. Hauser and Hydroelectric 
Development on the Missouri River, 1898-1912 ( 143 pp. ) 
Director: H. D. Hampton 
In 1898, ex-Montana Territory Governor Samuel T. Hauser com­
pleted construction of a hydroelectric generating plant on the 
Missouri River near Helena, Montana. An aging Hauser, having 
suffered serious financial reverses in his other economic con­
cerns, entered the new Montana electrical industry with plans 
for three generating facilities. Between 1898 and 1908, S. T. 
Hauser completed the construction of two dams and power plants 
(Canyon Ferry and Hauser) and planned the erection of a third 
dam (Holter). In addition, Hauser's companies financed the 
construction of a transmission line from Helena to Butte and 
Anaconda, Montana. 
S. T. Hauser did not build his hydroelectric plants without 
competition. Acceptance of electrical power by various elements 
of Montana society, including the rapidly consolidating mining 
industry, produced a favorable climate for competing hydro­
electric interests in the state. Hauser1s two challengers were 
John D. Ryan, representing the electric power interest of Great 
Falls, and Charles W. Wetmore, representing power interests in 
Butte. Of the two individuals, John Ryan proved to be the 
greater threat to Hauser. Ryan's corporate ties to the Anaconda 
Copper Mining Company (Amalgamated Copper Company) allowed him 
to combine his interests with those of Wetmore and to drive 
S. T. Hauser from the power industry. 
Hauser failed in his efforts to protect his Missouri River 
power plants from being purchased by the Ryan/Wetmore syndicate. 
Although he had been in the forefront of promoting and develop­
ing the new source of power, an elderly S. T. Hauser was not 
able to retain the support of Amalgamated and had to relinquish 
control of his property in 1911. Formation of the Ryan/Wetmore 
syndicate and Hauser's failure prefaced establishment of the 
Montana Power Company in December, 1912. The creation of that 
corporation and the surrender of S. T. Hauser's power companies 
to the new firm evidenced the strong tendency in Montana towards 
monopolization of hydroelectric facilities. 
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THE RIVER AND INDUSTRY 
When American explorers first entered the present state of Montana, 
they did so via a primary regional waterway. Those preeminent adventur­
ers, Meriwether Lewis and William Clark, entered the Missouri River in 
the spring of 1804 in anticipation of following that great river to the 
Pacific Ocean. It was a notion buttressed by years of experience on 
rivers east of the Mississippi, but it was an idea that quickly died 
when confronted with the unpredictable character of western watercourses. 
While Lewis and Clark may have been disappointed with the navigability 
of Montana's most prominent river, the prescience of their focus on 
the Missouri was uncanny. 
Less than a year after the return of the Lewis and Clark Expedi­
tion, fur trading entrepreneurs were venturing onto Montana rivers. 
By the 1840s, posts along the upper Missouri carried on a brisk trade 
with native populations--receiving trade goods transported by river-
boat and shipping furs by the same means to the downstream port of 
St. Louis. In 1860, the first steamboat ascended the often treacherous 
Missouri River to the American Fur Company outpost at Fort Benton. 
The history of steamboat travel on the upper Missouri River is 
one of precarious spring ascents, which often ended with a floundered 
sternwheeler perched atop a hidden sandbar. The river was tolerated at 
best, and quickly abandoned in the 1880s when a more assured means of 
travel was available on railroads. Despite this seeming rejection, 
2 
the Missouri continued to support a variety of local enterprises. It 
served as a vehicle for delivering logs from the forest north of Helena 
to the great falls beginning in the 1880s. The river also supported a 
small cargo trade south of the community of Great Falls in the eighties 
and, during the nineties, offered a source of recreation to boating 
enthusiasts. The very substance of the river, its water, was employed 
by local agriculturalists as it was diverted into irrigation ditches and 
returned downstream to continue its course to the Mississippi. Through 
all of these uses, the significance of the Missouri River to the economic 
development of Montana is evident. 
Still, the river aided yet another industry during the last decade 
of the nineteenth century. That industry was mining, and its importance 
to Montana was enormous. 
Although the state's natural resources supported a variety of 
exploitative enterprises from fur trading to open range cattle ranching 
to lumbering, it was the mining industry that had the greatest impact 
on its land and its people. 
The prominence of the mining industry in Montana can be attributed 
to a variety of factors. Certainly, the most important element was the 
abundance of mineral wealth in the state. The discovery and development 
of gold and silver lodes in the 1860s and 1870s were but precursors to 
the great wealth of copper that was extracted from the hills around 
Butte beginning in the 1880s. The capital required to tap the state's 
mineral deposits necessarily attracted huge sums of investment monies 
from national and foreign financiers. The influx of these funds into 
the state brought with them attendant influence in many aspects of 
3 
Montana's economic, social and political life. Significantly, the mining 
industry is important to Montana for its urbanizing effect. The com­
munities of Butte, Anaconda, Helena, and Great Falls owe their existence 
to the presence of mining. In many respects, their history can be 
charted with the expansion and contraction of that industry. 
The link between the Missouri River and Montana's mining industry 
is energy—more specifically electricity. At the same time that mining 
entrepreneurs made their initial investments in the copper lodes around 
Butte, other capitalists laid the foundation for electrical generation 
and consumption in Montana. It is not a coincidence that the first 
applications of electricity in Montana were in the communities of 
Helena, Butte and Great Falls, or that some of the first industrial uses 
of the new energy were in lighting the region's mines. Neither is it 
coincidental that some of the first developers of electricity in the 
state were men who were tied to the mining industry. 
Samuel T. Hauser was such an individual. Having been involved in 
mining from his earliest days in Montana Territory, he clearly saw the 
practical application of electricity to industrialization. His develop­
ment of hydroelectric power plants at three sites on the Missour River 
evidenced a commitment to the new energy source. By following 
S. T. Hauser's course from 1898, the year he completed his first hydro­
electric facility, to 1912, the year he resigned as president of his 
electric power company, one can trace the interrelationship between 
the river, electricity, and the mining industry. 
S. T. Hauser is the medium through which one understands the 
genesis of hydroelectric development in Montana. By viewing his successes 
4 
and his failures, we can see the corporate entanglements that welded 
the mining industry to electrical generation in the state. Such a per­
spective may help to illuminate not only the circumstances of industrial 
development in Montana, but may explain the special relationship between 
the state's mining industry and power suppliers. 
Samuel T. Hauser came to Montana via steamboat on the Missouri 
River in 1862. After a thirty-five year career that included activities 
in banking, ranching, land speculation and mining, he spent his last 
years harnessing the river that carried him west. 
CHAPTER I 
A NEW POWER FOR MONTANA 
Electricity was not a new phenomenon in late nineteenth-century 
America. Its value as a source of power was apparent to experimenters 
and inventors as early as 1808. Improvements in electrical producing 
equipment and rapid advances in the promotion of the new energy source 
caught the imagination of Americans in the late 1870s and characterized 
the last two decades of the nineteenth century. It was these same 
achievements that attracted capital investment to the electrical industry 
and encouraged the formation of new corporations. In Montana, farmers 
continued to break new sod and the American Indian held tenaciously to 
the last vestiges of his nomadic culture. In the midst of these transi­
tions, frontier communities quickly followed the lead of their eastern 
neighbors in establishing electrical plants. Pioneer capitalists 
turned their attentions from mining, lumbering and agriculture to the 
new industry of electricity. 
Electricity's first commercial developers in the United States 
promoted its use in lighting. Sir Humphrey Davy, in 1808, had dis­
covered that by passing an electric current through two pieces of 
carbon, he could produce light. But not until 1876 did the American 
inventor Charles F. Brush perfect this system of "arc-lighting" with 
the introduction of a simplified arc lamp. To supply power to this 
lamp, Brush constructed a small "dynamo" which converted mechanical 
5 
6 
energy into electrical energy. Brush marketed his generating machine 
and arc light system in metropolitan areas of the United States during 
the late 1870s, and, by the early 1880s, he had clearly demonstrated its 
technical value J 
While Brush continued his experiements in arc-lighting, another 
American inventor, Thomas A. Edison, toyed with the idea of an incan­
descent lighting system. Edison realized that high voltage arc lights 
were suitable for municipal lighting needs, but he believed that they 
were ill-adapted to wider distribution in the American residential light-
2 
ing market. Production of a low voltage, incandescent lamp, operated 
on a parallel rather than a series circuit, appeared to Edison to have 
3 greater economic value than the arc lamp. 
Edison and a team of engineers worked on the incandescent lighting 
plan from 1879 to 1881. In the fall of the later year, they were ready 
to install their first unit in a New York City building. The electric 
lighting venture proved economically feasible and, by 1881, the newly-
1. Harold C. Passer, The Electrical Manufacturers, 1875-1900: A 
Study in Competition, Entrepreneurship, Technical Change and Economic 
Growth (New York: Arno Press, 1972), pp. 11-21, discusses the origins 
and development of the electrical industry in America. This work is 
particularly valuable for its insights into early corporate consolida­
tion. Also see John Garraty, The New Commonwealth: 1877-1890, New 
American Nation Series (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 94. 
2. Passer, The Electrical Manufacturers, pp. 79-80. U.S. Depart­
ment of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of the Census, Central Electric 
Light and Power Stations, Special Reports, 1902 (Washington: 1905), 
p. 86. 
3. In a series circuit, a negative pole is connected to a positive 
and vice versa. In parallel circuitry, positive poles are connected 
together and negative poles are connected together. In practical terms, 
parallel circuitry delivers a greater current from a lower voltage source 
than does series circuitry. 
7 
created Edison Electric Light Company served eighty-five commercial 
4 
customers in metropolitan New York. 
The success of incandescent lighting soon was apparent to the 
American public, and the demand for Edison's product increased dra­
matically during the 1880s. An expanding market created a need for 
capital investment. Many inventors, including Edison, Brush, and Elihu 
Thomson, secured financing from interested businessmen and established 
various firms during this early phase of electrical development. The 
lighting industry captured the imagination of Americans during the 
1880s, but high development costs forced inventors to find more specula­
tive forms of monetary support. 
While noted investors J. P. Morgan and Henry Villard were instru­
mental in funding the nation's first electrical companies, other, less 
moneyed, individuals, also entered the business. Charles A. Coffin, 
a Lynn, Massachusetts businessman, was typical of the entrepreneurs who 
entered the new industry during its infancy. Coffin and a small group 
of Lynn speculators purchased the American Light Company (holders of 
Elihu Thomson's patent for an arc-lighting system) in 1882. Reincor­
porating the company under the name Thomson-Houston Electric Company, 
Coffin and his associates established a manufacturing plant in Lynn 
in 1883.5 
Coffin originally functioned as the firm's salesman and corporate 
manager, while Thomson concentrated on perfecting new designs. 
4. Passer, The Electrical Manufacturers, pp. 86, 90; Garraty, 
The New Commonwealth, p. 94. 
5. Ibid., p. 26. 
8 
Throughout the 1880s, Coffin focused his attention on consolidating the 
proliferating electrical industry. As one twentieth-century historian 
explains, "Charles Coffin was the entrepreneur in the arc-lighting 
equipment industry who understood the importance of acquiring other 
firms and who had the necessary financial resources."6 Between 1883 and 
1890, the Thomson-Houston Company acquired the assets of a number of 
small metropolitan lighting companies. Most of these transactions were 
accomplished through mergers that were beneficial to both parties. By 
1890, the Thomson-Houston Electric Company was a leader in the elec­
trical industry, and, when the company reorganized as the General 
Electric Company in 1892, Charles Coffin was selected to head the new 
7 
firm. 
Westinghouse Electric Company shared the leadership of the elec­
trical industry with the General Electric Company in 1892. George 
Westinghouse, a man with little formal education, rose to prominence 
as an inventor when he produced the first railroad air brake in 1869. 
His interest and success in developing mechanical devices for the rail­
road industry introduced Westinghouse to the rapid advances in the field 
of electric power production. Westinghouse avoided duplication in the 
area of electrical lighting by concentrating on applying electricity to 
industrial use. The adaptation required an efficient method for trans­
mitting the power, and the new use for electricity forced Westinghouse 
g 
to focus on alternating rather than direct current. Success in this 
6. Ibid., p. 52. 7. Ibid., pp. 52-57, passim. 
8. Direct current is current that flows in only one direction, 
from negative to positive. It can be reversed only by changing the 
9 
endeavor rested on the inventor's ability to develop a method to 
"transform" high voltage alternating current into lower, consumptive 
voltages. 
The Westinghouse Electric Company was formed in January, 1886, to 
finance experiments in alternating current. By March of that year, 
William Stanley of that company was ready to demonstrate an alternating 
current transmission system. Tests proved successful and Westinghouse 
proceeded, in 1886, to install the country's first commercial alternat­
ing current lighting system. By 1891, he had not only perfected the 
transmission system but had constructed an alternating current electric 
g 
motor for use in a mine at Telluride, Colorado. The work of George 
Westinghouse and his associates markedly advanced the course of the 
electrical industry by providing a method of transmitting electricity 
from a power source to distant markets and by demonstrating the applica­
bility of electrical power to industrial use.^ 
The promotional and technical efforts of the Westinghouse and the 
General Electric Company (successor to the Thomson-Houston Company) 
polarity at the source. Alternating current, which is produced by 
generators, changes direction regularly without physically reversing 
the polarity at the source. By using alternating rather than direct 
current, Westinghouse could employ a generator to create high-voltage 
electricity which could then be transmitted to distant power stations. 
See Arthur A. Bright, Jr., The Electric-Lamp Industry: Technological 
Change and Economic Development From 1800 To 1947 (New York: Arno Press, 
1972), pp. 98-99. 
9. Passer, The Electrical Manufacturers, pp. 136-68, 279-80. 
10. Garraty, The New Commonwealth, p. 96. 
10 
transformed America's commercial power system. Development of alternat­
ing and direct current lighting facilities forced the nation's coal, coke 
and gas companies to accept the superiority of electric light over that 
supplied by gas. Increasingly in the 1880s, local city gas companies 
purchased the rights to distribute electric light and power, while they 
relegated gas consumption to home and office heating.^ Similarly, the 
adaptation of electricity to industrial motors forced manufacturers 
to recognize the benefits of converting to the new source of power. 
The emergence of electric power for lighting and manufacturing on 
America's eastern shore was followed quickly by the same phenomena in 
Montana. Though still a frontier with much of its land uncharted in 
1880, Montana Territory received the benefits of electric arc and 
incandescent lights in step with much of the nation. Such early recep­
tivity to electricity in Montana was one factor that encouraged local 
businessmen to enter this field of enterprise. 
The mining community of Butte was one of the earliest Montana 
communities to receive electric light. C. C. Ruthrauff of the Brush 
Electric Light Company installed a small, steam-driven dynamo and four­
teen lights at the Alice Mine in 1880. The successful operation of 
this new source of illumination encouraged the incorporation of Butte's 
12 
Brush Electric Light and Power Company in 1882. Eight years later, 
11. Passer, The Electrical Manufacturers, pp. 195-203, passim. 
Also see Bureau of the Census, Central Electric Light and Power 
Stations, p. 15. 
12. The Montana Power Company, "The Story of Montana Power" (n.p., 
n.d.), pp. 8-9. Also see Douglas F. Leighton's "The Corporate History 
of the Montana Power Company: 1882-1913," unpublished M.A. Thesis, 
Montana State University (Missoula: 1950), p. 8. 
11 
the electrical industry in Butte expanded when investors formed the 
Butte General Electric Company. This new firm consolidated the elec­
trical plants and interests of the Silver Bow Electric Light and Power 
Company, the Brush Electric Light and Power Company, and William A. 
13 Clark's recently organized Butte Electric Light and Power Company. 
Despite a separation of more than 2,000 miles, Montana mimicked its 
eastern neighbors, by applying electricity to street and commerical 
lighting. The town of Helena soon challenged Butte's lead in this field. 
In 1883, E. W. Knight, H. M. Parchen, and T. H. Kleinschmidt formed the 
Helena Light and Power Company and introduced arc lighting to that 
community. This firm operated a steam-powered Brush dynamo to fulfill 
14 
a contract to the city of Helena for street lighting. In 1889, the 
Citizens Electric Light Company, which sported the competing Thomson-
Houston lighting system, joined the Helena Light and Power Company in 
15 
supplying electric service to the community. 
During the late 1880s and the early 1890s, the citizens of Helena 
received further benefits from electricity when the City Council approved 
a plan to electrify the community's street railway.^6 Encouraged by the 
13. Leighton, "The Corporate History of the Montana Power Company," 
p. 10. 
14. Michael Leeson, History of Montana (Chicago: 1885), p. 734. 
Also see Helena Illustrated: A History of the Early Settlement and the 
Helena of Today (Helena: Frank L. Thresher, Publisher, 1890), pp. tz-13. 
15. Helena Illustrated, pp. 12-13. 
16. For a thorough history of the Street railway system in Helena, 
see Rex Myers, "A History of the Street Railways in Helena, Montana 
(1883-1927)," unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Montana (Missoula: 
1970), pp. 33-37. 
12 
production of improved electric motors, noted Montana and ardent Helena 
promoter C. A. Broadwater organized the Helena Electric Railway Company 
in March, 1890. In May of that year, Broadwaterls street railway line 
began operation of the first electric railway in the city.^ 
The success of pioneer electric lighting and power companies and 
the trend towards consolidation of those same firms were as evident in 
Helena as they were in Butte. By 1894, the newly-formed Helena Power 
and Light Company had assumed the interests of the Helena Gas Light and 
18 
Coke Company, the Helena Electric Company, and two street railway lines. 
Production of the new power source did not remain solely with 
Helena or Butte. Great Falls was a third Montana city to enjoy the 
benefits of supporting the new electric industry. A relatively new 
community, Great Falls was founded in 1888 by Paris Gibson, who saw the 
town as a terminal for the Great Northern Railway Company's trans­
continental railroad. Gibson located the townsite astride the Missouri 
River at a site blessed with water power. Gibson recognized the 
potential for power generation that existed in the Missouri's cascades 
at Great Falls. 
In magnitude the Falls of the Missouri are unsurpassed 
in the United States except by the falls of the Niagara. 
The power available here at the medium flow is ten times 
greater than that of the Mississippi river at Minnea­
polis, and thirty times that of either Lowell, Lawrence, 
Holyoke or Lewiston. ... It is estimated if all the 
power at Niagara could be harnessed, it would yield 
power at 1,000,000 horse power, while the available 
17. Ibid., p. 42. 
18. T. H. Kleinschmidt, H. M. Parchen and Anton Holter were the 
incorporators of this company. Myers, "A History of the Street 
Railways in Helena," p. 54. 
13 
power at the Falls of the Missouri is placed at 350,000 
horse power at a medium low stage of waterJ9 
Gibson's claim of the power available from the great falls of the 
Missouri River was not unwarranted and soon was justified by one of the 
first attempts in Montana to harness water power for electrical use. 
In 1887, Paris Gibson formed the Great Falls Water Power and Town-
site Company and purchased all of the available water power sites at the 
20 great falls of the Missouri from railroad magnate James J. Hill. 
Two years later, the company entered into an agreement with the Boston-
Montana Consolidated Copper and Silver Mining Company (later the Boston-
Montana Copper Smelting and Refining Company) to supply power to that 
company's new smelter and electric plant at Great Falls. In 1891, 
Gibson's firm completed construction of Black Eagle Dam and began delivering 
energy to the smelter's plant by means of a rope transmission. Two 
1,000 foot long hemp ropes supplied mechanical power to direct current 
Thomson-Houston generators that ran the Boston-Montana Company's 
21 
smelters, concentrator, and electric lights. The city of Great Falls 
maintained the lead in exploring the possibiliities of water power when, 
in 1891, it replaced a steam electric generating plant with one powered 
22 by water . u 
19. Paris Gibson, "The Falls of the Missouri—Their Past, Present, 
and Future," Rocky Mountain Magazine: An Illustrated Monthly. Vol. 1 
(September 1900), p. 25. 
20. The Montana Power Company, "The Story of Montana Power," p. 15. 
21. Ibid., p. 16. 
22. Ibid., p. 17. 
14 
Establishment of light and power facilities at Great F&lls, Helena, 
and Butte fostered investment in the electrical industry. The reception 
accorded electricity, first in commercial lighting and later in industrial 
plants at Great Falls, encouraged Montana businessmen to keep abreast of 
further developments in the field. As their collective interest was 
aroused, Montana capitalists began investigating the suitability of numerous 
water power sites. They were aided in this search by the national 
approach to utilizing this natural resource. 
During the mid-1880s, Congress began assuming its jurisdiction over 
dams in navigable rivers. Provisions of the first legislation on the 
subject, the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1884, required the Secretary of 
War to report the location of navigation obstructions, including dams, 
to Congress. The Rivers and Harbors Acts of 1890 and 1899 extended con­
gressional authority in this area by requiring each new dam to receive 
specific approval from the federal legislative body. Both of these laws 
were restricted, however, in that they only applied to dams that were 
situated in navigable waterways. Dams that were located on the public 
domain, but not on navigable rivers, and those that lay wholly within 
the boundaries of state or private lands, were not subject to federal 
23 
supervision. 
As a result of this liberal federal policy, it was not difficult 
for Montana water power promoters to secure approval for dams on the 
23. For a good discussion of early water-power legislation, see 
Jerome G. Kerwin's Federal Water-Power Legislation, Studies in History, 
Economics, and Public Law NO. z/4 (New YorK: uoiumoia University Press, 
1926), passim. For a view of early federal water legislation and other 
conservation issues, see Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel 
of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920 
(New York: Atheneum, 1972), passim. 
15 
Missouri River above the great falls. While there had been repeated 
attempts during the 1870s and 1880s to develop navigation on this upper 
stretch of the river, the U.S. Arniy Corps of Engineers considered the 
truly navigable section of the Missouri to be downstream from Fort 
24 
Benton. A Montana dam developer simply needed to acquire the appro­
priate water rights and lan<t and to make his application to Congress. 
There was no time limit for either beginning or for completing con­
struction of the dam, and there was no charge for the privilege of 
occupying a navigable waterway. A perceptive speculator could easily 
secure the river's available power sites in expectation of future 
development. 
After 1900, an increased number of reauests to construct dams forced 
Congress to address the water power question directly. In June, 1906, 
Congressional members passed the General Dam Act in an attempt to 
establish uniform rules and procedures for future dam applications. The 
salient provisions of the 1906 legislation were the requirements that 
1) dam plans and specifications be approved by the Chief of Engineers 
and the Secretary of War, 2) the grantee provide locks and navigational 
24. Between 1876 and 1899, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers con­
ducted a number of improvement projects on the Missouri River above 
Fort Benton, Montana. Most of the projects involved the construction 
of wing dams, the removal of snags, and bank improvements. The con­
struction of railroads along the Missouri during the later 1880s 
dampened the federal government's enthusiasm for developing the upper 
reaches of the river for navigation. Competition from dam promoters 
added to the Corps' reluctance to improve the river. After 1899, the 
federal government took no further measures to improve the Missouri 
above Fort Benton. For more information on this development, see 
Alan Newell and Gary Williams, "Missouri River Navigation Study: 
Loma, Montana, to Three Forks, Montana," unpublished manuscript pre­
pared for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha District, 
August 12, 1974. 
16 
aids, 3) construction start within one year and be finished within 
three years. As in previous water-related statutes, the General Dam 
Act did not apply to non-navigable waters in the public domain. 
Furthermore, the 1906 act stipulated no time limit for the grant's 
duration and it authorized no federal charge for use of a federally 
controlled river. Despite these limitations, Congressional leaders 
hoped that the General Dam Act of 1906 would allow them to exert control 
over the nation's increasing hydroelectric development, while reducing 
25 
the amount of time they had to expend on individual dam requests. 
The issue of dam construction on navigable rivers was but one of 
the many resource conservation issues that faced policy makers at the 
turn of the century. Still, it was an issue that involved the nation's 
leading advocates of federal control of natural resources (Gifford 
Pinchot, James Garfield, Frederick Newell), and it was a matter that 
26 
became entangled in the political machinations of the period. 
National conflicts over conservation problems delayed initiation of a 
clear federal water power policy until 1920. The Water Power Act of 
that year placed time restrictions on grants for dam construction and 
25. Kerwin, Federal Water-Power Legislation, p. 112; Hays, 
Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency, p. 115. 
26. The question of water-power development of the nation's rivers 
involved various views of the nature of the public domain. Under the 
leadership of Gifford Pinchot, federal policy makers developed a permit 
system whereby power companies were regulated in their construction of 
dams on National Forest lands. The attempt to shift this policy to all 
public lands was thwarted when Richard A. Ballinger replaced James 
Garfield as Secretary of the Interior in 1908. Not until the Water 
Power Act of 1920 did the Pinchot principle of permitting hydroelectric, 
companies extend to all public lands. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel 
of Efficiency, pp. 73-81. 
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authorized the federal government to charge a rent for the use of 
navigable rivers. This new legislation emphasized that Congress viewed 
the act of operating a privately owned dam, affecting public resources, 
27 
as a privilege and not a right. 
Federal inability to anticipate the rapidity with which the hydro­
electric industry developed offered Montana promoters an opportunity to 
secure valuable water power sites for nominal costs. Combined with the 
Montana public's receptivity to electricity, this lack of an adequate 
public policy invited investors to enter the electrical power business 
in Montana. 
A third factor that prompted Montanans to invest in electrical 
generation was the adaptability of electricity to the mining industry. 
The mining and smelting of various ores represented Montana's major 
form of industrialization during the last two decades of the nineteenth 
century. While silver, lead, and gold were important state resources, 
it was the rapid expansion of the copper industry that thrust Montana 
into a leading position in the mineral producing community. 
The cities of Butte and Anaconda were the sites for most of the 
state's important copper smelters. The Butte and Boston Company, 
William A. Clark's Butte Reduction Works, the Colorado Smelting and 
Mining Company, and the Parrot Silver and Copper Company owned mines and 
smelters in the city of Butte during the 1880s. Marcus Daly, driven by 
a shortage of water on the Butte Hill, located his famous Anaconda 




smelters in the city of the same name in 1884 and 1887. 
Operation of the mining and smelting facilities in the mining center 
of Butte/Anaconda required vast amounts of energy. Steam, produced by 
burning coal, coke, or charcoal, was the primary source of power during 
the 1880s and 1890s. While charcoal was readily available from the 
forests of western Montana, the availability of coal and coke was more 
restricted. High quality coal was a scarce commodity in Montana during 
these years, most of the resource being secured from mines at Sand Coulee 
and Belt in Cascade County, and from the Bozeman, Livingston and Red 
29 
Lodge areas. Acquisition and the cost of coal for steam plants was 
a constant problem for smelting plants, and it may have been a major 
reason for the Boston-Montana Copper and Smelting Company's locating 
a smelter in Great Falls in 1889 near the Sand Coulee and Belt mines. 
Development of both alternating and direct electric current motors 
in the 1880s offered a potential solution to the industry's difficulties. 
Installation of the electric motors at a Telluride, Colorado, mine in 
1891 demonstrated that electricity could be used successfully for 
28. For a discussion of the mine and smelter development at Butte 
and Anaconda, see Historical Research Associates, "Preliminary Investi­
gations, Historical Emissions Inventory, Montana Air Pollution Study," 
Montana Department of Health and Environmental Sciences, Air Quality 
Bureau (Helena: June 1, 1978), passim. 
29. Commercial development of coal mines in Montana began as early 
as 1867, when Colonel James D. Chestnut located a small mine on the 
divide separating Bozeman from Livingston. During the 1890s, the 
Northern Pacific Railway Company mined coal from a large formation 
near Red Lodge. For a history of early coal mining in Montana, 
see Rita McDonald's and Merrill G. Burlingame's "Montana's First 
Commercial Coal Mine," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 1 
(1956). Also see William tvans and Robert Peterson's "Decision at 
Colstrip," Pacific Northwest Quarterly* Vol. 61, No. 3 (1970). 
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powering hoisting, pump and haulage equipment. In 1894, one mining 
journal reported that electricity also was suited to "mine lighting and 
to the explosion of blasting charges, while electrolytic treatment of 
30 
ores is a most important branch of metallurgical science." Marcus 
Daly exploited this latter use of electricity in his Anaconda Company 
"Lower Works" smelter in 1894. By 1896, the smelter was electrically 
refining more than one-fourth of the monthly ore volume from the upper 
31 
and lower works. Other mining journals also commented on the uses of 
electricity in the mining industry. By the mid-1890s, it was apparent 
to most knowledgeable observers that electricity would soon replace 
32 
steam as the direct source of power in this important economic area. 
While electricity's versatility gained increased recognition during 
the 1890s, steam plants were still required to drive the dynamos that 
produced the new-found energy. Greater efficiency in a smelter or mine 
dictated full utilization of electricity and less dependence on fossil 
fuels. George Westinghouse's experiments with the transmission of 
alternating current helped lessen the reliance on coal and coke. The 
ability to transmit high voltage electricity great distances and to 
reduce its strength through transformers revolutionized the power supply 
30. Montana Mining and Marketing Reporter, Vol. I, No. 3 (October 
6, 1894), p. 20. Also see Western Mining World, Vol. Ill, No. 49, 
p. 88. 
31. Historical Research Associates, "Preliminary Investigations," 
p. 53; Western Mining World, Vol. IV, No. 68, January 4, 1896, p. 1; 
Ralph I. Smith, "History of the Early Reduction Plants of Butte, Montana," 
State of Montana, Bureau of Mines and Geology (reprinted from De Re 
Metallica, Vol. 18, No. 2 and 3 [May, 1953], p. 13). 
32. For example, see Western Mining World, Vol. Ill, No. 59 
(November 2, 1895), p. 210. 
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business. Electrical energy could now be generated from a central 
source and transmitted to a number of distribution centers. The most 
significant ramification of this discovery for Montana was the public 
recognition of the increased potential for hydroelectric generation. 
As early as 1890, engineers speculated on the importance of water 
power and the transmission of electricity. One analyst anticipated 
locating a "steam plant by the water side, where compound condensing 
engines can be used and where by concentration of stations, we can use 
33 large engines with the greatest economy in coal consumption." This 
writer suggested that the location of a steam plant outside of the city 
would remove an objectionable source of both noise and air pollution. 
He also added that "these advantages, great as they are, are nothing 
compared with the possibilities in the way of utilizing our water 
..34 powers. 
Montanans also recognized the future importance of the state's 
water resource. An enthusiastic engineer reported to a local meeting 
of the Society of Engineers in 1895 that: 
The electrical transmission for power is fast 
bringing all the hitherto obscure water powers 
of the world into commercial importance. The 
day is not far distant when all the available 
water power of the United States, in fact, the 
world, will be utilized to its fullest capacity. 
. . . Montana has extensive opportunities for 
the development of water power within her 
borders, and the next decade should show vast 
33. Eugene Friggin, "The Electrical Transmission of Power," 




35 strides along the lines of its development. 
The cost of steam power versus water generated elecricity was 
particularly important to early promoters of electrical expansion. 
Noted civil engineer Max Hebgen claimed that steam power cost mining 
companies approximately $125 to $200 per horsepower per year. Elec­
tricity, on the other hand, could be purchased consistently at $50 per 
36 
horsepower per annum, and it was available for as little as $35. 
The susceptibility of Montana mining facilities to electrical 
usage, especially in the Butte/Anaconda area, encouraged development of 
electric generation. The search for an abundant and cheap source of, 
energy focused the mining industry's attention on the transmission of 
electricity from central hydroelectric stations. The example of the 
Boston-Montana Company's electrically operated smelter in Great Falls 
was not wasted on that firm's competitors. It also was likely that 
Montana's copper magnates recognized the increased demand for copper 
wire that the nation's rapid electric development would require. All 
of these factors heightened Montana businessmen's awareness of the 
eminent full electrification of the mining industry and the monetary 
reward of such a technical renovation. 
Historian Henry Adams commented on the new age of electricity after 
venturing to the Paris Exposition in 1900. Amid all the mechanical 
35. M. S. Parker, "Cost of Steam and Water Power in Montana," 
Association of Engineering Societies, Vol. 15 (June 18, 1895), p. 26. 
36. Max Hebgen, "Hydroelectric Development in Montana," Trans­
actions of the American Institute of Mining Engineers. Vol. 46 
(August, 1913) (New York: 1914), p. 804. 
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inventions that were exhibited in the great hall, Adams was lured to the 
display of dynamos. Increasingly concerned with his own anachronism, 
the Boston scholar pondered the significance of the colossal machines. 
As he grew accustomed to the great gallery of 
machines, he began to feel the forty-foot 
dynamos as a moral force, much as the early 
Christians felt the Cross. The planet itself 
seemed less impressive, in its old-fashioned, 
deliberate, annual or daily revolution, than 
this huge wheel, revolving within arm's length 
at some vertiginous speed, and barely murmur­
ing—scarcely humming an audible warning to 
stand a hair's-breadth further for respect of 
power—while it would not wake the baby lying 
close against its frame. Before the end, one 
began to pray to it; inherited instinct taught 
the natural expression of man before silent and 
infinite force. Among the thousand symbols of 
ultimate energy, the dynamo was not so human 
as some, but it was the most impressive.3' 
To Henry Adams, the dynamo and its ability to convert mechanical energy 
into electrical energy graphically illustrated the public's fascination 
with science and its head-long rush into the twentieth century. 
Other Americans were equally impressed with this new form of 
energy. Men such as J. P. Morgan, Henry Villard, and Henry H. Rogers 
saw in electricity the same economic potential that had propelled the 
country to positions of leadership in other industries. These indivi­
duals thought electricity efficient and recognized that its generation 
would result in a more productive and wealthy America. Historian Howard 
Mumford Jones explains that during this "age of energy, one can say 
37. Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams (New York: The 
Modern Library, 1931), p. 380. 
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without being paradoxical that the vision of John D. Rockefeller, Sr., 
paralleled the vision of Walt Whitman—a picture of a happy, wasteless, 
and plentiful society."^ 
Montana's industrial society had its own Rockefellers during the 
1890s and early 1900s. At the turn of the century, local capitalists 
such as Anton Holter, William A. Clark, and Samuel T. Hauser held posi­
tions of economic power and political influence. These were men who had 
arrived in the state during territorial days and had risen to prominence 
largely through expansion in the mining industry. They were at their 
entrepreneurial zenith in the 1890s and they sought to retain that 
standing. 
Samuel T. Hauser is representative of this group of elderly capi­
talists. Having arrived in Montana before the land achieved territorial 
status, Hauser quickly attained distinction on the western frontier. 
A fervent promoter of Helena, Hauser shared his friends' interest in 
bringing electricity to that community. This prominent Montanan also 
capitalized on federal indecision over water power development by taking 
advantage of accessible Missouri River power sites near Helena. Most 
importantly, Hauser possessed the practical mining skills and necessary 
experience to realize the inevitability of electrical application to the 
mining industry. He was one of the first Montana mining entrepreneurs 
to utilize the new energy source in an industrial capacity. The rapid 
development of Hauser's facilities at three locations on the Missouri 
38. Howard Mumford Jones, The Age of Energy: Varieties of American 
Experience. 1865-1915 (New York: Viking Press, 1970). 
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was predicated on his belief that mining and smelting operators would 
soon turn to electric power. 
In 1893, at the age of 60, S. T. Hauser began his efforts to develop 
the hydroelectric potential of the Missouri River. By the early 1900s, 
he came into conflict with two other entrepreneurs, John D. Ryan and 
Charles W. Uetmore, representing power interest in Great Falls and Butte, 
respectively. These men also understood the economics of selling elec­
tricity to industrial clients and they turned their attentions to 
challenging Hauser's plans for the Missouri. 
Inevitably, S. T. Hauser was forced to do economic battle with 
these two adversaries. In the ensuring fight, Hauser suffered various 
defeats—some of his own doing and some directed by fate. In the end, 
Hauser's inability to retain the support of Montana's largest industrial 
consumer of electricity forced him to sell his Missouri River properties. 
Events surrounding Samuel Hauser's involvement in electrical gener­
ation offer a valuable perspective on the beginnings of the electric 
industry in Montana. While some Americans such as Henry Adams warily 
eyed the coming years, an elderly S. T. Hauser plunged enthusiastically 
into the new century. The pioneer Montanan realized too late that he 
did not command the financial resources to keep pace with the rapidly 
consolidating electric industry. 
CHAPTER II 
S. T. HAUSER AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MISSOURI RIVER DAMS, 1896-1908 
"The Goose Hangs High" 
Samuel Thomas Hauser arrived at Fort Benton (Montana) from St. 
Louis, Missouri, in the spring of 1862. Born in Falmouth, Kentucky on 
January 10, 1833, Hauser had received his early education in civil 
engineering. He was working for a railroad company in Missouri when 
the Civil War erupted in 1861. At twenty -nine years of age, a strongly 
pro-southern S. T. Hauser decided to abandon the strife-ridden border 
state of Missouri and to seek his fortune in the WestJ 
Hauser came to the Rocky Mountains destined for the gold mines of 
the Salmon River. After receiving favorable reports of the mineral 
wealth of that region (Idaho), the young pioneer retreated from the 
Bitterroot Mountains of western Montana and joined other prospectors 
1. The two major sources of information on Samuel T. Hauser's 
early years are John W. Hakola's "Samuel T. Hauser and the Economic 
Development of Montana: A Case Study in Nineteenth-Century Capitalism" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1961), and the 
Herbert Peet Collection, Montana State Historical Society (Helena), 
Archives, MSS #89. Hakola's dissertation is far more useful than the 
miscellaneous notes and typescripts of Peet. Nevertheless, Peet's 
material is very good for information on Hauser's first two decades in 
Montana, and Hakola relies heavily on this collection of documents. 
Both Peet and Hakola end their respective examinations of Samuel 
Hauser's career before 1893. 
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2 at Gold Creek. Later in 1862, Hauser journeyed from these diggings to 
new riches located at Bannack, Montana. In April of the following year 
(1863), he accompanied a group of young miners led by James Stuart on 
an ill-fated exploration of the Yellowstone Valley. 
By the autumn of 1863, Samuel Hauser had been in Montana for little 
over a year. He was thirty years old and, even though he had barely 
carved an economic niche for himself, the young miner had discovered 
two important things. He recognized that the immediate future of 
Montana lay in the territory's mineral wealth, located primarily in 
quartz lodes. Hauser also realized that in order to erect facilities 
and to buy machinery to exploit this natural resource, Montana entre­
preneurs would have to look outside the state for investment capital. 
For more than a year, 1863-1864, Hauser sojourned on the East Coast 
3 
in an attempt to promote economic and political interest in the West. 
He returned to the East once again in 1865, this time to gather capital 
for developing a quartz lode of silver in the Beaverhead Valley. This 
search fostered the organization of the Missouri Petroleum and Mining 
Company in 1866. The company, which featured numerous Missouri inves­
tors, was soon renamed the St. Louis and Montana Mining Company. As 
historian John Hakola remarks, this firm was one 
. . . which, with changes in name and structure, 
lasted until the First World War, and in its long 
2. Gold Creek is located approximately fifteen miles southeast of 
Drummond, Montana. It was the site of the first reported gold discovery 
in Montana in 1858. Hakola, "Samuel T. Hauser," pp. 14-20. 
3. Hauser made his first bid for political appointment during this 
trip to the East coast. As a staunch Democrat in a circle of Republicans, 
his efforts were unsuccessful. Ibid., pp. 25-29. 
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history presents in a microcosm the experiences of 
silver mining in Montana from the initial discovery 
and experimental stages to a final reworking of the 
tailings and dumps and the extraction of a tempo­
rarily more valuable mineral than silver.^ 
While Samuel Hauser was not influential in the St. Louis and Montana 
Mining Company for all those years, his early involvement in the cor­
poration demonstrated promotional abilities and undaunted optimism in 
5 
the future of the Montana territory. It was his skill at garnering 
outside money and foreseeing future economic trends in the region that 
made S. T. Hauser such a powerful and successful man. He exhibited his 
business acumen in a number of financial ventures during the 1870s and 
1880s. 
Hauser was a strong supporter of railroad expansion into Montana 
during the 1870s. In 1873, he lobbied strongly for a territorial 
subsidy for the Utah and Northern Railway Company's planned extension 
6 
from Utah to Montana. When that company decided to make Butte, and 
4. Ibid., p. 37. 
5. Hakola argues, pp. 72-73, that Hauser was always more the pro­
moter of business than the shrewd manager. However, the evidence of 
Hauser's participation in the hydroelectric business suggests that the 
Montana capitalist's managerial abilities can be debated. Certainly, 
Hauser's earlier economic ventures suffered from his mistakes. None­
theless, his successes and failures in managing the hydroelectric 
business must be qualified by the nature of his opposition. As will be 
shown later, S. T. Hauser competed with a tremendous financial and 
political power in his attempt to control hydroelectric development 
in Montana. A man without S. T. Hauser's full range of business 
abilities could not have succeeded to the degree that he did. 
6. Clark C. Spence, Territorial Politics and Government in 
Montana: 1864-1889 (Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois Press, 1975), 
pp. 122-23. 
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not Helena, its Montana terminus in 1880, Hauser quickly switched his 
efforts toward promoting an east-west line for the Northern Pacific Rail­
way Company. Hauser1s ties to the Northern Pacific Company remained 
strong throughout the 1880s and 1890s, and it was through this bond that 
he was able to construct numerous branch lines to his various mining 
facilities.^ 
S. T. Hauser's financial strength was based upon more than interest 
or investments in railroads and silver mining. For thirty years (1866-
1896), Hauser grounded all of his economic activities on his First 
National Bank of Helena. Hauser's bank, incorporated in 1866, was in­
deed the first national bank established in Montana Territory. Once 
again, Hauser turned to St. Louis capital to fund this institution. He 
also enlisted the support of a number of Montanans in the venture-
establishing a pattern of combining local and outside money that he used 
g 
repeatedly in future enterprises. 
The banking industry in Montana during the later decades of the 
nineteenth century was linked intricately to mining. Banks often re­
ceived silver and gold ores from local mining operators, and shipped 
q 
the raw product to smelters in the eastern United States and Europe. 
Mining ventures were speculative and a bank's lending policies had to be 
7. Hakola, "Samuel T. Hauser," pp. 151-54. Hauser's ties to the 
Northern Pacific Railway Company management remained strong through the 
1890s. 
8. Ibid., pp. 84-85. At various times in his career, S. T. Hauser 
also was interested in irrigation and cattle ranching. He was one of 
the partners in the famous DHS ranch. 
9. Ibid. 
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liberal. As the mining industry expanded and contracted during times 
of economic crisis, so too did Hauser's First National Bank. Indeed, 
it was Hauser's use of bank finances that allowed him to engage in min­
ing activities. It was this same reliance on the First National's credit 
that contributed to that institution's failure in the economic depression 
of 1893-1896. 
Hauser's early career in engineering is perhaps partly responsible 
for his fascination with mining. In addition, his contacts through the 
First National Bank undoubtedly introduced him to the enormous profit 
available in this fledgling enterprise. During his first years in 
Montana, Hauser promoted the silver mining industry in Montana when he 
sponsored construction of a smelter near Argenta in Beaverhead County 
(1866). This premature effort failed in 1867. Undaunted, Hauser led 
his St. Louis and Montana Mining Company directors into investments in 
mines near Philipsburg. It took more than ten years of production to 
realize large gains from the Philipsburg properties, and Hauser received 
few of the profits. Nevertheless, the Montanan's faith in the silver 
mining industry never waned.^ 
Ownership of the First National Bank of Helena introduced Hauser 
to other mining properties in the 1870s and 1880s. The more profitable 
real estate was the Alta and Comet mines at Alta, Montana (in the 
Boulder River Valley south of Helena) and the Montana Company smelting 
10. Hauser decided to sell his stock in the mining company in the 
1870s, at the very time that it was beginning to increase in value. 
His other investments may have necessitated his making this financial 
move. 
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plant at Wickes. Hauser assumed control of this property in 1879 when 
the Montana Company's president, William Wickes, defaulted on loans to 
the First National Bank of Helena.^ Hauser reorganized the company, 
but the mines and smelters continued to lose money. In 1882, Wickes 
resigned as president and Hauser and Daniel C. Corbin assumed full con­
trol. The men formed the Helena Mining and Reduction Company, and 
added an old friend, Anton Holter, and his bank's cashier, T. H. 
12 Kleinschmidt, as directors. 
Despite the reorganization efforts and the construction of a branch 
line of the Northern Pacific Railway Company to Wickes in 1883, the 
Helena Mining and Reduction Company failed to return substantial profits. 
In an attempt to raise profits and to meet growing competition from a 
competing silver smelting company, Hauser once again reorganized the 
Helena Mining Company in 1888. The new corporation, the Helena and 
Livingston Smelting and Reduction Company, became a holding company for 
Hauser's Livingston Coke and Coal Company, the Gregory Consolidated 
Mining Company and the Helena Mining and Reduction Company. That same 
year, Hauser's Helena and Livingston Company opened a new smelter in 
13 East Helena. Fierce competition in the silver smelting industry forced 
the Helena and Livingston Company to sell its new plant to the recently 
11. Hakola, "Samuel T. Hauser," p. 258. Western Mining World, 
September 21, 1895, Vol. 3, No. 53, p. 138. 
12. T. H. Klenschmidt also was the cashier for Hauser's First 
National Bank of Helena. 
13. Hakola, "Samuel T. Hauser," pp. 293-94. See also Western 
Mining World, September 21, 1895, Vol. 3, No. 53, p. 138. 
31 
formed United Smelting and Refining Company in 1890. From that date 
to 1899, Hauser's Helena and Livingston Company retained forty percent 
14 interest in the United States Smelting and Refining Company. 
Samuel T. Hauser's involvement in a wide variety of economic enter­
prises brought him renown as one of the state's ablest business pro­
moters. Similarly, his economic life was tied to political aspirations. 
Hauser, a lifelong Democrat, had been instrumental in gaining territorial 
status for Montana in 1864. As a friend of the influential Missouri 
Senator George Vest, Hauser had standing in the national Democratic 
15 Party. His ability to wield political influence in Montana resulted 
in President Cleveland's appointing him Territorial Governor in 1885. 
S. T. Hauser was at his political and economic peak in 1890. 
With an active interest in Montana's railroads, mines and smelters, he 
entered the last decade of the nineteenth century with confidence. The 
first few years of that decade, however, presented the country, Montana, 
and an optimistic Samuel Hauser with serious economic reversals. Eco­
nomic panic and depression visited the nation in 1893. As confidence 
in the country's financial well-being deteriorated, lending institutions 
began to retrench and to demand their outstanding loans. 
14. In 1899, the East Helena smelter became the property of the 
American Smelting and Refining Company, the newly formed successor to 
the United Smelting and Refining Company. Letter, S. T. Hauser to 
I. Eilers, August 30, 1894, Montana State Historical Society (Helena), 
Archives, MSS #37, Samuel T. Hauser Papers, Box 32, folder 31. Here­
after cited as HP. See also Western Mining World, September 7, 1895, 
Vol. 3, No. 51, and Letters, S. T. Hauser to A. D. Lynch, April 20 and 
December 9, 1899, HP, Box 33, folder 2. The money gained from the sale 
of the smelter was used to repay the debts of the First National Bank 
of Helena. 
15. Spence, Territorial Politics, pp. 159-60. 
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Hauser's First National Bank of Helena was one of the many western 
banks that was summoned to repay its heavy indebtedness. The Helena 
Bank was unable to secure the necessary cash to send east and, amidst 
bank failures throughout the country, closed its doors in July, 1893.^ 
A federal examiner, charged with overseeing Hauser's operation of the 
bank, required the Helena businessman to find a majority of the bank's 
customers who would agree not to demand payment for at least twelve 
months. Hauser solicited aid from one of the bank's largest stock­
holders, E. L. Bonner of Missoula, claiming that, "It does not seem 
possible that my own friends are going to refuse to do what over four 
thousand people have already given their agreement to do."^ To another 
friend, James A. Talbot of Butte, Hauser invoked memories of past support 
in Judge A. J. Davis' political battles. Hauser argued that if Talbot 
and Davis could back him in his efforts to reopen the First National, 
". . . it would enable us to save ourselves from very serious losses; 
and, once opened, I have no doubt that I could get someone to purchase 
the estate stock, or at least assume the responsibility of owning it 
..18 
on some terms. 
These efforts, combined with Hauser's ability to secure personal 
loans from corporate executives, allowed the First National Bank of 
16. Letter, S. T. Hauser to George A. Baker, December 25, 1893, 
HP, Box 32, folder 30. 
17. Letter, S. T. Hauser to E. L. Bonner, December 2, 1893, HP, 
Box 32, folder 30. 
18. Letter, S. T. Hauser to James A. Talbot, September 6, 1893, 
HP, Box 32, folder 30. 
33 
Helena to reopen between 1894 and 1896. The bank floundered once again 
19 
in 1896 and it was forced to close its doors permanently. 
Samuel Hauser's financial difficulties in the 1890s were aggravated 
in another way by the national depression. The federal government's 
large purchases of silver, required by the Silver Purchase Act of 1890, 
merely reinforced a failing industry. In the wake of the Panic of 1893, 
newly-elected Democratic President Grover Cleveland initiated action to 
have Congress repeal the Act of 1890. Hauser commenced a letter writing 
campaign in the late summer of 1893 in a futile effort to win support 
for bimetal ism. Writing to Maryland Senator A. P. Gorman, Hauser claimed 
that: 
Our state produces from forty to fifty million 
dollars in value of metals, copper, silver, lead 
and gold; and our population is only about one 
hundred and fifty thousand; this you see would 
be from three to four hundred dollars per capita 
for our entire population. Destroying the money 
function of silver would absolutely destroy four-
fifths of this entire product. Being a practical 
man you can readily see what a large percentage 
of our people depend upon this industry for a 
living, certainly nine-tenths of them. Conse­
quently we not only have financial distress, 
and men who are worth hundreds of thousands of 
19. Hauser solicited a number of personal loans to cover bank and 
mining debts. In one case, he asked for a re-discount of a personal 
note in order not to report the prohibited transaction to the bank's 
examiner. By 1899, Hauser was endorser for more than $300,000 of the 
First National's debts. Letters, S. T. Hauser to George A. Baker, 
December 25, 1893, HP, Box 32, folder 30; S. T. Hauser to President, 
Shoe and Leather National Bank, September 1, 1894, HP, Box 32, folder 31; 
S. T. Hauser to A. D. Lynch, December 9, 1899, HP, Box 33, folder 2; 
S. T. Hauser to Messrs. Lynch, Willson and Brown, May 31, 1893, HP, 
Box 32, folder 34; A. M. Holter to S. T. Hauser, February 13, 1899, HP, 
Box 26, folder 26; Hauser to Sen. George G. Vest, August 12, 1893, HP, 
Box 32, folder 30. 
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dollars are today paupers, but there will be 
very considerable amount of actual starvation. 0 
Hauser clearly exaggerated his claim of impoverishment for nine-tenths 
of the state's population. Nevertheless, the damage to his own financial 
assets from repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act was dramatic. 
In August, 1893, Hauser wrote to Pennsylvania Senator J. D. Cameron 
explaining that the summer's financial panic and the threat of repeal 
of the Sherman Act had already forced many individuals (including Anton 
21 Holter) to assign much of their property. Writing to Anaconda copper 
magnate Marcus Daly a day later, Hauser argued that: 
Of course the success of silver is not so important 
to you as it is to me. Destroying silver would 
certainly be fatal to all of my interests, hence 
I am very anxious to do all that is possible, and 
believe that you will." 
Despite these entreaties to Daly and to old political allies in Washing­
ton, Hauser was unable to prevent unconditional repeal of the Sherman 
Silver Purchase Act. The nation's adoption of a single gold standard 
23 
for currency in 1894 exacerbated Hauser's financial disaster. 
20. Letter, S. T. Hauser to Sen. A. P. Gorman, September 6, 1893, 
HP, Box 32, folder 30. 
21. Letter, S. T. Hauser to Sen. J. D. Cameron, August 23, 1893, 
HP, Box 32, folder 20. 
22. Letter, S. T. Hauser to Marcus Daly, August 24, 1893, HP, 
Box 32, folder 30. 
23. In a letter to old Missouri friend Senator George G. Vest, 
Hauser explained that three "... mining companies alone were paying 
into the bank about one hundred thousand dollars per month." Letter, 
S. T. Hauser to Sen. George G. Vest, August 12, 1893, HP, Box 32, 
folder 30. 
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The economic reversals that Samuel Hauser faced in 1893 would have 
caused many men to abandon hope of recouping their losses. Instead 
Hauser, as Montana's premiere promoter, sought new challenges in the wake 
of past failures. With a bank under examination and heavy investment in 
a depressed silver market, the indomitable entrepreneurj>repared to enter 
the new field of electrical production. 
Hauser first became interested in electricity during the latf"T880s. 
Always concerned about the scant supply and high cost of coal, he signed 
a contract with the Thomson-Houston Company to erect an electric generat­
ing plant at his Alta mine in 1889. The mine and concentrator at Corbin 
were two of the first such Montana operations to sport not only electric 
24 
lights, but an electric tram and mine hoist. Hauser also considered 
using water power to generate electricity to other mining operations. 
Between 1890 and 1892, his Spokane Farm Company considered producing 
electricity from a dam on McClellan Creek, southeast of Helena. Hauser 
planned to transmit this hydroelectricity to the United Smelting and 
25 
Refining Company's plant at East Helena, but the Panic of 1893 cur­
tailed development in this area. Nevertheless, Hauser optimistically 
remarked to Henry Seligman, a director of his Helena and Livingston 
Smelting and Reduction Company: 
We will undoubtedly put the water power in if 
it becomes evident that the works [US&R Co. 
24. Hauser's concern for a reliable fuel supply caused him to 
organize the Livingston Coke and Coal Company. Hakola, "Samuel T. 
Hauser," pp. 283-85, 300. 
25. Ibid., pp. 211-12. 
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smelter] will continue to run, which I am sure 
they will do. *6 
Little more than two years after the disastrous summer of 1893, Samuel 
Hauser rekindled his plans to apply electricity to the mining industry 
around Helena. 
Hauser's initial plans for electrification were two-fold. He first 
intended to establish an electrical plant at the Peck-Montana Company 
concentrating mill at Corbin, Montana. Hauser estimated that this proj­
ect would require a small electric plant, primarily used to drive the 
Peck concentrator. Another more ambitious scheme was to organize a 
water power company, which, after constructing a large hydroelectric 
facility on the Missouri River, would sell power to the smelting and 
refining plant at East Helena. 
The Peck-Montana Company erected an experimental concentrating 
plant at Corbin in the early 1890s. Investors hoped that the facility 
would demonstrate the feasibility of using the Peck machine on silver 
27 
ore tailings. Both Hauser and hardware salesman Anton Holter invested 
in the Peck-Montana Company. Initial attempts at working the old Alta 
mine tailings proved costly, but Hauser estimated that adding another 
machine to the company's experimental facilitiy would eventually make 
26. Letter, S. T. Hauser to Henry Seligman, August 31, 1893, HP, 
Box 32, folder 30. 
27. The Peck Concentrator, designed by 0. B. Peck, was cone shaped 
and operated on the principle of centrifugal force. Crushed ore pulp 
was fed into the smaller end of the machine and rotated at 600 to 800 
r.p.m. This action forced cleaned concentrates from the larger end. 
Hauser believed that the efficiency of this machine made it particularly 
suitable for working a profit from old talings. See The Engineering and 
Mining Journal, March 31, 1900, pp. 375-76. 
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the venture profitable. He expected the monetary return to be substantial 
if the new plant were equipped with electric motors. Hauser reasoned 
that if electricity were applied to four machines at the Peck-Montana 
works, the power would cost only $139 per day as opposed to $227 per day 
28 with direct steam power cost. 
Hauser implemented his plan to provide water-power generated elec­
tricity to the new Peck Company plant in March, 1896. Having secured 
the necessary water rights on Prickly Pear Creek near the Corbin mill for 
$3,000, he contracted with W. J. Chalmers of Chicago for the necessary 
29 water power machinery and pipe for the hydroelectric facility. Con­
tracts stipulated that construction of the new plant was to be completed 
by July, 1896. Inexplicable delays in the delivery -of equipment prevented 
the plant from starting operation until November of that year. Once in 
production, however, the new electrically driven Peck concentrator proved 
30 satisfactory to Hauser and to his associates. 
S. T. Hauser initiated his second venture during that spring of 
1896. He proposed to United Smelting and Refining Company executives 
that they enter into a joint venture with the Peck-Montana Company and 
the Helena Electric Railway and Light Company to construct a dam across 
28. Letter, S. T. Hauser to Henry Seligman, March 4, 1896, HP, 
Box 32, folder 33, and Agreement, Peck-Montana Co. and S. T. Hauser, 
March 30, 1896, HP, Box 25, folder 4. 
29. Letter, S. T. Hauser to Henry Seligman, March 4, 1896, HP, 
Box 32, folder 33. 
30. Letters, S. T. Hauser to W. J. Chalmers, August 5, 1896, and 
S. T. Hauser to Henry Seligman, November 18, 1896, HP Letterpress Books, 
Box 36, December 13, 1898-January 20, 1901. 
the Missouri River at Canyon Ferry, approximately twelve miles north­
east of Helena. New York financier Abram S. Hewitt's United Smelting 
and Refining Company would be required to advance the majority capital 
in return for a guaranteed cheap source of power and a substantial in­
terest in the power company. In addition, Hauser proposed that the 
Peck-Montana Company erect a new concentrating plant adjacent to United 
Smelting Company's smelter in East Helena. Hauser reasoned that the 
Peck machine's demonstrated ability to work tailings at the Corbin 
plant would allow him to contract for silver tailings from the Rimini 
District. He anticipated that the application of cheap electric hydro­
electric power to the smelter and concentrator would insure a substan-
31 
tial profit from both companies. 
In April, 1896, Hauser and representatives of the Hewitt interests 
formulated plans for the hydro-powered installation. The parties agreed 
that the new dam would produce 4,000 horsepower upon completion; its 
eventual capacity was anticipated to be 6,000 horsepower. Most of the 
available current was destined for the United Smelting and Refining 
Company's smelter in East Helena, but sufficient quantities were to be 
reserved for the operation of the Peck-Montana's new concentrator. The 
remainder of the electric power was scheduled for transmission to the 
city of Helena for use in the city's electric works, and to the 
31. Hauser's initial experiements with electricity proved expen­
sive. Nevertheless, he believed that the suitability of that power 
source to the Peck Concentrator would be demonstrated eventually. 
Letter, S. T. Hauser to Henry Seligman, November 18, 1896, HP Letter­
press Books, Box 36, December 13, 1898-January 20, 1901. 
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Peck-Montana Company plant at Corbin. 
The Helena Water and Electric Power Company, incorporated in May, 
1896, reflected the interests of the respective mining firms. S. T. 
Hauser and Henry Seligman, of the Peck-Montana and Helena and Livingston 
Companies, and Abram Hewitt, W. S. Gurnee and Barton Sewell, of the 
United Smelting and Refining Company, formed the new power company's 
33 
directorate. During the sunnier of that year, the Helena Water and 
Electric Power Company applied to the Secretary of War for a permit to 
construct a dam at Black Rock Canyon (Canyon Ferry) on the Missouri 
River. The Secretary replied that, "It is understood by the Department 
that the river at the point is not navigable in fact," and authorized 
the Montana company to erect its obstruction in the river.^ 
By the end of 1896, S. T. Hauser had not only the Secretary of 
War's approval for a dam on the Missouri River, but enough funds to con-
35 struct the dam and to erect the concentrator in East Helena. The 
32. "Prospectus for Company," April 29, 1896, HP, Box 62, folder 
42; "Agreement," 1896, HP, Box 63, folder 1; letter, S. T. Hauser to 
James H. Eckels, December 30, 1896, HP, Box 32, folder 33. The Peck-
Montana Company was to give a rebate on ores to the United Smelting and 
Refining Company. Letter, 0. B. Peck to S. T. Hauser, June 13, 1896. 
33. "Prospectus," April 29, 1896, and Carl M. Westby, Jr., "Canyon 
Ferry: Placer Gold to Power Dam" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Missoula, 
Montana: Montana State University, 1954), p. 146. 
34. Letter, Secretary of War Abram S. Hewitt. September 18, 1896, 
Montana State Historical Society (Helena), Archives, MSS #13, Federal 
Power Commission Records, Box 4, folder 6. Hereafter cited as FPC. 
35. Letter, S. T. Hauser to James H. Eckels, December 30, 1896, 
HP, Box 32, folder 33. 
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financial failure of 1893 seemed remote and the future appeared full of 
promise. 
In February of the following year, however, Hauser encountered 
difficulties with the United Smelting and Refining Company's executives 
at the Helena smelter. Plant manager W. H. Aldridge disputed Hauser's 
estimate of the profitability of a Peck machine at East Helena, claiming 
that the Corbin Plant was not nearly as successful as the ex-Governor 
represented it to be. Since Hauser needed money from the United Smelt­
ing Company to finance this new plant, Aldridge urged his corporate 
bosses to consider seriously the benefits of the Peck machine. 
There are any number of good men whose report may 
be relied on, and who can examine and determine 
once and for all, whether this machine is a success 
or not. If it is not, and the plant at East Helena 
is likely to be a failure, Mr. Gurnee should cer­
tainly be made aware of this, and the United Company 
withdraw its support and encouragement. It is wrong 
for the Company or for Mr. Gurnee to advance money 
for any enterprise which it starts in by believing 
it to be a fake. There are enough monuments of 
Gov. Hauser's folly in this country now. without 
putting up another one at East Helena.3d 
Aldridge explained that Hauser was always enthusiastic in promoting 
ventures similar to the one then under consideration. He cautioned that 
none of the Hauser people should be relied upon to give a true represen-
37 
tation of the successes and failures of the Peck machine. 
S. T. Hauser received copies of Manager Aldridge's lengthy letter 
to the United Smelting and Refining Company executive board. Since the 
36. Letter, W. H. Aldridge to Barton Sewell, February 9, 1897, HP, 
Box 32, folder 33. 
37. Ibid. See also W. H. Aldridge to Barton Sewell, February 19, 
1897, HP, Box 25, folder 39. 
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company's support of the Missouri River dam was tied intricately to the 
new Peck mill at East Helena, Hauser feared that skepticism of one ven-
38 
ture would hurt the other. In a detailed letter to Director Abram 
Hewitt, Hauser restated to the Board his faith in the benefit of using 
the Peck machine to work the Rimini ores. He claimed that he had re­
ceived a further endorsement from the Peck investors in Chicago as to 
the reliability of this device. Hauser also explained that the Peck-
Montana Company stood to make no direct monetary return from the rework­
ing of the Rimini tailings, but expected to profit from the royalties 
it would receive on each ton of ore that was concentrated. Hauser re­
minded Hewitt that it had been the United Company that had urged the 
construction of a new complex that would utilize more of the power pro­
duced by the Helena Water and Electric Power Company generating plant. 
Hauser now claimed that he had been leery of it all the time. Neverthe­
less, the Helenan repeated his assertion that . . we have made tests 
of the Rimini ore; that I have these reports with me, and that I can 
duplicate them indefinitely; . . . and that we can work them successfully 
39 as proposed." 
38. In 1896, Hauser expressed his concern to W. J. Chalmers that 
the electrical plant at Corbin not be delaved. The reason for this concern was 
that Hauser wanted to demonstrate the benefits of using electricity on 
the Peck machine. He hoped that this effort would support his enter­
prises on the Missouri River. Letter, S. T. Hauser to W. J. Chalmers, 
August 5, 1896, HP Letterpress Books, Box 36, Dec. 13, 1898-Jan. 20, 
1901. 
39. Hauser's activities during 1896 indicate that he was equally 
enthusiastic about the Peck plant at East Helena. Letter, S. T. Hauser 
to Abram Hewitt, April 11, 1897, HP, Box 32, folder 34. 
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Abram Hewitt, W. S. Gurnee and other executives of the United 
Smelting and Refining Company may have been suspect of the Peck machine, 
especially when the Corbin plant had to close temporarily in April, 
1897. Nonetheless, the United Company had a tremendous investment in 
the Missouri River power development; it was unlikely that the firm 
would abandon S. T. Hauser even if the Peck-Montana Company proved to 
be a failure. In July, 1897, Hauser reported to 0. R. Allen, manager 
of the Helena and Livingston Smelter and Reduction Company plant at 
Corbin, that the United Company had voted unanimously to complete the 
40 
dam and to fund the Peck concentrator in East Helena. 
Construction began on the Peck plant in November, 1897. Ten months 
later, it was complete and awaiting the extension of a power line from 
Canyon Ferry. The twenty-nine foot high timber crib dam at Canyon 
Ferry was scheduled for completion before the Peck concentrator. High 
water in the late spring of 1898 caused some minor damage to the struc­
ture, however, and the dam's engineer, N. L. Cooper, could not finish 
it until October, 1898.^ 
Completion of the Canyon Ferry Dam on the Missouri River and the 
Peck-Montana Company plant at East Helena temporarily satisfied S. T. 
Hauser. He remarked that: 
40. Letter, S. T. Hauser to 0. R. Allen, July 16, 1897, HP, 
Box 32, folder 34. 
41. Letters, S. T. Hauser to A. J. Davis, March 26, 1898, HP 
Letterpress Books, HP, Box 36, Dec. 13, 1898-Jan. 20, 1901; S. T. Hauser 
to W. J. Chalmers, Sept. 26, 1898, HP Letterpress Books, Box 36, Dec. 13, 
1898-Jan. 20, 1901; W. A. Clark to S. T. Hauser, June 25, 1898, HP, 
Box 25, folder 38; S. T. Hauser to W. A. Clark, June 24, 1898, HP Letter­
press Books, Box 36, Dec. 13, 1898-Jan. 20, 1901. 
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I can only add that it verifies what I so long 
contended, that by working large quantities the 
Peck machine can and will make good interest on 
large capital, provided they can have cheat) 
power, which I have succeeded in securing.^ 
Two years later, a reporter for a national engineering and mining jour­
nal commented that credit was certainly due Hauser for maintaining his 
43 faith in the Peck concentrator despite repeated, costly failures. 
Hauser's momentary triumph did not allay the criticism of numerous 
skeptics. Writing to Northern Pacific Railway Company President C. S. 
Mellen in 1899, Hauser tried to dismiss rumors of the machine's failures 
that had come to Mellen via "some of your subordinates who were pre-
44 
judiced or misinformed." Hauser stated that the concentrator had 
successfully worked more than 70,000 tons of ore that could not have 
been smelted otherwise. He added that the Peck machine had just begun 
to work the Rimini ore and that this would prove an even greater profit. 
Striking for the economic heart of Mellen, Hauser claimed that the Peck 
mill provided twenty-five percent of the ores smelted at the United 
plant and that this supply undoubtedly raised the freight revenue of 
the railway company. Hauser optimistically predicted that "there is 
42. Letter, S. T. Hauser to Thomas A. Banning, November 20, 1898, 
HP Letterpress Books, Box 36, Dec. 13, 1898-Jan. 20, 1901. 
43. The Engineering and Mining Journal, March 31, 1900, p. 375. 
Other Montana mining magazines praised the important events at East 
Helena. For example, see Western Mining World, January 2, 1897, Vol. 6, 
No. 120, p. 17, and January 16, 1897, Vol. 6, No. 122, p. 51. See 
also John Herron, "Address Before the Montana Society of Civil Engineers," 
Association of Engineering Societies, March, 1897, Vol. 18, No. 3, 
p. 146. 
44. Letter, S. T. Hauser to C. S. Mellen, December 2, 1899, HP, 
Box 33, folder 2. 
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every reasonable probability that we will have to double or treble the 
45 
plant to be able to handle the ore that will be mined in this vicinity." 
By 1898, S. T. Hauser had attained his goal of constructing the 
Peck concentrator in East Helena and the first hydroelectric facility 
on the Missouri River at Canyon Ferry. He also had successfully linked 
the United Smelting and Refining Company's economic interest to the new 
application of electric power. Soon after these facilities were operat­
ing (1900), the United Company reorganized into the American Smelting 
and Refining Company, and S. T. Hauser ended his active interest in the 
former business. At the same time, he encountered difficulties in se­
curing enough profit to keep the Peck concentrator open, and turned his 
attention from that operation and devoted himself fully to promoting 
the electric power industry. 
In October, 1900, Hauser reorganized the Helena Water and Electric 
Power Company and formed the Missouri River Power Company. While the 
American Smelting and Refining Company, as successor to the United 
Company, retained a financial interest in the Missouri River Power 
Company, it was Hauser's old Helena Livingston Smelting and Reduction 
Company that controlled the largest block of the new power company's 
stock. Consequently, Samuel Hauser became president of the Missouri 
River Power Company, appointing M. H. Gerry as his chief engineer and 
general manager.^® As the head of the new enterprise, Hauser emphasized 
45. Ibid. 
46. Letters, S. T. Hauser to T. A. Marlow, March 15, 1901, and 
S. T. Hauser to W. A. Clark, October 26, 1901, HP, Box 33, folder 2. 
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his commitment to expanding electric service by negotiating with the 
Northern Pacific Railway Company for a transmission line right-of-way to , 
the mining center of Butte. He completed the 66,000 volt transmission 
~ 47 line in 1901. During the same period, Hauser projected an expansion 
of Canyon Ferry Dam. 
The Missouri River Power Company's objective in this expansion was 
to supply electric power to the rapidly developing mining industry in 
the Butte/Anaconda area. One independent report to a New York banking 
institution that had financial interest in Hauser's economic affairs 
commented on the marketing goals of the Missouri River Company. 
The business of the Missouri River Power Company 
is to generate and sell electric power in large 
units only. The Company does not have to seek a 
market. It accepts only business of the kind it 
prefers. For example, while the Butte Railway 
& Electric Light Co. has been writing to ask for 
power, the Missouri River Power Company, having 
the opportunity of contracting with a score of 
companies that use power, wisely reserves its 
contracts for those customers that use the cur­
rent most uniformly, such as the smelters and 
the mines that use current for their blowers or 
air condensers and their pumps.48 
This investigator added that the Missouri River Power Company's future 
was impressive and that previously published reports on its prospects 
47. Letters, S. T. Hauser to J. N. Hannaford, May 21, 1900, HP, 
Box 33, folder 2; S. T. Hauser to Henry Blakely, October 30, 1900, HP 
Letterpress Books, HP, Box 36, Dec. 13, 1898-Jan. 20, 1901; Hauser also 
planned to expand facilities at the Canyon Ferry power plant. Letter, 
M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, July 27, 1901, HP, Box 27, folder 7. See 
also Max Hebgen, "Hydroelectric Development in Montana," p. 793. 
48. Letter, Rufus Waples to J. W. Seligman and Co., April 10, 1901, 
HP, Box 27, folder 14. 
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were "unusually conservative." 
Samuel Hauser's foresight and ambition had driven him, in less than 
five years, to the leadership of an industry with enormous economic 
potential. He had rebounded from financial ruin and had made plans to 
expand his electrical interests throughout central Montana. 
A number of out-of-state investors assisted S. T. Hauser in pro­
motion of his water power properties. Barton Sewell, general manager 
of the United Smelting and Refining Company, had been associated with 
Hauser and the Helena and Livingston Company's mining properties for 
many years. In February, 1896, when Hauser itfas searching for financial 
support for his dam, Sewell wrote the ex-Governor offering to "do every-
50 thing I can in reference to the proposed water power." Henry Villard, 
at that time president of the Northern Pacific Railway Company, joined 
Sewell in sponsoring the project by loaning Samuel Hauser $25,000 with 
which to purchase stock in the Helena Water and Electric Power Company. 
Leading all interests in encouraging Hauser was the firm of Albert 0. 
Seligman, former Montana mine promoter and territorial legislator. 
Seligman's New York City banking house had considerable interest in the 
Helena and Livingston Smelting and Reduction Company. Since this company 
owned the largest share of stock in the water power company, Seligman had 
49. Ibid. 
50. Letter, Barton Sewell to S. T. Hauser, February 17/ 1896, 
HP, Box 25, folder 7. 
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an understandable concern for the progress of the dam project. 
Montanans also backed S. T. Hauser in the new power enterprises. 
Anton M. Holter was an old supporter of Hauser who had joined the ex-
Governor in various investment schemes. Holter was part owner in the 
Helena Electric Railway Company and had a keen interest in the applica­
tion of electricity to commercial businesses. Anton Holter was one of 
the earliest investors in Hauser's Missouri River Power Company and con­
tinued his interest in that firm through the first decade of the twen-
52 tieth century. 
Samuel Hauser's most important ally in the power project, and one 
that he spent a good deal of time courting, was William A. Clark. The 
Clark/Hauser relationship began during Montana's early territorial days. 
Both men had come to the region during the 1860s and had turned from 
speculative mining ventures in Bannack to more assured commercial en­
deavors. Clark and Hauser joined each other briefly in a banking firm 
in Deer Lodge in 1872. Clark, however, abandoned the cause of national 
banking when he became interested in mining properties in Butte and 
opened a private bank in that community in 1878. Politically, Hauser 
51. Letter, S. T. Hauser to H. Villard, May 2, 1896, HP, Box 32, 
folder 33. Hauser wrote repeatedly to Henry Seligman in New York 
advising him on the progress of the project. 
52. Anton Holter had been chiefly responsible for developing the 
silver mines at Elkhorn, Montana. He also sold mining machinery at his 
hardware store in Helena. Holter owned 15,000 shares of the Missouri 
River Power Company. See Letter, S. T. Hauser to Charles Clark, 
August 29, 1900, HP Letterpress Books, Box 36, Dec. 13, 1898-Jan. 20, 
1901; and Michael Maione and Richard Roeder» Montana: A History of Two 
Centuries (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976), p. 144. 
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and Clark were strong Democrats whd spent time and money promoting the 
town of Helenr during the capital fight of 1894. During William A. 
Clark's unsuccessful attempt to retain his ill-gotten United States 
Senate seat in 1899, S. T. Hauser journeyed to Washington, D.C. to 
testify in defense of his friend.®"* 
Hauser secured W. A. Clark's support in the dam-building enterprise 
in two ways. The transmission of power from Canyon Ferry Dam required 
a considerable amount of copper wire* and Hauser went to one of Clark's 
Butte copper companies to purchase the necessary material. His interest 
peaked, Clark contributed $50,000 to the formation of the Helena Water 
and Electric Power Company. When Hauser proposed expanding his power 
facilities to serve the Butte/Anaconda market, he again turned to then 
Senator William Clark for additional copper wire. Hauser also facili­
tated the flow of Clark's money into the power company's coffers by 
negotiating favorable contracts for the delivery of electricity to the 
senator's mines and smelter in Butte. In 1900, Hauser concluded an 
agreement with Clark to furnish power to the Butte Reduction Works, the 
54 Butte Electric Railway, and the Original, Stewart, and Colusa mines. 
53. Michael Leeson, History of Montana (Chicago, 1886), pp. 1326-
1327; C. B. Glasscock, The War of the Copper Kings: Builders of Butte 
and Wolves of Wall Street (New York: Grosset and Dun!ap, 1935), p. 190; 
Hakola, "Samuel T. Hauser," p. 105. 
54. Letters: S. T. Hauser to W. A. Clark, June 24, 1898, HP Letter­
press Books, Box 36, Dec. 13, 1898-Jan. 20, 1901; W. A. Clark to S. T. 
Hauser, June 25, 1898, HP, Box 25, folder 38; S. T. Hauser to Harvey 
Barbour, March 10, 1898, HP, Box 32, folder 33; "Agreement," August 4, 
1900, HP, Box 63, folder 4; S. T. Hauser to H. H. Rogers, August 31, 
1901, HP Letterpress Books, Box 36, Dec. 13, 1898-Jan. 20, 1901; S. T. 
Hauser to Charles W. Clark, August 29, 1900, Letterpress Books, Box 36, 
Dec. 13, 1898-Jan. 20, 1901. 
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Missouri River Power Company President Hauser continued to press 
W. A. Clark for financial support during the years immediately following 
1900. Unfortunately, Clark's election to the United States Senate in 
1901 and his subsequent settlement of difficulties with the Amalgamated 
55 
Copper Company directed his attention elsewhere. In the senator's 
absences, Hauser's general manager, M. H. Gerry, had to negotiate with 
Clark's agent, A. H. Wethey. 
Gerry and Wethey did not agree on the suitability of hydroelectric 
power for mine equipment. Wethey advised Clark that the senator could 
not rely on water power produced electricity, since there would be a 
power deficiency at times of low water. Gerry retorted that Clark's 
plants were receiving power from a small hydroelectric facility on the 
Big Hole River on a day-to-day basis without a seeming concern for 
whether or not the service would be interrupted. Neither Gerry nor 
Hauser saw any reason why Clark and Wethey could not patronize the 
Missouri River Power Company. Clark responded to the Missouri River men 
that his contract with the Big Hole firm (the first Montana Power Company) 
ran for a number of months. When that obligation ended, he would give 
preference to the Missouri River Power Company. Clark added that, "It 
would be well for Mr. Gerry to get a little better acquainted with the 
56 
facts in the case before criticizing Mr. Wethey." 
55. A seeming ally of F. Augustus Heinze and opponent of the copper 
trust during the state elections of 1900, Clark broke with the Butte 
renegade soon after the election tally. After his election to the U.S. 
Senate, Clark spent less and less time in Montana. 
56. Letter, W. A. Clark to S. T. Hauser, March 26, 1902, HP, Box 27, 
folder 26. See also Letters, W. A. Clark to S. T. Hauser, April 15, 1902, 
July 13, 1902, July 15, 1902, HP, Box 27, folder 26. 
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Despite these minor personality and business conflicts, Hauser and 
Clark remained on the best of terms. W. A. Clark's financial interest 
in the Missouri River Power Company, and subsequent Hauser-operated 
power companies, remained substantial. While Clark represented Montana 
in the United States Senate (1901-1907), Hauser frequently requested 
his friend to intercede on the company's behalf with the Department of 
the Interior.®^ 
Samuel Hauser required the encouragement and the financial support 
of his various associates to promote his electric generating companies. 
Without their money and the exercise of their respective influences, 
he would not have been able to proceed with either the construction and 
enlargement of Canyon Ferry Dam or the extension of a high voltage trans­
mission line to Butte. By demonstrating a continued faith in the strength 
of the state's economy, Hauser welded his and other capitalists' percep­
tions of the possibilities of electric generation into an effective power 
enterprise. 
Hauser understood that that strength depended upon the continued 
economic growth of Montana's mining industry. In addition to the support 
of his numerous associates, the Helena power promoter needed to capture 
the interest and financial backing of the state's newest mining conglom­
erate, the Amalgamated Copper Company. 
57. Letters, S. T. Hauser to C. S. Mellen, September 25, 1901, HP, 
Box 33, folder 4; S. T. Hauser to Charles W. Clark, August 20, 1900, 
HP Letterpress Books, Box 36, Dec. 13, 1898-Jan. 20, 1901; W. A. Clark 
to S. T. Hauser, March 22, 1906, HP, Box 28, folder 3; W. A. Clark to 
Hauser, February 9, 1906, HP, Box 28, folder 33. 
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Amalgamated*s Montana roots were in the first efforts of Marcus 
Daly to develop copper mines in the territory. Daly's initial forays 
into the Butte mining center in the 1870s convinced him that the future 
of that area was in copper, not silver. He convinced fellow investors 
George Hearst, James Ben Ali Haggin, and Lloyd Tevis of the accuracy of 
these findings and, with their help, formed the Anaconda Copper Mining 
Company in the early 1880s. The Anaconda Company's copper reduction 
works and giant Washoe Smelter, constructed in 1884 at Anaconda, Montana, 
symbolized the primacy of the company in the nation's copper mining 
industry. 
Marcus Daly and his investors from California were not the only 
persons who were interested in the^copperlodes of Butte. Boston capi­
talists, having reaped large profits from the Michigan copper mining 
regions, turned their collective attentions to the mineral areas of 
58 
Montana in the 1890s. Henry H. Rogers, Thomas Lawson and other offi­
cials of one of the nation's largest corporations, the Standard Oil 
Company, also cast a speculative eye towards the Butte/Anaconda area. 
Rogers, who may have become interested in copper from his associa­
tions with Back Bay mining tycoons, began negotiating with Marcus Daly 
59 
for the Anaconda properties in 1898. According to contemporary ac­
counts, Rogers was a kind and engaging fellow to both his friends and 
58. The Butte and Boston Consolidated Mining Company and the 
Boston and Montana Mining Company are the best examples of investment in 
Montana by Boston capitalists. Maione and Roeder, Montana, pp. 157-58. 
59. Glasscock, War of the Copper Kings, pp. 205-06. 
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to those he sought to influence. But he was also one of the nation's 
leading businessmen and had succeeded John 0. Rockefeller to the presi­
dency of Standard Oil because of an ability to squeeze the last ounce 
of profit from a dollar's investment.^ 
Rogers and Standard Oil Company concluded their negotiations with 
Daly, Haggin, and Tevis in 1899. The Amalgamated Copper Company was 
formed soon after the sale to act as a holding company for the Anaconda 
properties. Marcus Daly was the copper trust's first president and, on 
his death in 1900, Henry Rogers rose to the Amalgamated's presidency. 
At that point, Rogers was engaged in his famous copper war with F. 
Augustus Heinze. His immediate objective was to wrest control of the 
Butte mines from the flamboyant Heinze and in so doing to consolidate 
all copper production in Montana under the leadership of Amalgamated. 
S. T. Hauser considered the Amalgamated Copper Company to be one 
of the largest potential customers for electricity in the state. The 
copper trust, having purchased fifteen percent of the Missouri River 
Power Company in 1900, also was a likely source of capital for the Butte 
61 
transmission line and the enlargement of Canyon Ferry Dam. Hauser 
pursued both goals in his 1901 campaign to enlist the support of Henry 
H. Rogers and his copper company. 
Hauser initially directed his efforts towards securing the necessary 
funds from Rogers to complete the transmission line and dam project. He 
60. Ibid., pp. 202-03. 
61. Letter, S. T. Hauser to William SealIon, March 2, 1901, HP, 
Box 33, folder 4. 
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argued that raising the height of Canyon Ferry would increase the 
Missouri River Power Company's power transmission from 3,000 h.p. to 
9,000 h.p. Claiming support in these estimates from Amalgamated and 
American Smelting and Refining Company engineers, Hauser explained that 
these men were contemplating electrifying their companies' plants. 
H. H. Rogers, acting upon the strength of these reports and the value of 
Amalgamated's interest in the Missouri River company, agreed to loan 
C O  
Hauser $75,000 to complete the power company's expansion. 
Rogers' support of the two projects was critical to Hauser's ability 
to continue construction in 1901. The Helena power promoter failed, 
however, to convince H. H. Rogers to commit himself immediately to 
Hauser's other proposal—construction of a second Missouri River dam. 
Hauser planned to erect his second dam eighteen miles below the 
Canyon Ferry plant. Early in March, 1901, he attempted to interest 
Rogers and Amalgamated in the project. In a letter to Amalgamated's 
top official in Butte, William SealIon, Hauser proposed contructing 
the new facility if the copper company would take additional power and 
would double its investment in the Missouri River Power Company. Seal Ion 
was leery of the Missouri River's ability to furnish enough water for 
two hydroelectric facilities so close together and he recommended to 
Rogers that he withhold approval of any agreement until an independent 
investigation of the project could be made. An investigation of the 
Canyon Ferry plant and the new dam site., conducted during the spring of 
62. Letter, S. T. Hauser to H. H. Rogers, March 21, 1905, HP, 
Box 33, folder 8. Also see letter, S.T. Hauser, February 4, 1901, HP, 
Box 33, folder 4. 
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1901, confirmed Scallon's suspicions. Consequently, Rogers informed 
Hauser that the necessary funds for construction of the new power plant 
would have to await proof of the Missouri River eompany's ability to 
CO 
transmit constant power from its present facility. 
Despite this rebuff, S. T. Hauser continued his efforts to commit 
Rogers and Amalgamated to the new dam project. Hauser argued that hydro­
electric power was decidedly more economical to the mining company than 
steam power, the former costing only $88 to $90 per horsepower per annum 
and the latter $150. Countering the argument that making the necessary 
equipment conversion to electricity would be overly expensive, Hauser 
explained that, "... you will also find that we can furnish you the 
power at a rate that will save you, each and every year, the entire cost 
64 
of installing the power and making the change." Taking up the elec­
trical cudgel, General Manager M. H. Gerry informed Hauser that one min­
ing engineer at the Amalgamated Company wanted electricity instead of 
65 
steam power in order to reduce the temperatures in mine shafts. 
63. Letters, S. T. Hauser to Board of Directors, H. & L. S. & R. 
Co., July 12, 1901, HP Letterpress Books, Box 36, Dec. 13, 1898-Jan. 20, 
1901; S. T. Hauser to Clark, Dodge and Co., April 16, 1901, HP, Box 33, 
folder 4; S. T. Hauser to Barton Sewell, July 24, 1901, HP Letterpress 
Books, Box 36, Dec. 13, 1898-Jan. 20, 1901; S. T. Hauser to Barton 
Sewell, July 19, 1901, HP Letterpress Books, Box 36, Dec. 13, 1898-
Jan. 20, 1901; S. T. Hauser to William Scallon, March 2, 1901, HP, 
Box 33, folder 4. 
64. Letter, S. T. Hauser to B. B. Thayer, May 10, 1904, HP, Box 33, 
folder 7. See also S. T. Hauser to H. H. Rogers, June 24, 1903, HP, 
Box 33, folder 6. 
65. Letter, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, February 27, 1905, HP, 
Box 28, folder 4. 
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Gerry discovered one reason for the Amalgamated Company's reluctance 
to jump wholeheartedly into Hauser's venture, when he suggested that the 
copper trust's ownership of coal mines prevented the company from con­
verting immediately to hydroelectricity. He warned Hauser that Amalga­
mated would eventually realize the savings in electricity, but that their 
commitment to coal properties would delay their decision to convert. 
In view of these conditions the maintaining of 
certain coal properties on a narrow margin of 
profit will not ultimately prevent the applica­
tion of electricity power, but it may, of course, 
tend to delay it. and that is what confronts us 
at the present."® 
S. T. Hauser's sale of Helena and Livingston Smelting and Reduction 
Company stock to H. H. Rogers in 1903 partially contributed to Amalga-
matedlsjrefusaT to back fully the electrical ventures. That sale in­
cluded an interest in coal properties from which the copper company in­
tended to supply its smelters. When the coal from these properties 
proved less desirable than expected, Amalgamated officials decided in 
1905 to liquidate the coal company for what was owed the copper firm in 
undelivered fuel. Hauser, ironically, was caught in the middle of this 
decision. On the one hand, the failure to provide adequate coking coal 
underscored his claims of the value of electricity; yet, Amalgamated's 
change to that power source deflated the value of his coal properties.®^ 
66. Ibid. 
67. Letter, S. T. Hauser to H. H. Rogers, June 24, 1903, HP, Box 
33, folder 6. Hauser wrote to Rogers in November stating that, "You will 
probably know of this program in a general way [closing out the coal com­
pany] which on its face seems fair, but in fact would not be, and in my 
opinion would be unjust to my associates, and ultimately work injury to 
your Company." Letter, S. T. Hauser to H. H. Rogers, November 15, 1905, 
HP, Box 33, folder 8. 
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Samuel Hauser's promotion of competing power sources may have caused 
him temporary embarrassment, but his commitment to the construction of 
the second Missouri River dam did not wane. During the winter of 1905, 
Hauser developed a plan to finance the plant through a newly-formed com­
pany, the Helena Power Transmission Company. This firm was owned and 
controlled by the stockholders of the Missouri River Power Company. 
Hauser estimated that the Helena Power Transmission Company could finance 
the new dam for approximately $700,000, Extension of a transmission line 
from the Missouri River company's Butte substation to Amalgamated's new 
Washoe Works at Anaconda would require an additional $100,000. Hauser 
proposed to H. H. Rogers and to Amalgamated that they provide the financ­
ing for this construction program and in return, the copper company would 
receive a contract for electric power that was substantially lower than 
the price it paid for steam power. Rogers would benefit doubly through 
his interest in the Helena and Livingston Company which still owned 
68 
forty percent of the Missouri River Power Company. 
By 1905, H. H. Rogers and other Amalgamated officials were convinced 
that the application of electricity to the Butte and Anaconda plants was 
both feasible and profitable. Dispelling their cautious behavior of four 
years previous, they eagerly agreed to finance Hauser's companies. In 
May, 1905, Rogers concluded an agreement with Hauser for a personal loan 
of $750,000. Hauser raised the ante a few days later, and Rogers amended 
the agreement to provide an additional $150,000. This increased funding 
68. Letters, S: T. Hauser to H. H. Rogers, March 21, 1905, and 
March 27, 1905, HP, Box 33/ folder 8. 
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allowed the Helena Power Transmission Company to construct a coal-fired, 
69 steam-powered auxiliary plant in Butte. 
Agents of Amalgamated evidenced an equally tough bargaining stance 
when they exacted a power contract from M. H. Gerry, reducing the annual 
charge from $50 to $40 per horsepower. In addition, the new contract 
had a provision holding the power company libel for non-performance. It 
was this clause in the contract that would cause S. T. Hauser difficul­
ties three years later.^ 
During the spring and early summer of 1905, S. T. Hauser and M. H. 
Gerry exchanged correspondence concerning the selection of a site for 
the new dam. The original location required construction of a forty-one 
foot high dam with a capacity to generate 8,000 horsepower. Gerry con­
vinced Hauser that this amount of electricity was not sufficient to meet 
the increased requests for power. With 17,000 horsepower contracted for 
sale in July, 1905, Gerry reasoned that the electrical production of the 
old dam (Canyon Ferry), the new dam(Hauser), and double the size of the 
steam plant in Butte would be necessary to meet the demand.^ The gen­
eral manager proposed a new site for the second dam that was four miles 
69. Letters, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, April 21, 1905, and S. T. 
Hauser to H. H. Rogers, May 17, 1905, HP, Box 33, folder 8; H. H. Rogers 
to S. T. Hauser, May 24, 1905, HP, Box 28, folder 7; "Agreement Between 
H. H. Rogers and S. T. Hauser," May 12, 1905, HP, Box 63, folder 5. 
70. M. H. Gerry admitted to Hauser that, "I would have preferred 
leaving out this clause, but it is really of very little moment." 
Letter, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, May 3, 1905, HP, Box 28, folder 24. 
71. "Extract From Letter to Hon. W. A. Clark," April 10, 1905, 
HP, Box 33, folder 8, and Letter, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, May 27, 
1905, HP, Box 28, folder 24. 
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downstream from the original location. Hauser accepted this recommenda­
tion and, by October, 1905, had received authorization from the Secretary 
72 
of War to construct Hauser Dam. 
The power company president reported to H. H. Rogers in late 
October, 1905, that the Helena Power Transmission Company's sixty-five 
foot high dam would have a generating capacity of 18,000 horsepower. 
Completion of the new plant, and the increased power available from 
Canyon Ferry, and the steam-powered auxiliary plant at Butte, would. 
give the power companies a total supply of 24,000 intermittent and con-
^tant horsepower. Hauser explained to Rogers that the second dam would 
be constructed of concrete and steel as opposed to the previous timber 
and crib dam. The larger size of the new dam and plant, its steel con­
struction, and the increased cost of the new site had driven the cost of 
the facility from $800,000 to nearly $1,000,000. Gerry admitted to 
Hauser that the cost of a steel dam increased the price by $30,000, but 
he claimed that it would "... have nearly twice the factor of safety, 
73 
and can be completed within at least four months less time." The time 
consideration was of particular importance to a financially strapped 
Samuel Hauser. 
Hauser Dam required little more than one year to construct. It was 
operational by January, 1907. Hauser wrote to W. A. Clark explaining 
72. "Authorization," October 29, 1905, FPC, Box 9, folder 14. 
Letter, S. T. Hauser to Board of Directors, July 10, 1905» HP, Box 33, 
folder 8. 
73. Letter, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, October 9, 1905, HP, 
Box 28, folder 21. 
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that there had been a six-month delay in completing the plant, but that 
he believed that it was "... beyond question [that] we have the most 
durable and substantial dam in the entire country (rock, steel, and 
cement)."7^ 
S. T. Hauser did not plan to end his hydroelectric expansion with 
completion of his second dam. While that facility was under construc­
tion during the spring of 1906, the power promoter advocated formation 
of yet another electric generating firm. This new company, entitled 
the United Missouri River Power Company, was incorporated under the laws 
of the state of New Jersey in the spring of 1906. Hauser explained to 
W. A. Clark that this new company was "... the virtual consolidation 
of the two companies."7® Hauser and his associates, through the Helena 
and Livingston Smelting and Reduction Company, retained the largest 
block of stock in the new business; H. H. Rogers and William A. Clark 
were the second and third largest shareholders of the United company.7® 
Hauser's foremost reason for urging creation of the United Missouri 
River Power Company was to increase the capital stock of the two old 
firms and to supply himself with enough cash to repay outstanding debts. 
As he explained to his wife, Ellen, in March, 1906, ". . . at last I can 
say, we can, within six months, pay our debts—and have three or four 
74. Letter, S. T. Hauser to W. A. Clark, November 5, 1906, HP, 
Box 33, folder 9. 
75. Letter, S. T. Hauser to W. A. Clark, March 21, 1906, HP, 
Box 33, folder 9. 
76. Letter, S. T. Hauser to W. A. Clark, March 9, 1908, HP, 
Box 33, folder 11. 
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hundred thousand left for our children." Ellen Hauser died that same 
year without realizing benefits from her husband's expectations.^ 
In addition to the desire to liquidate his indebtedness, S. T. 
Hauser had other motives in forming the United company. In a letter to 
old friend Henry Seligman, the entrepreneur revealed his design. 
If, under the proposed plan, we can or could 
materially increase our bond issue, and use 
the bonds, or the proceeds thereof, in adding 
to the two present plants or construct a third 
dam-or plant, if you please, it would weigF 
greatly in deciding and enabling me to bring 
about the proposed merger. 
Hauser controlled what he believed was the last suitable site for a dam 
on the Missouri River between Three Forks and Great Falls. He believed 
that construction of a dam at the new location would place him in a 
position to control any attempt to consolidate power facilities on the 
river. With this inducement, he turned once again to Henry H. Rogers 
for support. 
In 1906, Rogers and the Amalgamated Company had completed their 
intimidation of the Montana legislature and were preparing to issue the 
coup de grace to their pernicious enemy, F. Augustus Heinze. Heinze's 
sale of his United Copper Company to the copper trust in 1906 capped the 
Amalgamated Copper Company's drive to consolidate the copper mining 
77. "Extracts from Letters S. T. Hauser to Ellen F. Hauser," 
January 23, 1906 to March 20, 1906, HP, Box 33, folder 9. See also 
S. T. Hauser to Board of Directors, Helena Power Transmission Company, 
July 6, 1906, HP, Box 33, folder 9. 
78. Letter, S. T. Hauser to Henry Seligman, August 6, 1906, HP, 
Box 33, folder 9. 
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industry in Montana. With this accomplished, H. H. Rogers and other 
Amalgamated officials turned their attention to expanding mining facili­
ties i n Butte* Anaconda and Great Fal1s. 
Hauser immediately offered to supply Rogers with the additional 
power that his plants required, anticipating that the copper tycoon's 
investments in all three power companies would compel him to support an 
expansion of the firms' facilities. Confiding to Henry Seligman in the 
late summer of 1906, Hauser wrote that he was "... dealing with one 
of the ablest men in this or any Country [RogersJ, [butJ ... as you 
know, so far, I have presented no proposition that he did not accept, 
79 
without scarcely any changes." 
Hauser's plan to refinance the old companies by organizing the 
United Missouri River Power Company was successful. It did not, how­
ever, allow him to proceed with location of the third dam. Passage of 
the General Dam Act in April, 1906 (34 Stat. 11) may have forced Hauser 
to form yet another company that would be free to solicit a construction 
permit without the encumbrance of two earlier permits. In 1906, he or­
ganized the Capital City Improvement Company and received federal ap-
80 proval to construct a new hydroelectric plant on the Missouri River. 
During the next five years, Hauser and his associates proceeded with plans 
79. Ibid. See also Letter, S. T. Hauser to H. H. Rogers, 
February 17, 1906, HP, Box 33, folder 9. 
80. "Investigation to Determine Whether Hydroelectric Developments 
Should Be Licensed by the Federal Power Commission," IT-5840, U. S. 
Federal Power Commission Reports, Vol. 8 (1948), p. 183. The United 
Missouri River Power Company and the Capital City Improvement Company 
maintained their respective identities until 1910. The distinction be­
tween the two companies was a matter of legal convenience. Most 
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to erect what eventually became Holter Dam. [See Appendix "A" for a 
diagram of Montana electric power companies.] 
S. T. Hauser was 73 years old in 1906. In thirteen years, he had 
overcome financial ruin and had organized four power companies. His 
accomplishments included the enlistment of many of Montana's wealthiest 
residents and the backing of one of the nation's largest mining corpora­
tions and richest capitalists. This aging pioneer had financed construc­
tion of the state's two largest hydroelectric plants and the longest 
single transmission line. 
More important than all of these successes was Hauser's proof of 
the applicability of electricity to industrial usage. By 1906, he had 
demonstrated clearly that electricity, generated from a single water-
powered plant, could be transmitted to that state's rapidly expanding 
industrial centers. This one accomplishment did more to promote elec­
trical development in Montana than did any previous endeavor. 
On April 14, 1908, W. A. Clark received a note from Hauser stating 
that the Secretary of War had approved plans for the third dam on the 
Missouri River. In response, Clark characterized Hauser's successes by 
writing that "... everything was lovely, and I shall take for grartted 
81 
that 'the goose hangs high'." Hauser's triumph was evident and 
Clark's comment ironic. At four p.m. on April 14, 1908, the Helena 
supporters and competitors of Hauser referred to his power firm as the 
United Missouri River Company. In January, 1910, Hauser and his associ­
ates hoped to raise additional capital for the third dam by merging the 
two firms and reissuing bonds. 
81. Letter, W. A. Clark to S. T. Hauser, April 14, 1908, HP, 
Box 29, folder 18. 
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Power Transmission Company's Hauser Dam collapsed in a spring flood. 
That event triggered the decline of Hauser's hydroelectric empire and 
his eventual loss of the United Missouri River Power Company. 
CHAPTER III 
HAUSER'S OPPOSITION AND THE FAILURE OF THE SECOND DAM 
/ 
The months of January and February, 1908, were warmer than normal 
across much of Montana. The mean temperature for most of the state in 
January was between 25 and 35 degrees, cooling only a bit to the mid-
twenties in February. The maximum temperature during January reached 
as high as 50 degrees in most areas of Montana. Precipitation during 
the first two months of the new year also was slightly abnormal, with 
the greatest deficiency showing in the mountain snowpackJ Balmy 
weather in the northwest contributed to a feeling of optimism for an 
early spring and a return to out-of-doors activities. 
While the weather was temperate during mid-winter, 1908, its 
promise of a mild and short spring was deceptive. March proved to be 
windy, with excessive precipitation reported in many localities. April 
and the first weeks of May showed signs of a return to spring conditions, 
but, in late May and early June, more than twice the average rain and 
2 
snow fell in the western portions of Montana. Heavy rainfall and the 
late appearance of a heavy snowpack in the western mountains caused 
1. U.S. Weather Bureau, Climatoloqical Data—Montana Section, 
Vols. 8-11 (Washington, 1905-1908), p. 99. 
2. Ibid., pp. 99-100. 
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rivers to rise to recordheights. The result was some of the most seri­
ous and dramatic floods in Montana's climatological history. 
The high spring "run-off" of 1908 challenged the stability of many 
small dams on rivers and creeks throughout Montana. The dam at Black 
Eagle Falls faced the possibility of eminent destruction on June 5, as 
more than 6.5 feet of water poured over the top of the flashboards for 
3 
twenty-four hours. One facility that was not threatened by the record 
rise of early June, 1908, was Hauser Dam. The dam, reportedly "one of 
the finest structures of this kind in the world," had succumbed to one 
of the first spring freshets on April 14, 1908. Seepage of water through 
the base of the dam, at the juncture of the steel plates and the bedrock, 
undermined the structure and forced its collapse. Hauser Dam required 
more than a year's labor to construct and demanded less than ten minutes 
to wash away.^ 
Collapse of the dam caused a wall of water to be sent rushing down 
the channel of the Missouri River, sweeping five company houses, an 
office building and a stable before the flood. Miraculously, though 
the powerhouse was filled with water, none of the more than thirty 
workers at the plant was killed. Damage to the dam and power plant was 
of less immediate concern to local residents than was the impending 
disaster to the downstream inhabitants of Craig, Cascade and Great Falls. 
3. "Floods of 1892 and 1908 Are Recalled by Old Timers," Univer­
sity of Montana Library and Archives, Missoula, Montana, Clipping Files, 
File: "Floods and Flood Control." 
4. The Helena Independent, April 15, 1908, p. 1. 
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Forewarned of the flood by telegraph, occupants of the small river 
community of Craig abandoned their homes for higher ground. In Great 
Falls, workmen hurriedly constructed a wing dam in front of the Rainbow 
Dam powerhouse and labored through the night of the 14th to protect the 
5 
city's low-lying areas. Through quick response and ardent preparation, 
the disastrous potential of the flood was not visited upon downstream 
Missouri River communties. 
Damage to Hauser Dam was substantial. United Missouri River Power 
Company General Manager M. H. Gerry assured local reporters that the 
dam would be rebuilt and that, during the interim, power Mould be trans­
mitted to Helena, Butte, and Anaconda from the plants at Canyon Ferry 
and Butte. Samuel Hauser, in New York at the time of the flood, re­
ceived word of the disaster from manager Gerry. The ex-governor moved 
quickly to reduce alarm by wiring his friend and publisher of the 
Helena Independent, John S. M. Neil, that the dam would be repaired and 
that work on the third power facility (Holter) would continue. Neil 
responded to Hauser's assurances by praising the power promoter's 
optimism. In an editorial two days after the collapse, Neil wrote that 
Hauser's courage made him the "... dominant and indomitable spirit of 
the biggest, best and most engaging enterprises ever successfully 
launched in Montana."® 
Hauser's public optimism was not mirrored by a similar private 
confidence in the power company's position. The flood had not only 
5. Ibid., p. 1, and The Story of Montana Power, p. 19. 
6. The Helena Independent, April 16, 1908, p. 4. 
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wrecked the dam but had also destroyed the governor's faith in steel 
construction. A concrete structure was planned as a replacement, and 
would undoubtedly prove expensive. There was the additional concern 
that during construction revenues would not be available to repay the 
debt on the original dam. Finally, Hauser feared that downstream resi­
dents who had been affected by the flood would demand reparations. 
While this threat never materialized to any consequence, it worried 
Hauser during the months immediately following the dam's collapse.7 
Following the April 14 disaster, Hauser faced his greatest diffi­
culties in satisfying contractual obligations to supply power to the 
Amalgamated Copper Company plants at Butte and Anaconda. Although 
M, H. Gerry claimed that the Canyon Ferry and Butte facilities could 
supply this need, it was obvious to Hauser that there would be a sub­
stantial power deficiency. In 1908, his power companies were not the 
only businesses capable of supplying electricity to industry in Butte 
and Anaconda. Two other concerns, one serving Butte under the leader­
ship of C. W. Wetmore and the other in Great Falls, headed by John D. 
Ryan, had been vying with S. T. Hauser for a share of the electricity 
market since 1904. The disaster of April, 1908, could only encourage 
these corporate challengers in their efforts to undermine the former 
Montana governor's dominant position. 
7. Anton Holter, a director of the company and resident of Helena, 
faced the immediate onslaught from these irate Montanans. He repeatedly 
wrote Hauser that some form of restitution would have to be provided 
them. Letters, A. M. Holter to S. T. Hauser, June 17, 1908, and 
July 10, 1908, HP, Box 29, folder 21. 
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As noted in an earlier chapter, commercial electricity first came 
to Butte in 1883 with the organization of the Brush Electric Light and 
Power Company. Nine years later, the Butte General Electric Company 
organized in that community to assume the interests of the Brush Company 
and two of its competitors (the Silver Box Electric Light and Power 
Company and W. A. Clark's Butte Electric Light and Power Company). A 
subsequent sale and reorganization effort formed the Butte Electric and 
Power Company in 1901. After this date, the New Jersey-incorporated 
firm controlled the residential electrical power supply for the communi-
g 
ties of Butte and Anaconda. 
Creation of the Butte Electric and Power Company was a significant 
event for the mining city. With the establishment of this organization, 
the General Electric Company, a corporate giant, dominated residential 
power distribution in Butte. Control was exercised through a director­
ship which included C. A. Coffin, president of General Electric, and 
C. W. Wetmore, a director of the Electric Bond and Share Company (a 
utility holding company). Of the two men, Wetmore was by far the most 
g 
active individual in the Butte Electric and Power Company. 
The new Butte Electric Company was predominantly an electricity 
distributor. As such, it held contracts with the city of Butte to supply 
power to the community's street lighting and electric railway systems. 
8. See Leighton, "The Corporate History of the Montana Power 
Company," pp. 7-15, for a fuller detailing of the formation of these 
power distribution companies. 
9. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Corporations, "Report of the 
Commissioner of Corporations on Water-Power Development in the United 
States," March 14, 1912, p. 151. 
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The company also negotiated easements with the city fathers for pole 
lines throughout the town, which were used to carry electricity to city 
residents. The Butte Electric and Power Company first relied on power 
generation from a number of steam plants in the Butte area. After 1901, 
the electrical supply was augmented by a hydroelectric facility on the 
Big Hole River southwest of Butte. This water-powered plant on the Big 
Hole was owned by the Montana Power Transmission Company which, after 
1903, was a subsidiary of the Butte Electric and Power Company.^ 
C. W. Wetmore's Butte Electric and Power Company served primarily 
residential interests in the Butte area at the turn of the century. 
Wetmore's successful attempts to acquire hydroelectric facilities to 
supplement steam generation plants interested the utility magnate in 
expanding both the market for and the supply of electricity in 
Montana.^ Electrification of the Amalgamated Copper Company's Butte 
and Anaconda mines and smelters at the turn of the century offered 
Wetmore an opportunity to enter the industrial market. To do this, 
he necessarily had to compete with the rapidly developing hydroelectric 
power complex of S. T. Hauser. 
Wetmore's first approach to Hauser's empire was not competition, 
but agreement. Wetmore hoped to interest the Helena promoter in a com­
bination of electric facilities which would include the recently 
10. Leighton, "The Corporate History of the Montana Power Company," 
p. 14. 
11. The Butte company also received power from the Norris generat­
ing facility on the Madison River, operated by the Madison River Power 
Company. 
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completed Helena Power Transmission Company pole line to Butte (1901). 
W. A. Clark reported to Samuel Hauser as early as February, 1903, that 
the Butte concern had approached him about a consolidation of electrical 
12 companies. More than a year and a half later, the two Montana inter­
ests compiled a list of "suggestions" for combining the interests in 
Butte. The first proposition required the Butte Electric and Power 
Company to purchase a third company, the Madison River Power Company, 
and then to "consolidate with the Missouri River Company on an equitable 
1 ̂  basis." The second scenario would have allowed the Missouri River 
Power Company to join with the Butte Company in joint purchase of the 
Madison River properties. The final suggestion did not constitute a 
financial consolidation at all. Rather, it was a marketing and supply 
agreement to allow the Butte Company to purchase businesses in its area 
and to garner surplus hydroelectric power from the Missouri River com-
14 pany's stations near Helena. None of these suggestions proved immedi­
ately satisfactory to the parties involved in the negotiations, although 
15 
in January, 1905, the idea of consolidation was still being discussed. 
A merger of the Hauser and Wetmore power interests was not eminent 
in early 1905; yet, both parties realized that some accommodation would 
12. Letter, W. A. Clark to S. T. Hauser, February 25, 1903, HP, 
Box 27, folder 44. 
13. "Suggestions Concerning Combination of Water Power and Elec­
tric Companies of Butte, Montana," HP, Box 63, folder 14. 
14. Ibid. 
15. See Letter, W. A. Clark to S. T. Hauser, January 11, 1905, HP, 
Box 28, folder 19. 
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have to be made in order to avoid economically damaging competition. 
The situation reached crisis proportions in May, 1905, when both the 
Wetmore/Coffin firm and the Hauser companies bid on a contract to supply 
power to F. Augustus Heinze's smelter in Butte. Heinze had previously 
been a Hauser customer, and the Helenan saw the Butte Company's bid as 
a challenge to the Missouri River Power Company's territory. Hauser 
wired Wetmore, informing him that if the Butte Electric Company pro­
ceeded with the Heinze negotiations, he (Hauser) would order his people 
to begin looking at Wetmore's customers. Both parties wanted to avoid 
the eminent confrontation and, in mid-May, 1905, concluded an agreement— 
to prevent interfering with one another's customers and to "work in 
harmony."^ 
The Hauser-Wetmore agreement to restrain trade in the Butte market 
was probably illegal. No matter; it was observed more in the breach 
than in fact. Neither party really intended to honor the accord. With 
large capital expenditures required for a successful power production 
industry, it was understandable that both Wetmore and Hauser had to 
secure valuable mining company contracts—mostly in the Butte-Anaconda 
area. F. Augustus Heinze's surrender to Amalgamated in 1906 dictated 
that either the two power companies combine or that one eliminate the 
other from the marketplace. 
C. W. Wetmore revealed his option first in a letter to his Butte 
general manager, H. W. Turner, in June, 1906. Instructing Turner on 
16. Letter, S. T. Hauser to Messrs. Thayer and Addicks, May 19, 
1905, HP, Box 33, folder 8, and Telegrams, S. T. Hauser to M. H. Gerry, 
May 18, 1905, and C. W. Wetmore to H. W. Turner, May 18, 1905, HP, 
Box 33, folder 8. 
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choosing to electrify an Amalgamated mine or one of an independent com* 
pany, Wetmore advised that both were attractive, but: 
I am not willing ... to defer the installation 
of the Amalgamated mines in favor of the Lexington 
mine, because one main purpose of selecting one of 
the Amalgamated mines was to further cement our 
relations with Mr. Ryan, which I hope will lead, 
within a few months, to a permanent alliance of 
great and lasting importance to our interest.17 
The Mr. Ryan of whom Wetmore spoke was John D. Ryan, president of the 
Anaconda Copper Mining Company and an investor in hydroelectric proper­
ties^ n Great Falls. Wetmore's stated intention, by 1906, was to com­
bine with Ryan and to acquire control of Hauser's Missouri River Power 
18 Company. 
Born in Michigan, John D. Ryan spent his early adult years learning 
the mercantile and sales business in that state. As a young man in the 
1890s, he journeyed west to Denver, Colorado, where he entered the oil 
business as a salesman. A man of considerable business acumen and 
ambition, Ryan came to Montana in 1901 and assumed management of the 
Marcus Daly Bank and Trust Company. The young entrepreneur was direct­
ing that financial establishment in 1903 when the Daly estate auditor, 
19 John Morony, interested him in water power sites in Great Falls. 
17. Letter, C. W. Wetmore to H. W. Turner, June 28, 1906, Public 
Service Commission Records, RS 107, Public Service Commission (Helena), 
Box 37, exhibit 37. (Hereafter cited as PSR.) 
18. Ibid. 
19. "Depositions of C. F. Kelley and W. D. Thornton In The Matter 
Of The Investigation By The Entitled Commission Of The Montana Power 
Company's Reclassification of Electric Plant," PSR, Box 37, pp. 10-13. 
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Ryan and Morony maneuvered Marcus Daly's widow into advancing 
» capital to purchase the deteriorating facilities of the Boston Electric 
Company and the Great Falls Electric and Power Company. These companies 
purchased water power from the Great Falls Water Power and Townsite 
Company and generated electricity to the city of Great Falls. Soon after 
his purchase of the Boston Electric Company, Ryan was elected to the 
firm's presidency and, two years later in 1906, he incorporated this 
business and the recently^-purchased Great Falls Street Railway Company 
20 
into the Great Falls Electric Properties. 
By 1906, John D. 1*yan was one of the most prominent Industrialists 
in Montana. He not only controlled the consolidated electric facilities 
in Great Falls, but held the joint post of managing director for Amal­
gamated Copper Company, and president of Anaconda Copper Mining Company. 
The latter positions tied Ryan to the Standard Oil Trust of Henry Rogers 
and introduced the young Michiganite to the financial resources of one 
of the world's largest financial trusts. His unique position as a 
participant in two rapidly expanding enterprises (hydroelectric pro­
duction and copper mining) was not lost on Ryan as he proceeded to direct 
the course of Montana's industrial future during the next five years. 
As early as February, 1906, Samuel Hauser learned that Ryan was 
interested in developing hydroelectric power from the Missouri River at 
Great Falls and transmitting it to Butte and Anaconda. Hauser was over­
extended from the rapid expansion of the previous five years and, with 
20. Ibid., pp. 13-14, and Leighton, "Corporate History of the 
Montana Power Company," pp. 32, 33. 
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construction started on his second dam, he could ill-afford a new 
competitor. 
In an attempt to stymie interest in the Great Falls properties, 
Hauser wrote to H. H. Rogers explaining in detail the progress of the 
United Missouri River Company ventures. Hauser informed the Standard 
Oil executives that the formation of the new United Missouri River Power 
Company was complete and that the company's second dam at Hauser Lake 
would be finished by mid-summer. Hauser claimed that the Amalgamated 
Company held more than $2.5 million in securities of the power companies, 
thus hoping to appeal to Rogers' sense of financial commitment to the 
United Missouri Company. Recognizing the link between John Ryan and the 
copper trust, Hauser confronted H. H. Rogers with rumors of the formation 
a competing power company. 
If you or your companies, or anyone backed by you, 
should develop the power at Great Falls, it would 
cost our company in the consequent depreciation 
of its stocks and securities at least 25%; there­
fore would depreciate your holdings from $500,000 
to $700,000, and I think even more than that. 
Remember, that it is your backing and cooperation 
that has made the above results possible, and it 
was upon this theory that I have in the past based 
my negotiations in figuring the consideration and 
fixing the price for power to your companies.2' 
Hauser urged Rogers that, if power was needed at Amalgamated's ismelter 
at Great Falls, the United Missouri River Power Company would supply 
22 
the electricity from the Hauser Lake facility. 
21. Emphasis mine. Letter, S. T. Hauser to H. H. Rogers, 
February 17, 1906, HP, Box 33, folder 9. 
22. Ibid. 
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The degree of collusion between H. H. Rogers and John D. Ryan in 
23 developing the Great Falls properties is difficult to determine. 
Circumstantial evidence indicates that there was at least tacit agree­
ment between the two parties on building facilities at Great Falls as 
early as 1906. By that date, S. T. Hauser had proven the benefits of 
electrical operation to the Amalgamated Company. Indeed, as emphasized 
in the previous chapter, Rogers' personal loan to Hauser in 1905 allowed 
the elderly Montanan to garner financial support for the second dam and 
power plant near Helena. It is conceivable that, if electricity was to 
become the major source of power for the smelters and mines at Butte, 
Great Falls and Anaconda^the__state's- largest mining companyj*ould,..want 
to guarantee the power's availability at the lowest price possible. 
As president of the Anaconda Copper Mining Company in 1906, John 
D. Ryan sought to lower the price paid by the company to Hauser's power 
firms. In early December, 1906, Hauser's General Manager, M. H. Gerry, 
wrote to the Missouri Power Company president informing him that Ryan 
was demanding a price reduction of $10 per horsepower per year, 
from $50 per horsepower per annum to $40 per horsepower. This was a 
charge in agreement with the earlier contract of May, 1905. At the 
Anaconda works, however, Ryan wanted to pay only $36 per horsepower per 
year for electricity. Gerry anticipated that the lost revenue would 
23. Records of the Anaconda Copper Mining Company and the Montana 
Power Company, generally, are not available to the researcher. Some 
records of the ACM company have recently been deposited at the Montana 
Historical Society in Helena, but the documents have not been processed 
and have restrictions placed on them. Records of early transactions of 
the Montana Power Company are available only at the Montana Public 
Service Comnission. 
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total $66,000 annually and he recommended to Hauser that the terms not 
be accepted. But, Gerry also informed Hauser that John Ryan threatened 
to develop the Great Falls properties if the new terms were not accepted 
within one or two months. 
Mr. Ryan stated that he contemplated the develop­
ment of the power at Great Falls, that he had 
already purchased the site there, that Mr. James 
J. Hill would cooperate with him in installing 
a new plant and transmit power to Butte and 
Anaconda, and that he contemplated doing this 
if the terms, as stated above, were not agreed 
to.24 
Ryan's entrance into the power business worried not only Hauser 
and Gerry, but also C. W. Wetmore. Wetmore may not have believed that 
he could block Ryan's plan for developing Great Falls power, but the 
Butte Company president obviously tried to lessen the impact from the 
new competition. In 1906, the Butte Electric Company purchased a five-
sixths interest in Ryan's newly-incorporated Great Falls Electric 
25 
Properties. At the same time, Wetmore initiated a study of Ryan's 
potential business in Great Falls. The result of the study convinced 
power-company financier Wetmore to begin negotiating with the Anaconda 
26 
Company president for an industry merger. 
In a competititive choice between S. T. Hauser and John D. Ryan, 
24. Letter, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, December 1, 1906, HP, 
Box 28, folder 39. 
25. Leighton, p. 33, and U.S. Federal Power Commission, Reports, 
Vol. 4 (1945), p. 230. Not until 1908 did the Butte company complete 
the purchase of the remaining one-sixth share of Ryan's business. 
26. See Leighton for a discussion of these early negotiations, 
pp. 42-43. 
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C. W. Wetmore clearly saw that Ryan was the greater threat. Hauser had 
the larger power plants and had invested more money in the actual pro­
duction and delivery of electricity. Yet, John Ryan's position with 
Amalgamated convinced Wetmore that he must align his interests with the 
owner of the Great Falls properties. In May, 1906, Wetmore wrote to 
H. W. Turner, general manager of the Butte Electric and Power Company, 
informing him that he was sending someone to investigate the feasibility 
of applying electricity to Amalgamated's hoist works in Butte. Wetmore 
realized that the immediate benefits of such an expansion in the market 
would "accrue to the Missouri River Power Company," but that, eventually 
the Butte Company's interest would be advanced. 
It is certainly for our interest to promote the 
application of electricity to hoisting and to 
exhaust the Missouri River Company's power as 
soon as possible, so as to definitely and finally 
dispose of the possibility of their competing 
with us.27 
Wetmore made these arrangements with John.Ryan with the obvious inten-
28 tion of preparing the way for a more formal merger. 
Wetmore's initial efforts in 1906 produced five-sixths ownership 
in the Great Falls Electric Properties. Since that company did not 
control any water power sites (instead buying its water from the Great 
Falls Water Power and Townsite Company), Wetmore was not in control of 
27. Letter, C. W. Wetmore to H. W. Turner, May 15, 1906, PSR, 
Box 29(1), exhibit 364. — 
28. Ibid. Note that this was in violation of the agreement with 
Hauser dated in 1905, although Wetmore did tell Turner that he expected 
the relationship to be maintained in good faith and he did have the 
investigator notify Gerry that he was coming. 
future hydroelectric development in Great Falls. John Ryan's purchase 
of the entire stock of Great Northern Railway magnate James J. Hill in 
the Great Falls Water Power and Townsite Company in 1908 awakened a new 
interest in the merger by Wetmore. With control of the Great Falls 
power sites, Ryan was in a superior position to negotiate with the Butte 
Company. 
This unequal situation was immediately evident during the initial 
discussions between the two parties in July, 1908. Ryan stated that he 
would consider a sale of part of his interest in the Great Falls proper­
ties if he could secure low-priced electricity^for~the~copper"companies.-
Ryan repeated the threat to Wetmore that he had made to Hauser two years 
earlier. He proposed that if a deal could not be struck that "he and 
his associates would develop the Great Falls power, transmit it to Butte, 
do their own business, and in this connection he very strongly intimated 
29 
that they would take on lighting business also." Wetmore's general 
manager, H. W. Turner, took the threat seriously and informed his boss 
that "Mr. Ryan and the Amalgamated Company . . . are supreme in this 
30 
vicinity and they are fully able to carry out any program they attempt." 
Turner's observation of John D. Ryan's strength in the Montana 
power business was supported by the Cooper and Powelson engineering firm. 
Wetmore hired these consultants in 1908,to make an appraisal of the 
relative solvency of the three major power interests in the state: 
29. Letter, H. W. Turner to Sidney Z. Mitchell, July 18, 1908, 
quoted in U.S. Federal Power Commission, Reports, Vol. 4 (1945)»p. 231. 
30. Ibid. 
John D. Ryan at Great Falls, S. T. Hauser at Helena, and the Butte 
Electric and Power Company owned by Wetmore. The lengthy report is en­
lightening, not only in its assessment of the three significant power 
concerns in Montana in 1908, but in its analysis of the future of 
hydroelectric production in the state. 
Cooper and Powelson's engineers analyzed data submitted by Turner 
and determined that the position of S. T. Hauser's United Missouri River 
Power Company was tenuous. Hauser's company had two facilities, one at 
Canyon Ferry with a generating capacity of 4,150 horsepower, and one at 
Hauser Lake, with a capacity of 7,820. The latter plant was inoperable 
in late 1908, having been damaged by the spring floods of that year. 
In addition to these operations, the investigators learned that Hauser 
planned to construct a third dam at Wolf Creek with a planned capacity 
of 11,170 horsepower. The engineersalso took note of the steam gener­
ating ability of the Missouri River Company interests,butdismissed 
its importance as being too costly to operate and productive only of 
31 
"fractional power." The facility could not, therefore, be relied 
upon to be an asset to the Missouri River Company. 
"Fractional" power of this kind is of doubtful 
value. By this we do not mean to convey the 
idea that it is of no value. It is undoubtedly 
advantageous to install powerhouse machinery 
and transmission lines for the purpose of 
developing some power in excess of that pro­
duced by the minimum flow of the stream, but 
31. Cooper and Powelson's engineers claimed that the steam plant's 
profitability depended upon the cost of fuel, i.e., coal. 
how much can profitably be developed depends 
upon the cost of coal-produced power in the 
district . . . 
The engineering analysis of Hauser's firms revealed that the com­
panies were heavily in debt. With the reconstruction of Hauser Dam, 
the Missouri River Power Company would have to return at least $32.50 
33 
per horsepower per annum, just to meet expenses. Without this charge, 
a stockholder in the United Missouri Company could not even sustain his 
investment, let alone return a profit. 
When put in this form, the weakness of a pur­
chaser of stock of the United Missouri River 
Power Company in-attempting to-compete with 
the Ryan interests is completely exposed. 
Who, understanding the conditions, would for 
one moment seriously consider purchasing the 
stock of the United Missouri River Power Com­
pany unless he first acquired the Ryan interests 
or became a substantial partner therein.34 
S. T. Hauser never had the personal capital to justify the rapid growth 
of his hydroelectric facilities at Helena. Because of his insolvency, 
and the experimental nature of the electrical industry in Montana, he 
had to support his power plants by charging relatively high prices for 
electricity (approximately $50 per annum per horsepower). Hauser was 
not in a position to meet competition from any interest that could 
drastically reduce this price for water-power generated electricity. 
John D. Ryan's water power sites placed him in a unique position 
32. "Report of Cooper and Powelson, Consulting Engineers and 
Managers," December 31, 1908, PSR, Box 20, exhibit 78, p. 13. 
33. Ibid., p. 17. 
34. Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
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to attack Hauser's artificially high price structure. Cooper and 
Powelson established that Ryan had four possible sites available at 
Great Falls; power facilities at these locations would have a combined 
generating capacity of 49,320 horsepower. The attractive feature of 
Ryan's position was his ability to market electricity in the Great Falls 
area for approximately $16.50 per horsepower and to deliver it to the 
35 
Butte/Anaconda region for $22.50. Moreover, the engineers understood 
that in 1908, Ryan had secured a contract with the Amalgamated Copper 
Company to deliver 10,000 horsepower to Butte and Anaconda at a cost of 
$30.00 per horsepower. 
From all that has been said above, it must be 
apparent that the Ryan interests dominate the 
electric power situation in Montana. If the 
Great Falls Properties are developed and if 
they offer for sale wholesale power in Butte 
at from $30.00 to $35.00 per horsepower, the 
Missouri River Power Company could ,not compete 
and that Company would be forced to seek the 
retail field where the return is greater 
36 
• • • 
The threat of the Missouri River Company's entrance into the retail 
power business, especially in Butte, was of immediate concern to Wet­
more's Butte Electric and Power Company. 
The engineers' report affirmed in 1908 that the "Butte Company is 
37 essentially the retailer of electricity in the State of Montana." 
Wetmore's firm was rapidly developing a surplus of power from steam 
generating plants in Butte, from hydroelectric facilities on the Madison 
35. Ibid., pp. 10, 19. 36. Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
37. Ibid., p. 19. 
River near *ftorrls~and from a plant on the Big Hole at Divide^ In 
addition, Wetmore planned to erect a third plant, dam and reservoir on 
the Madison with an expected production capability of 8,400 horsepower. 
Despite these advantages, Cooper and Powelson suggested that the Butte 
Company was in a vulnerable position. The company's dominance of the 
retail electrical market returned a remarkable profit, one which would 
inevitably become attractive to both the Hauser and Ryan interests. 
Entrance of either one or both of these concerns, with their inexpensive 
water-power generated electricity, would force the Butte Company from 
the competitive field. 
It would appear therefore that while the stock­
holders of both the Missouri River Company and 
the Butte Company are weak and could be crushed 
by the Ryan interests, the Butte Company from 
one point of view is in a weaker position than 
the Missouri River Company in the sense that if 
the Ryan interests were removed from the field, 
the Missouri River Company would have more power 
to injure the Butte Company than has the Butte 
Company to injure the Missouri River Company.39 
Fear of both Montana businesses prompted Wetmore to renew negotiations 
towards a consolidation of electrical supply in Montana. 
Cooper and Powelson's report urged Wetmore to align his firm with 
that of Ryan. From that point of strength, the two interests could 
negotiate for the sale of the Hauser companies. The consulting engi­
neers suggested that Ryan be solicited as an equal partner, holding 
38. Ibid., p. 7. See also "Power Development of the Butte Elec­
tric and Power Company, Madison River Power Company, and Montana Power 
Transmission Company," Montana Power Company (n.p.: 1906). 
39. Cooper and Powelson Report, p. 25. 
common stock. Such a combination of financial and industrial power 
would aid immeasurably in influencing state and community leaders and 
40 in advancing the interests of the "monopoly." Less than one month 
after submission of the report, Wetmore concluded preliminary negotia-
tions with John Ryan for the merger of their respective power interests. 
In May, 1909, the parties arranged a final agreement by which Ryan sold 
half interest in the Great Falls Water Power and Townsite Company to 
Wetmore in exchange for an equivalent value of Butte Electric and Power 
Company stock. Ryan also became a director and member of the executive 
41 
committee of the Butte Company. 
The Ryan-Wetmore agreement of 1909 fulfilled the Butte Company 
president's longstanding desire to consolidate power production and dis­
tribution in Montana. Wetmore first envisioned the scenario unfolding 
as an alliance between himself and Hauser in 1904. The rapid rise of 
John D. Ryan, and that individual's tacit support from Amalgamated, 
quickly altered Wetmore's design. The failure of S^.X~»Hausegis-
Hauser Dam in April, 1908, also Influenced Wetmore's projections in that 
"" 42 
it acted, as a catalyst far the subseqtient negotiations wi th Ryan. 
40. Ibid., p. 48. 
41. 4 FPC, p. 223, and Leighton, pp. 45-48. 
42. Douglas Leighton in his "The Corporate History of The Montana 
Power Company," passim, accepts a version of the electric power pro­
ducers' consolidation story that first appeared in Federal Power Com­
mission documents in the 1940s. That account was derived selectively 
from the writings of John D. Ryan, C. W. Wetmore, and Cornelius Kelley. 
These men claimed that both Ryan and Wetmore had first considered an 
arrangement for consolidation in 1906. Subsequent negotiations and 
agreements between the two men were prompted by depreciated securities 
following the failure of Hauser Dam in 1908 and by a belief that 
84 
Seeming not only to upset Wetmore's original plan for consolidation, 
the failure of the dam also foretold other changes for the three power 
interests on the Missouri River in Montana. 
One day after the April 14 tragedy, S. T. Hauser received an offer 
from C. W. Wetmore for supplemental electricity. Wetmore agreed to 
provide Hauser's companies with 6,000 horsepower for one year at a cost 
of $40 per horsepower. The Butte company president even suggested that 
he would be willing to pay half the cost of stringing lines between the 
43 
rival systems. Wetmore's motivation in making this offer is difficult 
to determine. No doubt he desired to sell a ready surplus of power that 
had increased dramatically with construction of the Madison No. 2 plant. 
monopolization of the Missouri's water power was essential to the sur­
vival of both individual's companies. Leighton concludes that the 
failure of Hauser Dam forced the United Missouri River Power Company to 
default on its contracts and forced the Amalgamated Copper Company to 
cancel its contracts. [P. 18.] 
The scenario that is presented by Leighton is basically correct. 
But the situation of S. T. Hauser, who was virtually excluded from the 
Leighton account, sheds additional light on the process of consolida­
tion. Indeed, Hauser's records indicate that he and Wetmore considered 
a power consortium as early as 1904. The entrance of John D. Ryan and 
that individual's position with Amalgamated explains the defection of 
Wetmore from Hauser to Ryan. As will be shown later, the cancellation 
of Amalgamated's power contracts with Hauser was. not predicated solely 
on the former governor's unfortunate accident in 1908. 
Failure of Hauser Dam in 1908 may have raised the anxiety of all 
parties involved in hydroelectric development on the Missouri. But its 
greatest affect was on S. T. Hauser's ability to participate in the 
planned power monopoly. Failure of the dam was both a catalyst for the 
Ryan-Wetmore negotiations and for the withdrawal of S. T. Hauser from 
the electric power industry. 
43. Letter, S. T. Hauser to M. H. Gerry, May 15, 1908, HP, 
Box 33, folder 11. 
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Hauser's predicament also provided Wetmore with a legitimate opportunity 
to secure a portion of the wholesale electrical supply market in the 
Butte/Anaconda area. 
C. W. Wetmore's motives in aiding Hauser were not strictly oppor­
tunistic. Butte Electric and Power Company officials expressed genuine 
concern for the plight of the Missouri River Company, knowing that a 
similar calamity could visit any firm that tampered with the Missouri 
River. Writing to Max Hebgen the day after the failure of Hauser Dam, 
Butte Electric General Manager H. W. Turner admitted that: 
I really feel sorry for-them, andHiope-thatHtM^ 
not so bad as reported down here, and I feel that 
we should refrain from exulting in the misfortune 
of our competitor. No one knows where lightning 
may strike next.44 
Turner feared that the failure of one power company's dam could shake 
the confidence of consumers in the safety of all water power develop­
ments. 
Whatever the motives of the Butte Company in offering Hauser 
assistance, the aging Helenan had little choice but to accept. The 
1905 power contract between Hauser's companies and Amalgamated held the 
power companies libel for not delivering electric power. The applica­
bility of this clause to the loss of Hauser Dam, an event which Hauser 
considered an "act of God," was a legality that would require years of 
negotiation to settle. Meanwhile, Hauser had to satisfy the needs of 
his primary customer or risk losing Amalgamated to a willing competitor. 
44. Letter, H. W. Turner to Max Hebgen, April 15, 1908, PSR, 
Box 29(2), exhibit 72. 
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The failure of the dam in 1908 left Hauser with only the Canyon Ferry 
hydroelectric unit and the auxiliary steam plant in Butte. While the 
first facility could supply some of the necessary power to Amalgamated, 
the cost of burning coal in the steam plant was prohibitive. In such a 
situation, the availability of Wetmore's water-power generation was an 
attractive option. Although Hauser worried that lower water would pre­
vent the Butte company's plants from generating the anticipated 6,000 
horsepower, he claimed that, "it is very important to make the connec-
45 tion and be able to shut down the steam plant." 
Hauser thanked C. W. Wetmore for his "kind offer" which arrived so 
46 
soon after the failure of the Missouri River dam. He delayed the 
decision to accept his competitor's power until the end of August of 
that year. By that time, pressure from business associates such as 
Henry Seligman forced Hauser to join his United Missouri River Power 
Company transmission lines with those of the Butte Electric and Power 
47 Company. During the next two years, the Butte company augmented 
48 
Hauser's electrical supply at a cost of nearly $400,000. 
45. Letter, S. T. Hauser to M. H. Gerry, May 15, 1908, HP, Box 33, 
folder 11. 
46. Telegram, S. T. Hauser to C. W. Wetmore, April 15, 1908, HP, 
Box 33, folder 11. 
47. Writing to Hauser in late August, 1908, Seligman urged the 
Missouri Company president to accept Wetmore's offer. "This will enable 
you to do away with using steam at a loss, and you would be in a posi­
tion to take care of your customers while the old dam is being recon­
structed. I wish you would give this your very serious consideration." 
Letter, Henry Seligman to S. T. Hauser, August 27, 1908, HP, Box 29, 
folder 6. 
48. Letter, R. S. Condit to S. T. Hauser, June 9, 1910, HP, 
Box 30, folder 18. 
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The price S. T. Hauser paid to Wetmore's Butte Electric and Power 
Company was more than monetary. A distraught Hauser knew that he was 
offering Wetmore the opportunity to consolidate power development in 
Montana independent of the Helena-based firms. In a revealing letter 
to D. P. Robinson of the Boston-based Stone and Webster Engineering 
Corporation [the firm responsible for the construction of Hauser and 
Holter Dams], Hauser noted his true thoughts on the situation in Montana. 
The Helenan claimed that, "Immediately after our accident, these parties 
commenced taking advantage of our situation and attempted by manipula-
4Q 
tion to make it impossible for me to rebuild Hauser-Lake Dam.' -Since 
the Butte interests could not accomplish this alone, Hauser claimed 
that Wetmore then turned to an alliance with Ryan as the vehicle in the 
50 
consolidation drive. Hauser continued the analysis by explaining his 
acceptance of the Wetmore offer to supply power to the United Missouri 
River Power Company: 
Upon his (Jaretski's) [lawyer for Wetmore] represen­
tations, and notwithstanding the bad faith and the 
constant effort that had been made from time to 
time (at least by their subordinates and managers) 
to take our business away from us, I finally agreed 
to take what they then represented to be 6000 of 
their surplus horsepower, and use it in supplying 
our own customers. This 6000 when referred to 
their manager, dwindled down to less than 3000.51 
In subsequent correspondence, Hauser suggested that a conspiracy had 
49. Letter, S. T. Hauser to D. P. Robinson, April 13, 1909, HP, 
Box 33, folder 12. 
50. A reference to the 1909 agreement between Ryan and Wetmore. 
51. Ibid. 
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occurred at the time of the Wetmore offer. Not only had the attorney 
for the Butte Company- made overtures to Hauser, but a representative 
of Amalgamated had interviewed Seligman in New York and urged "that the 
Amalgamated Company be allowed to contract with the Butte Electric Light 
52 Company [Butte Electric and Power Company]." 
Events following the failure of Hauser Dam convinced S. T. Hauser 
that C. W. Wetmore's utility company would continue its efforts to 
exclude the United Missouri River Company's major stockholders from a 
consolidation of power companies. Despite repeated denials by Wetmore 
and Turner, Hauser remained firm in his belief that the Butte Electric -
53 
and Power Company intended to "swallow us up." 
S. T. Hauser's fears for the future of his hydroelectric business 
did not lie only with C. W. Wetmore's Butte Electric and Power Company. 
Hauser also anticipated the defection of financial and political sup­
porters of the United Missouri River Power Company following the failure 
of the Hauser Dam. William A. Clark, one of the earliest and strongest 
contributors to the Missouri River ventures, presented some reservations 
52. Letter, S. T. Hauser to W. A. Clark, July 5, 1910, HP, 
Box 33, folder 13. 
53. Letter, S. T. Hauser to D. P. Robinson, April 9, 1909, HP, 
Box 33, folder 12. Even while attempting to ally with John D. Ryan in 
1909, C. W. Wetmore tried to allay any fears that Hauser might have over 
the consolidation. Referring to the Butte Company's proposed contract 
for power with, by that time, the relatively small Heinze operation, 
Wetmore stated that, "We, Hauser and ourselves, have agreed that neither 
will interfere with any customers." Hie instructed H. W. Turner to defer 
negotiations with Heinze and to "observe this agreement strictly." 
Wetmore sent a copy of this telegram to Hauser. Telegram, C. W. Wetmore 
to H. W. Turner, April 17, 1909, HP, Box 29, folder 33. 
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to Hauser after the collapse of the dam. Failure of the United Missouri 
Company's dam caused Clark to worry about his own small structure on the 
Clark's Fork River, near Missoula. Clark requested and received from 
Hauser the use of General Manager Gerry for an inspection trip to the 
Missoula damsite. Having been reassured that this plant would not fail, 
Clark turned his attention to the problems near Helena. 
The Montana senator was particularly concerned that the potential 
Ryan/Wetmore alliance might cause the Missour River Company serious 
problems. Raising the issue of more ngtuf# disasters, Clark suggested 
that: 
If we could make some arrangements and get out of 
the Missouri River business on an equitable basis, 
... it might be well to do so, as we have had a 
very unfortunate accident there already, and pos­
sibly others might follow.54 
Hauser urged his associate not to succumb to the pressures of a "force[d] 
55 
consolidation" without first hearing from his "friends." But Clark 
clearly had doubts about the financial legitimacy of the hydroelectric 
power business and feared a battle with Ryan and Amalgamated Copper 
Company. He suggested to Hauser that the copper trust may have been 
behind the moves for electrical consolidation.56 Having faced the 
company during the 1900 election, Clark was not anxious to do so again. 
54. Letter, W. A. Clark to S. T. Hauser, June 13, 1908, HP, 
Box 29, folder 18. 
55. Telegram, S. T. Hauser to W. A. Clark, June 12, 1908, HP, 
Box 33, folder 11. 
56. Letter, W. A. Clark to S. T. Hauser, June 13, 1908, HP, 
Box 29, folder 18. 
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W. A. Clark was not the only Hauser supporter to express concern 
over the failure of the Missouri River dam in 1908. At the time that 
the Hauser Dam collapsed, the Amalgamated Copper Company owned twenty-
one percent share in the Hauser organized power companies. These shares 
had been negotiated directly through the offices of H. H. Rogers, Amal-
gamated's chief officer. The failure of the dam during the spring floods 
caused the company to look more seriously at the nature of this invest­
ment. Of more importance in Amalgamated's decision to reassess its 
position was the obvious intention of John D. Ryan to develop the Great 
57 Falls property. —Recognizing both influences,-S.- T. Hauser made over-~ 
tures to H. H. Rogers in an effort to commit the copper trust to the 
reconstruction of the Missouri River dam. 
In June, 1908, Hauser addressed a letter to Rogers imploring the 
New York financier to respond to a director's call for $100*000. As a 
lever for this request, Hauser agreed to supply the copper companies at 
Butte with 17,000 horsepower at $35 per horsepower. This generation 
would begin within ten months when the Hauser Dam would be reconstructed. 
Hauser claimed that within another year the United Missouri River Com­
pany's third dam at Wolf Creek would be operating, augmenting the power 
. 58 
system. 
Hauser received no direct response from Rogers on this matter. 
r 
One month later, in July, 1908, Hauser again wrote to Rogers to voice 
57. Leighton, "The Corporate History of Montana Power Company," 
p. 47. 
58. Letter, S. T. Hauser to H. H. Rogers, June 9, 1908, HP, 
Box 33, folder 11. 
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suspicions about the activities of Amalgamated1s general manager, John 
D. Ryan. Hauser repeated the threat that Ryan had made to M. H. Gerry 
concerning the need for a reduction in the price of power and the pos­
sibility of a competing company pushing hydroelectric facilites at 
Great Falls. Obviously unsure of Rogers' role in this affair, Hauser 
hoped to discern the New Yorker's true feelings. 
Now, Mr. Rogers, I have been unable to see you for 
four months; therefore I do not believe that you 
endorsed, or even encouraged the efforts of the 
representatives of the Amalgamated Company to 
destroy our property and carry out the threat of 
the managing director.*" 
Hauser reminded Rogers that the "Montana stockholders" were the 
"staunchest friends" of Amalgamated and that they had often aided the 
industrial giant.6^ Hauser urged Rogers to exert the influence neces­
sary to retain the support of Amalgamated for the Missouri River Com­
pany's interests. Hauser added that he was "proud to say that you have 
always promptly stopped any unreasonable and unfair treatment in the 
past."^ 
H. H. Rogers had befriended Hauser in the past, but was not in a 
position to do so again in 1908. After suffering a physical breakdown 
in 1907, Rogers' ability to manage the multitudinous affairs of the 
Standard Oil Company was limited. By June, 1908, he was in semi-
59. Letter, S. T. Hauser to H. H. Rogers, July 4, 1908, HP, 
Box 33, folder 11. 
60. Ibid. 61. Ibid. 
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retirement and, as events developed, had less than ten months to live. 
Answers to Hauser's inquiries of the copper trust came in late 
July, 1908. They were less than satisfactory. In a letter to Hauser's 
financial supporter Henry Seligman, Amalgamated Vice-President F. P. 
Addicks stated that a more "valid assurance" was necessary before the 
company could commit additional funds to the Missouri River Companyrs 
ventures. This guarantee could be shown by either subscribing enough 
funds for the reconstruction of Hauser Dam, or by having the completed 
dam once more in operation. In a terse postscript, Addicks informed 
63 
Seligman that, "I have sent a copy of this letter to Governor Hauser." 
S. T. Hauser may have suspected the defection of the Amalgamated 
Copper Company from his hydroelectric enterprises. He did not, how­
ever, know that in October, 1908, Amalgamated representatives had signed 
a contract with John D. Ryan for the delivery, of electric power from the 
Great Falls Water Power and Townsite Company's new dam at Rainbow Falls. 
The Ryan agreement with Amalgamated also allowed the Anaconda Company 
president to purchase the copper trust's shares in the United Missouri 
64 
River Power Company. As if to anticipate the assumption of control 
of Hauser's properties by the Ryan interests, this new contract required 
62. Harpers Weekly, "Henry H. Rogers: Captain of Industry," 
May 29, 1909, Vol. 53, No. 2736, p. 9. 
63. Letter, F. P. Addicks to Henry Seligman, July 29, 1908, HP, 
Box 29, folder 31. 
64. Ryan probably exercised this option. However, the United 
Missouri River Power Company's listing of stockholders showed F. P. 
Addicks, Amalgamated's vice-president, holding these securities. See 
"Listing of Stockholders," December 6, 1909, HP, Box 63, folder 19. 
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Amalgamated to renew its contracts with the Missouri River Power Company 
and the Helena Power-Transmission Company, or its successors, at the 
65 contract's expiration. 
John D. Ryan's actions in 1908 and 1909 indicated his intention to 
control the production and distribution of hydroelectric power in Mon­
tana. While not in possession of a majority stock in Hauser's companies, 
Ryan's replacement of H. H. Rogers in the United Companies did allow the 
younger capitalist to control one of Hauser's principal sources of 
funds. Ryan's position as president of Anaconda Copper Company added to 
fifi 
his ability to direct the course of consolidation after 1908. 
65. Contract between Great Falls Water Power and Townsite Company 
and Amalgamated, October 15, 1908, PSR, Box 43, exhibit 7. 
66. John D. Ryan later explained his involvement in the hydro­
electric industry as beginning in 1908 with the failure of Hauser Lake 
Dam. Ryan claimed that his responsibilities to Amalgamated forced him' 
to locate a reliable source of cheap electric power. When Hauser's dam 
collapsed in 1908, Ryan asserted that H. H. Rogers became disenchanted 
with hydroelectric power generation in Montana. He offered to sell Ryan 
Amalgamated's interests in the United Missouri Company and Ryan accepted. 
In addition, Amalgamated agreed to contract with Ryan for power from the 
prospective Rainbow Dam. 
While this scenario is partly true, it is clear that John Ryan 
anticipated the development of water power in Great Falls as early as 
1906. He had challenged both Hauser and Wetmore with the possibility 
of competition,and his alliance with Wetmore in 1909 confirmed these 
earlier intentions. Evidencing Ryan's plan to assume control of hydro­
electric production in Montana is the contract modification signed by 
his Great Falls Water Power Company and Amalgamated's Washoe Copper Com­
pany in July, 1909. At that time, the October, 1908 contract was al­
tered to require the consent of both parties to a renewal of a power 
contract with either the Missouri River Power Company or the Helena 
Power Transmission Company. See "Contract Between Great Falls Water 
Power and Townsite Company and Washoe Copper Company," July 30, 1909, 
PSR, Box 43, exhibit 9. See also Letter, John D. Ryan to H. M. Cole, 
May 1, 1923, PSR, Box 43, exhibit 3. 
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The collapse of Hauser Dam on April 14, 1908, marked the start of 
S. T. Hauser1s economic ruin. Heavily in debt for construction of two 
dams, a transmission line and a steam auxiliary plant in Butte, Hauser 
was taxed to garner sufficient funds to reconstruct the wrecked facility 
or to complete the building of his third hydroelectric plant. Even had 
Hauser Dam not been destroyed in 1908, it would have been questionable 
whether S. T. Hauser could have succeeded in his power ventures. In 
1908, Hauser owned the largest single block of stock in the United 
Missouri River companies.6* His heavy indebtedness suggests that the 
old capitalist was extended financially. It would have been difficult 
for him to have continued with construction of Holter Dam without con­
tinued support from his major investors. 
The appearance of John D. Ityan removed one of those prominent 
financial backers. In the coming months, it was critical that S. T. 
Hauser retain the support of other important investors. The failure of 
Hauser Dam made this task extremely difficult. In effect, the dam's 
collapse acted as a catalyst to propel the merger of Hauser's two oppo­
nents. The spring waters that washed his "durable and substantial dam" 
down the channel of the Missouri River drowned hopes that he might align 
himself with the financial forces of John D. Ryan, C. W. Wetmore, or the 
Amalgamated Copper Company. The future of S. T. Hauser's hydroelectric 
enterprise lay with the wreckage of Hauser Dam and it would be the 
Amalgamated Copper Company, under the leadership of John D. Ryan, that 
would direct the succeeding course of events. 
67. Letter, William P. Gower to S. T. Hauser, April 27, 1908, HP, 
Box 29, folder 29. 
CHAPTER IV 
A COMBINATION OF FORCES: THE BUTTE SYNDICATE 
C. W. Wetmore's purchase of half interest in John D. Ryan's Great 
Falls properties formed an alliance that threatened Samuel T. Hauser's 
electric power interests. Consolidation of the Wetmore and Ryan concerns 
presaged an assault on the valuable water-power facilities and sites near 
the city of Helena. Of particular concern to Hauser were Ryan's plan to 
construct the large hydroelectri c faci1ity at ̂ Rainbow Fal1s (Great falls r 
Montana) and the possibility that the aging Helenan might lose his lucra­
tive contracts with the Amalgamated Copper Company. S. T. Hauser was 
unable to prevent either event. 
On May 19, 1909, Henry H. Rogers died at his New York home. 
His death forced a shift in leadership in the Standard Oil Company 
and resulted in the appointment of new management for the conglomerate's 
subsidiary companies. John D. Ryan was selected to head the Amalgamated 
Copper Company. With control of the major industrial consumer of elec­
tricity in Montana, Ryan's Great Falls power sites inevitably increased 
in value. 
John Ryan quickly capitalized on his attractive position. In 1909, 
his Great falls Electric Company began construction of the dam andc elec­
trical generating facility on the Missouri River at Rainbow Falls. The 
project proceeded to conclusion in record time and was ready for power 
production in late summer of 1910. As reported in 1913 by Max Hebgen 
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(then the general manager of the new Montana Power Company), the Rainbow 
Dam facility was "the first large development . . . made at this point. 
The plant consisted of a low diversion dam, which was located above the 
falls. Water was funneled through a fifteen-foot penstock to generators 
situated below the falls. The electric generating capacity of the plant 
2 
exceeded 25,000 horsepower. 
While preparing the Rainbow hydroelectric plant for operation, 
John Ryan also considered the requirements for transmitting electricity 
from Great Falls to Amalgamated's mines and smelters at Butte and Ana­
conda. Obviously, a transmission line would have to be erected from 
Great Falls to the existing power line at Helena. One option for Ryan 
and Wetmore was to lease both the Helena/Butte line and the line from 
Butte to Anaconda, from S. T. Hauser's United Missouri River Power Com­
pany. Max Hebgen, representing the Wetmore interests, expressed the 
need to either lease the Hauser line or to construct a duplicate line. 
Hebgen feared that if Hauser lost the Amalgamated contracts for power 
and if the Butte Company assumed them, then the latter firm would need 
the availability of a pole line from Helena to Butte, with another line 
3 
tying in from Great Falls. 
John D. Ryan's representatives worried about these same transmission 
problems. The Ryan half of the power combination was particularly 
1. Max Hebgen, "Hydroelectric Development in Montana," p. 797. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Letter, Max Hebgen to H. W. Turner, October 14, 1909, PSR, 
Box 37, exhibit 403. 
concerned that Hauser's people not be served notice that the Amalgamated 
Company intended to terminate the United Missouri River Power Company's 
contracts. They feared that if Hauler knew that he would lose Amalga-
mated's business, he might attempt to channel his electrical power into 
4 the retail market in Butte. As one Ryan official noted, "The situation 
is a little delicate. S. T. Hauser probably knows he will lose Anaconda 
5 business but doubtless thinks he can hold Butte contracts." Either 
erecting a duplicate line to Butte and Anaconda, or leasing part of the 
Hauser system would invariably confirm the fact that Hauser would lose 
business. As a possible alternative, Ryan's spokesman suggested that, 
"We might buy the Butte-Anaconda line and Anaconda sub-station and in 
February and March quietly build our own line."6 Reportedly, both 
H. W. Turner and Hebgen favored this approach to the problem. 
The arrangement was not satisfactory to S. T. Hauser, however, and 
John Ryan was never able to effect an acquisition of the United Missouri 
River Company's transmission lines. Ryan's failure retarded the initia­
tion of power development from the Rainbow Falls plant, but did not 
prevent its eventual transmission of electricity over a new pole line 
to Butte and Anaconda—completed in 1910.* 
4. This was a course that had been rejected in the Hauser-Turner 
agreement of 1905. 
5. Telegram, R. S. Alley to John D. Ryan, October 19, 1909, PSR, 
Box 43, exhibit 188. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Letter, John D. Ryan to C. W. Wetmore, July 19, 1910, PSR, 
Box 43, exhibit 116. 
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While Ryan constructed Rainbow Dam and plotted with Wetmore on ways 
to deliver power to Butte and Anaconda, Samuel Hauser became increasingly 
concerned over the fate of his power interests. Hauser was not ignorant 
of the designs of the Ryan/Wetmore combination. Writing to M. H. Gerry 
in January, 1909, Hauser explained that "these same people [Butte Elec­
tric and Power Company] are in with Ryan and are figuring to secure as 
much [sic] of our customers as possible." Hauser added that "Addicks 
and Ryan have succeeded in making as Toole said 'the young old man' a 
8 
heap of trouble." The possibility of a Cancellation of his contracts 
with the Amalgamated Copper Company-and the consequent loss of business 
to the Ryan/Wetmore combination threatened the financial structure of 
Hauser's power companies. Aggravating the difficulties for the Helena 
water-power magnate were construction and financial problems in rebuild­
ing Hauser Dam and in completing plans for a third power facility at 
Wolf Creek (Holter Dam). 
A rnyriad of difficulties faced S. T. Hauser between 1908 and 1910. 
Chief among these was a problem that confronted Hauser after the collapse 
of the second dam. Rising costs for construction of Holter Dam forced 
the former governor's continual attention to the project's development. 
Inherent sluggishness in the project at Wolf Creek, coupled with struc­
tural and financial problems at both that facility and the reconstruc­
tion site of Hauser Dam, caused a serious drain on the monetary and 
personal resources of Hauser in the months following April, 1908. 
8. Letter, S. T. Hauser to M. H. Gerry, January 24, 1909, HP, 
Box 33, folder 12. 
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The principal difficulty in proceeding with the Holter Dam project 
was acquisition of the requisite capital. In July, 1908, Hauser's 
Capital City Improvement Company (the subsidiary firm that received the 
federal permit for the dam) engaged the services of the Stone and Web-
q 
ster Engineering Corporation for the Holter development. Stone and 
Webster's engineering experts estimated that the cost of construction 
of the dam and power plant would be $1.9 million. This figure was 
challenged by Hauser's general manager, M. H. Gerry, and by the Missouri 
River Company's consulting engineer, William de la Barre. Both men 
estimated that the cost of constructing the 110-foot high concrete dam 
and 20,000 horsepower generating plant would reach only $1.4 million. 
The half-million dollar difference was sufficient to cause a financially-
plagued S. T. Hauser uncertainty about the outcome of the projects.1^ 
Of greater concern to Hauser was his inability to continue construc­
tion of the dam once the work had begun in the spring of 1909. Stone 
9. Letter, William R. Barbour to S. T. Hauser, July 11, 1908, HP, 
Box 29. folder 32. The Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation was 
involved in numerous electric power development projects at the turn of 
the century. For a list of the company's holdings see Electric Power 
Development in the United States, U.S. Congress, Senate Doc. No. 316, 
part 3, 64th Cong., 1st sess. (1916), p. 465. 
10. Hauser was particularly concerned with the cost of the Wolf 
Creek project in light of the financial strain caused by the Hauser Dam 
failure. In a letter to D. P. Robinson, Stone and Webster Company presi­
dent, in October, 1908, Hauser claimed that while he realized "that the 
unfortunate loss of one dam will almost compel the expenditure of money 
on the side of extra precaution, ... I want something specific and 
definite as to your reasons for changing the plans and making the extra 
expenditures." Apparently, the higher figures were reluctantly accepted 
by Hauser, since Stone and Webster began work on the Wolf Creek project 
early in 1909. See Letter, Hauser to D. P. Robinson, October 27, 1908, 
HP, Box 33, folder 11. 
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and Webster Company President D. P. Robinson explained to Hauser in 
May, 1909, that, if only he (Hauser) could commit $200,000 immediately, 
the dam could be completed and operating by October, 1910.^ As work on 
the Holter Dam continued during the summer of 1909, new demands taxed 
the financial resources of S. T. Hauser. In a series of letters to 
S. T. Hauser in November, 1909, President Robinson anticipated that the 
funds then available to him for construction of the dam would not permit 
12 its completion. Consequently, Hauser faced a possible shutdown and 
was forced to request the Stone and Webster Company to use only the 
13 money then available in an effort to prepare the dam for abandonment.— 
In late December, Robinson prepared to cease operations at the Wolf 
Creek site, but, in early January, Hauser reversed his decision to slow 
the work effort. He requested that Robinson "proceed with the Capital 
City work on the basis that funds will be available as required to carry 
14 
the work on continuously until its final completion." 
S. T. Hauser's ability to proceed with the construction of Holter 
Dam was founded on the anticipated merger of the United Missouri River 
Power Company with the Capital City Improvement Company. Hauser and 
his associates anticipated floating a new bond issue soon after the 
11. Letter, D. P. Robinson to S. T. Hauser, May 25, 1909, HP, 
Box 30, folder 3. 
12. See Letters, D. P. Robinson to S. T. Hauser, November 22, 29, 
December 20, 1909, HP, Box 30, folder 3. 
13. Letter, D. P. Robinson to S. T. Hauser, November 13, 1909, 
HP, Box 30, folder 3. 
14. Letter, D. P. Robinson to S. T. Hauser, January 6, 1910, HP, 
Box 30, folder 17. 
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merger was effected. In addition, the power companies began new efforts 
to control construction costs. Hauser and General Manager M. H. Gerry 
scrutinized more carefully various authorizations for purchase of 
15 
materials and payment of expenses. Hauser and Gerry tried to restrict 
the engineers at the construction site.to expenses of no more than 
$50,000 monthly during the spring of 1910. Yet, Stone and Webster's 
cost estimates consistently exceeded that amount during the period."'® 
In July, 1910, D. P. Robinson acknowledged Hauser's request to keep 
expenditures within the $50,000 a month ceiling for the last quarter of 
1910, but estimated that his company would have to exceed the figure 
in order to complete construction at the Wolf Creek siteJ* 
S. T. Hauser's difficulties with financing the Holter Dam project 
were serious and threatening to the former governor's economic stability. 
Coupled with additional monetary and structural problems at the Hauser 
Dam reconstruction site, Hauser's business problems were acute. 
Rehabilitation of the Hauser Dam facility encountered serious 
delays from its start. The Stone and Webster engineering firm received 
the contract for the dam reconstruction project in January, 1909. As 
15. M. H. Gerry wrote to Hauser in March, 1910, charging that 
"owing to the excessive expenditures now being made by the Stone and 
Webster Engineering Corporation for the account of this Company [Capital 
City Improvement Company], ... it becomes impossible for this office 
to make any approval of expenditures for the account of construction at 
Camp Holter." Letter, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, March 24, 1910, HP, 
Box 30, folder 9. 
16. The cost figures were May, $86,900; June, $82,000; July, 
$69,000. Letter, D. P. Robinson to S. T. Hauser, May 12, 1910, HP, 
Box 30, folder 17. 
17. Letter, D. P. Robinson to Hauser, July 12, 1910, HP, Box 30, 
folder 17. 
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early as March of that year, M. H. Gerry wrote to Hauser informing the 
United Missouri Company president that very little work had been accom­
plished at the site. 
No work of any permanent nature had been started and 
the entire results thus far were in the nature of 
camp, equipment and preliminary construction., As I 
have never received any plans nor engineering infor­
mation regarding this work, I have been unable to 
form any opinion as to what was contemplated or how lfi 
the work could be carried to a successful conclusion.1® 
What bothered Gerry more than the fact that he could see no progress 
on the project was that it appeared to him that much of the work force 
was being laid off until after the high-water season had passed. The 
United Missouri Company general manager drew no conclusions from these 
19 observations, but he was obviously disturbed by the events. 
While M. H. Gerry entertained doubts as to the efficiency of the 
Stone and Webster managers, he was more skeptical of the quality of the 
Missouri River facility's engineering design. Throughout the 1909 con­
struction season at the Hauser Lake site, Gerry expressed particular 
concern that the new concrete dam was not designed to withstand high 
water similar to that of 1908. Gerry evidenced most concern about the 
capacity of the spillway at the new facility. He calculated that the 
design of the spillway did not allow sufficient water to be withdrawn 
from the lake during a period of high spring run-off. Such a deficiency 
would place added pressure on the dam and might cause the structure to 
18. Letter, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, March 16, 1910, HP, 
Box 30, folder 5. 
19. Ibid. 
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collapse. Stone and Webster President D. P. Robinson replied to this 
criticism by emphasizing to Hauser that such a circumstance could only 
happen if the flashboards on top of the dam were not removed (allowing 
water to overflow the dam) or if Canyon Ferry Dam failed. Robinson 
claimed that even the failure of the upriver dam would not insure the 
rise of Hauser Lake to the level necessary to place inordinate stress 
20 on the new dam. 
At the basis of M. H. Gerry's distrust of Stone and Webster com­
pany's work at Holter Dam and Hauser Dam was his doubt of the engineer­
ing firm's commitment to the projects.In January, 1910, D. P. Robinson 
informed Hauser that the bedrock under the proposed Holter Dam might be 
unstable. Gerry immediately responded to the claim by charging the 
engineering firm president with attempting to delay the project and to 
21 
raise costs. Hauser also expressed amazement to Robinson since he 
"presumed [that] this question had been settled by you and your engineers 
some six months ago—after spending three months in testing and boring 
22 
the foundation." Hauser suggested that an inspection team of engineers 
be sent to the Wolf Creek site for an examination of the situation. 
20. Letter, D. P. Robinson to S» T. Hauser, January 10, 1910, HP, 
Box 30, folder 17. M. H. Gerry inherently distrusted the Stone and 
Webster engineers. His criticisms of the Hauser Dam design dated from 
June, 1909. See letters, D. P. Robinson to S. T. Hauser, June 29, 1909, 
D. P. Robinson to J. & W. Seligman and Company, October 6, 1909, D. P. 
Robinson to S. T. Hauser, November 11, 1909, all in HP, Box 30, folder 3. 
21. Letter, D. P. Robinson to S. T. Hauser, January 26, 1910, HP, 
Box 30, folder 17. 
22. Letter, S. T. Hauser to D. P. Robinson, January 29, 1910, HP, 
Box 33, folder 13. 
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An inspection team composed of Gerry and engineers representing 
Stone and Webster and A. B. Leach and Company, a major investor in the 
project, inspected the Holter Dam facility in February, 1910. After 
lengthy discussions and negotiations, a general concensus as to the 
stability of the site's bedrock was reached. M. H. Gerry reluctantly 
agreed to changes in design that would add additional reinforcement to 
23 
the concrete dam. 
Gerry's skepticism of the Stone and Webster Company's design 
changes at Holter Dam was not predicated on his lack of concern for the 
structure's stability. Indeed, as has been shown, he questioned the 
engineering firm's failure to provide for possible record high water 
at the Hauser Dam facility. Instead, Gerry's lack of faith was predi­
cated on Stone and Webster's motivation for proposing the design changes. 
Even after the February agreement had been concluded, Gerry reported to 
Hauser that the consulting engineers continued in their efforts to 
"discredit the foundation rock" at the Holter Dam site.^ The United 
Missouri Company general manager was particularly concerned that Stone 
and Webster's workers were blasting the bedrock with excessive charges 
of dynamite and causing large cracks in the foundation. He added, "I 
find that they are also making up lists of the little cracks and leakage 
23. Letters, Charles T. Main, Henry Herrick and M. S. Parker to 
M. H. Gerry, February 9, 1910, HP, Box 30, folder 17; M. H. Gerry to 
S. T. Hauser, February 11, 1910 and February 12, 1910, HP, Box 30, 
folder 9. 
24. Letter, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, April 9, 1910, HP, 
Box 30, folder 9. 
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25 
seams near the surface and evidently endeavoring to. carry on the fight." 
Other problems with the Stone and Webster company plagued M. H. 
Gerry. A year earlier, in February, 1909, he reported to Hauser that 
the labor practices of the Boston-based engineering firm had been de-
26 
clared "unfair" by the Montana Federation of Labor. Referring to a 
written notice that had been published by the union, Gerry reported 
that the low wage scale ($1.75 per day for a laborer) and the company's 
policy of hiring foreign labor formed the basis for the charges. Gerry 
was particularly concerned that this situation not cause a problem for 
the United Missouri Company's Butte and Anaconda customers. Strong 
unionism in both industrial communities could prevent the sale of elec­
tricity from the Hauser-owned plants to mines and smelters. Gerry re­
minded Hauser that, "We have gotten along here ever since our plants 
were started without strikes in the midst of all kinds of bitter labor 
controversies and disputes; at the same time we have succeeded in keep­
ing the wage scale at a moderate figure and all of our men out of the 
27 
union excepting those in Butte." 
Supporting Gerry's complaints about the Stone and Webster company's 
labor controversy were suspicions that workers at the two dam sites were 
25. Ibid. 
26. The Montana State Federation of Labor was organized in 1894, 
and labeled the Montana Trades and Labor Council. A few years later, 
the name was changed to the Montana State Federation of Labor. 
The Federation was an independent union that chartered other unions, 
primarily those involving lumber, sawmill, and brick-making workers. 
The Federation was affiliated with the American Federation of Labor in 
1907. Montana State Federation of Labor, Yearbook: Golden Jubilee: 
1894-1944 (n.p. 1944), p. 53. 
27. Letter, M.H. Gerry to S.T. Hauser, February 2, 1909, HP, Box 
29, folder 44. 
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sabotaging the plants. In March, 1910, Gerry wrote to Hauser and en­
closed a confidential report from a private detective firm located in 
Helena. N. P. Walters, of the firm of the same name, reported to the 
general manager that one of his (Walters) "operatives" had overheard a 
barroom conversation between two employees of Stone and Webster. Both 
men detailed situations in which their foremen had halted work at 
Hauser Dam which was subsequently damaged by high water. Before with­
drawing from the area, the foremen ordered their men to retrieve any 
materials that belonged to the construction company. The Walters' 
"operative" related that both Stone and Webster employees believed that, 
with a bit more effort, the high water would not have caused any damage 
to the dam. 
These men all talked as if there was something 
crooked in connection with the Stone and Webster 
contract, and they had an idea that the Stone 
and Webster concern allow these accidents pur­
posely in order to eventually discourage those 
who are putting up the money for the work and 
to cause them to discontinue putting up money, 
and the Stone and Webster Company would then 
bring it about so that they will get control 
of the dam.28 
The two employees of the engineering firm had information that Stone 
and Webster had attempted to overrun costs at a dam near Seattle in an 
29 
effort to gain control of that venture. 
Without orders from Gerry, Detective Walters instructed his 
Operative #7 to obtain employment at the Hauser Dam site, under the 
28. Letter, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, March 18, 1910, HP, 
Box 30, folder 18. 
29. Ibid. 
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guise of a carpenter. In a detailed report to his employer a few weeks 
later, the agent related numerous instances of waste and inefficiency 
at the construction site. The pseudo-carpenter detailed how good lum­
ber, nails and spikes were often discarded as scrap, and how tools were 
often dispensed from the company shop without any attempt to account for 
them. Operative #7 explained that there was little planning of work at 
30 
the site and that much time was lost in the lack of coordinated tasks. 
General Manager Gerry claimed no solicitation or prior knowledge of 
these reports, but wasted little time in forwarding them to S. T. Hauser 
for the power company president's review. 
As construction delays and design problems continued and costs rose, 
M. H. Gerry became more certain that the Stone and Webster Company's 
loyalty to S. T. Hauser's project was suspect. Gerry clearly believed 
that the company's president, D. P. Robinson, was surreptitiously pro­
moting the interests of the Ryan/Wetmore combination. As early as 
November 6, 1908, Gerry informed Hauser that Robinson had met with John 
D. Ryan in Great Falls and had taken a copy of the Holter Dam plans with 
31 him. Further evidencing the duplicity of the arrangement between 
Robinson and Ryan was the hiring of Henry M. Herrick in February, 1910, 
as a consulting engineer to Stone and Webster at the Hauser projects. 
32 Supposedly Herrick also was employed by the Great Falls Power Company. 
30. Ibid.; Special Report of Operative #7, March 16, 1910. 
31. Letter, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, November 6, 1908, HP, 
Box 29, folder 23. 
32. Letter, S. T. Hauser to the Board of Directors, February 23, 
1910, HP, Box 33, folder 13. 
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As Gerry remarked in a confidential letter to Hauser in April, 1910, 
Herrick seemed to be involved in the most sensitive discussions with 
33 
Robinson and other Stone and Webster officials. 
By mid-April, 1910, M. H. Gerry had concluded that the actions of 
the Stone and Webster Company were cause for concern. Repeated changes 
in design by the firm threatened to bankrupt the United Missouri River 
Power Company. Gerry claimed that Robinson's changes in design had not 
34 "been suggested in good faith but rather for an ulterior purpose." 
As Gerry conceded to Hauser, the general manager had very little control 
over the costs or the production rate at either-the Holter Dam-or-Hauser 
Dam sites. Gerry issued an ultimatum to Hauser that he (Gerry) be given 
more control over the project, or "I must ask that I be entirely re­
lieved of all responsibility."^ 
M. H. Gerry did not quit S. T. Hauser's employ in April, 1910. He 
continued to serve as Hauser's representative in Helena in part because 
of the decision to restrict the Stone and Webster Company's expenses 
to $50,000 per month. Nevertheless, the inability of the power company 
to cap the mounting expenditures of its contractors continued to distress 
Gerry. 
S. T. Hauser shared some of his manager's reservations about the 
Stone and Webster Company and their progress on the two dams. In a 
33. Letter, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, April 12, 1910, HP, 
Box 30, folder 9. 
34. Ibid. 
35. Letter, M. H. Gerry to Hauser, April 13, 1910, HP, Box 30, 
folder 9. 
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letter to D. P. Robinson in January, 1910, Hauser noted that he 
(Robinson) had "selected an engineer that is now in charge of, and is an 
36 * 
employee of the Great Falls Power Co." While acknowledging Robinson's 
perogative to hire whomever he chose, Hauser requested the Stone and 
37 Webster president to try to keep "within the family." 
Hauser may have been concerned about the activities and inactivity 
of the engineering firm's representatives, but he recognized the need 
to placate the interest of all parties in his power development ventures. 
A concurrent attempt to reconstruct Hauser Dam and to erect a third 
hydroelectric facility on the Missouri River at Wolf Creek required more 
38 than $5 million worth of investment capital. To secure this money, 
Hauser necessarily had to woo various financial interest. 
During the late winter of 1909, Hauser counseled M. H. Gerry to 
exercise moderation in his remarks about the Stone and Webster 
36. Letter, S. T. Hauser to D. P. Robinson, January 29, 1910, 
HP, Box 33, folder 17. 
37. Ibid. 
38. It is extremely difficult to determine Hauser's estimated costs 
for either reconstructing the Hauser Dam or rebuilding Holter Dam. At 
one point, Hauser believed that Hauser Dam would cost approximately 
$500,000 to reconstruct. In June, 1910, D. P. Robinson of Stone and 
Webster Engineering Corporation informed Hauser that the price tag had 
soared to more than $2.5 million. Similarly, the cost of Holter Dam 
varied from $1.7 million to more than $3 million. The best estimate of 
Hauser's financial predicament is revealed in a letter that he wrote to 
his son in May, 1910. In that lengthy missive, the elder Hauser con­
fessed that both Stone and Webster and the financial house of A. B. 
Leach and Company had invested more than $5 million in the "Helena 
Enterprises." See letter, S. T. Hauser to S. T. Hauser, Jr., May 14, 
1910, HP, Box 33, folder 13. See also letter, S. T. Hauser to Isaac 
Seligman, May 18, 1909, HP, Box 33, folder 13; and letter, D. P. Robin­
son to S. T. Hauser, June 3, 1910, HP, Box 30, folder 17. 
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Engineering Corporation. That firm's monetary connections on Wall Street 
had helped Hauser secure much of the New York City capital that he needed 
for the dams. Hauser acknowledged the engineering firm's "shortcomings" 
but stated that it had supported him "in the face of powerful, if not 
39 
actual enemies." In the midst of the controversy over the design of 
the dams and their increasing cost in the spring of 1910, Hauser again 
rose to the defense of the Stone and Webster Company. 
In a letter to his son, Samuel T. Hauser, Jr., the former governor 
evidenced sheer expediency. He admitted that "Stone and Webster's 
40 
representati ves -had made some- fearful-mi stakes r" Oesp i te these -errors-* 
the elder Hauser believed that the firm's commitment to the projects was 
solid. In a complicated series of negotiations, Henry Seligman, A. B. 
Leach and Charles A. Stone (representing Stone and Webster) had pledged 
$1.75 million to the completion of Hauser Dam. In addition, Stone and 
Webster had offered an additional $1.3 million to Hauser. Hauser ex­
plained to his son that finishing the reconstruction project was vital 
to the successful prosecution of the Holter Dam facility since Leach 
would offer $12 million worth of bonds for sale on the London market 
41 
once the old dam had been reconstructed. 
Hauser expressed concern to his son that General Manager Gerry's 
dislike for Stone and Webster's representatives contributed to an 
39. Letter, S. T. Hauser to M. H. Gerry, March 22, 1909, HP, 
Box 33, folder 12. 
40. Letter, S. T. Hauser to S. T. Hauser, Jr., May 14, 1910, 
HP, Box 33, folder 13. 
41. Ibid. 
attitude that the dams could not be built. He asked that all concerned 
recognize the "desperate situation that we are now in. Hauser implied 
that if professional and personal differences between the engineers 
could not be resolved then at least an appearance of concensus must be 
fostered. 
In conclusion, my boy, I will say that you may read 
this letter to n\y friend John S'. M. Neal, Gerry's 
partner, and tell him that he should at least buy 
the ice to keep Gerry's head cool and make, him co­
operate and realize that the firm of Stone and 
Webster have no personal feeling in the matter 
whatever, and that business is business and demands 
the suppression of personal feeling to the end of 
success.43 
Hauser anticipated that by drawing on the financial resources of Stone 
and Webster, he would inevitably tie their fortunes and prospects for 
success to his own. 
S. T. Hauser's approach to securing the backing of Stone and Web­
ster and other financial concerns was consistent with his earlier 
alliances with H. H. Rogers and Amalgamated Copper Company. Character­
istically, the aging Montanan would not acknowledge the possibility 
that the successful completion of Hauser or Holter hydroelectric plants 
would not necessarily benefit him. The threat of losing the lucrative 
Amalgamated contracts once John D. Ryan's Rainbow Dam was complete did 
not deter the formidable gentleman. Hauser continued to press for co­
operation, financial control, and increased investment in the United 
Missouri River Power Company projects during late spring and early 
42. Ibid. 43. Ibid. 
summer of 1910. At the same time, Ryan and Charles Wetmore pursued 
their plans to complete the Rainbow project at Great Falls and to trans­
mit electrical power to the Amalgamated mines and smelters at Butte and 
45 
Anaconda. 
The likelihood that the completion of Rainbow Dam would mean a 
termination of United Missouri River Power Company contracts with Amal­
gamated did not escape S. T. Hauser. In April, 1909, he requested 
M. H. Gerry to visit the site of the Great Falls hydroelectric plant 
46 and to report on that project. In September of that year, William A. 
Clark informed Hauser that John D. Ryan had assured him (Clark) that 
the Rainbow plant would replace the Hauser-owned facilities as a sup­
plier of power to Amalgamated. Ryan claimed that the new dam and gen­
erators would produce 28,000 horsepower of electricity, 8,000 horsepower 
of which would be furnished to the city of Great Falls and the balance 
44. One of the reasons for consolidating the subsidiary power 
companies under the United Missouri Company in 1910 was to expedite 
the funding of the two hydroelectric plants. 
45. Hauser also was pressured by the congressional authorization 
to proceed with completion of the Holter Dam project. Federal attempts 
to force time limits on dam projects threatened Hauser's permit for the 
Wolf Creek facility. After consultation with Montana's Senator Thomas 
H. Carter, Hauser was assured that he would have at least three more 
years to complete Holter Dam. See letters, S. T. Hauser to Thomas A. 
Carter, January 27, 1909, HP, Box 33, folder 2; and letter, Thomas H. 
Carter to S. T. Hauser, January 30, 1909, HP, Box 29, folder 36. 
46. Gerry estimated that the Rainbow plant would produce approxi­
mately 17,500 horsepower of electricity. Letter, M. H. .Gerry to S. T. 
Hauser, April 12, 1909, HP, Box 33, folder 12. 
47 transmitted to Butte and Anaconda. Clark implied that he was resigned 
to the inevitability of losing the Amalgamated business and suggested to 
Hauser that the United Missouri Company sell its Helena-to-Butte trans-
48 
mission line to Ryan. 
Although facing considerable financial pressure from the Holter Dam 
project and the reconstruction effort at Hauser Dam, S. T. Hauser would 
not accept defeat and agree to sell or lease his transmission lines. In 
March, 1910, M. H. Gerry informed Hauser that John Gillie, superinten­
dent of the Amalgamated mines in Butte, stated that the power would be 
disconnected "as-soon as the Great Falls plant was completed and in 
49 readiness to deliver power." Even at this critical point in the 
future of his hydroelectric facilities, Hauser would not capitulate to 
the Ryan/Wetmore combination and sell the power lines. The delay cost 
John D. Ryan dearly. While the Rainbow plant was ready to furnish power 
to Butte and Anaconda in early July, 1910, Ryan had to await construc-
50 
tion of a new power line and substation on the Butte/Anaconda system. 
In late July, 1910, the transmission facilities in Butte were com­
plete and everything was ready for the delivery of power between that 
47. Letter, William A. Clark to S. T. Hauser, September 10, 1909, 
HP, Box 29, folder 38. 
48. Ibid. 
49. Letter, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, March 16, 1910, HP, 
Box 30, folder 18. 
50. Letter, John D. Ryan to C. W. Wetmore, July 19, 1910, PSR, 
Box 43, exhibit 116. Ryan laid direct responsibility for this delay to 
Hauser's intransigence on the lease or sale of the United Missouri 
Company's transmission lines. 
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community and the Great Falls plant. On Ju.ly.28, 1910, Ryan informed 
C. W. Wetmore that, "I believe it is now safe to have the Amalgamated 
Company give notice to the Missouri River Power Company, cancelling all 
51 
their contracts ..." Knowing that the transmission system would be 
completed soon, Ryan also suggested that Amalgamated keep the Missouri 
River Power Company contract that served the Anaconda smelters until the 
Butte-to-Anaconda line could be finished. Ryan estimated that notice 
would be given to the United Missouri Company in time for a termination 
of service on September 1, 1910. 
Nineteen days after the July 28 letter, the Amalgamated Copper 
Company gave formal notice to the United Missouri River Power Company 
that three of the power firm's contracts would be terminated in thirty 
52 
days. On September 17, the United Missouri lines were disconnected 
from Amalgamated plants and the power was shifted to the Butte Electric 
and Power Company. The following month, the Butte Water Company and the 
53 
Butte Electric Company also terminated their contracts with Hauser. 
By mid-November, 1910, Gerry unhappily announced to Hauser that "Amalga­
mated have today transferred all their remaining power to the other 
54 
system." 
51. Letter, John D. Ryan to C. W. Wetmore, July 28, 1910, PSR, 
Box 43, exhibit 95. 
52. The cancelled contracts included (1) a 1905 agreement for 4250 
horsepower, (2) a 1904 agreement for 7,000 horsepower, (3) a 1901 agree­
ment for 2,000 horsepower. See letter, John G. Brown to S. T. Hauser, 
October 7, 1910, HP, Box 30, folder 19. 
53. Letters, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, October 10 and 22, 1910, 
HP, Box 30, folder 18. 
54. Telegram, M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, November 16, 1910, 
HP, Box 30, folder 18. 
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Notwithstanding the events that unfolded in mid-:August, 1910, 
S. T. Hauser believed that he could ultimately retain control of his 
hydroelectric facilities. Hauser claimed that Amalgamated had illegally 
cancelled the power contracts. Specifically, Amalgamated had terminated 
the 1905 agreement on the grounds that the period of contract had ex­
pired. Hauser and his attorney, William Wallace, Jr., on the other 
hand, contended that the contract was still in force. A clause in the 
contract stipulated that if power from the plants was disrupted by an 
"act of God," then "the terms of this contract shall be extended and 
55 continued for a period equal to such suspension." Although Amalga­
mated1 s lawyers asserted that the failure of Hauser Dam could be attri­
buted to the negligence of the power company, Wallace and Hauser believed 
otherwise. 
Governor Hauser and his attorney argued the legal validity of their 
cause,but the ability to withstand a protracted court battle over the 
issues was clearly not theirs. Amalgamated withheld payment for any 
power that had been contracted after the termination date of September 17, 
56 and Hauser had little recourse to collect the overdue account. 
55. Letter, William Wallace, Jr., to S. T. Hauser, November 8, 
1910, HP, Box 30, folder 19. 
56. Letters, S. T. Hauser to W. B. Gower, August 23, 1910, HP, 
Box 33, folder 13, and M. H. Gerry to S. T. Hauser, November 23, 1910, 
HP, Box 30, folder 18. Attorney Wallace notified Amalgamated officials 
in October, .1910, that the company would be held liable for the con­
tracted power. This ultimatum had little affect on the copper trust's 
attitude. See letter, John G. Brown to S. T. Hauser, October 7, 1910, 
HP, Box 30, folder 19. 
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S. T. Hauser had no success convincing the Amalgamated Copper Com­
pany to honor its five-year-old agreement with the United Missouri River 
Power Company. The persistent capitalist did not despair, however, in 
his belief that the copper company would eventually need power from his 
hydroelectric holdings. In a letter to New York financier Henry Seligman 
in March, 1910, Hauser stated that the United Missouri Company had a 
"connected load" from its customers of 26,000 horsepower, although the 
failure of the dam prevented the firm from delivering that much power. 
Hauser claimed an additional 30,000 horsepower that was being negoti­
ated with present and prospective customers.Hauser posed the question 
to Seligman, "How much of this 56,000 horsepower can Ryan, together 
57 with the Wetmore Company, furnish." He argued that, at best, Ryan's 
Rainbow Dam plant could generate only 14,000 horsepower, and that little 
of this would be available to customers outside the Great Falls area. 
Hauser's estimation of the demand for electric power and his 
assessment of the capacity of the Great Falls facility were clearly 
inaccurate. Indeed, while the Ryan plant proved to offer more than 
20,000 horsepower once it was fully operational, Hauser restated his 
belief that the plant could produce no more than 12,000 to 15,000 
58 
horsepower. Unwaning optimism in the face of the Ryan/Wetmore com­
bination could not protect Hauser from the affects of the loss of 
57. Letter, S. T. Hauser to Henry Seligman, March 25, 1910, HP, 
Box 33, folder 13. 
58. Letters, S. T. Hauser to Henry Seligman, September 27, 1910, 
HP, Box 33, folder 13, and S. T. Hauser to Henry Seligman, January 24, 
1911, HP, Box 33, folder 14. 
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Amalgamated's power business. Hauser undoubtedly feared for the finan­
cial future of his power companies in the late summer and early fall of 
1910. But he had little time to ponder the veracity of electrical 
supply and demand predictions as he was forced to contend with the dis­
affection of his most trusted financial supporters. 
Difficulties with completing work on the Hauser and Holter Dams 
prompted S. T. Hauser's concern over losing his financial backing. An 
inspection of the Montana hydroelectric plants, conducted by a key 
Hauser financier, Henry Seligman, in June, 1910, helped allay some fears 
over the future of the power companies. But Hauser was anxious never­
theless over "the recent effort of our opponents to break us 
financially. 
Efforts by Hauser to retain this principal financier were futile 
in the face of Amalgamated's notice to terminate electric power con­
tracts with the United Missouri River Power Company. Although Hauser 
received official notice of the termination in mid-August, 1910, he did 
not inform Henry Seligman of the situation. When Seligman learned of 
59. Hauser was referring to the construction of Rainbow Dam and 
the rumors of new contracts between Amalgamated and the Great Falls 
firm. Letter, S. T. Hauser to John S. M. Neil, July 2, 1910, HP, 
Box 33, folder 13. Seligman was not totally reassured of the United 
Missouri Company's ability to withstand Ryan's economic pressure as an 
August 1, 1910, letter from Hauser evidences. Seligman was assured by 
Hauser that the company would do whatever was necessary to reach an 
accommodation with Ryan and Wetmore—even if this meant consolidation 
of power holdings. Hauser sought to impress Seligman, however, with 
the enormous potential of the United Missouri Company's hydroelectric 
power sites. Hauser reverted once again to hyperbolic statements re­
garding the company's ability to meet a growing demand for electric 
power. Letter, S. T. Hauser to Henry Seligman, August 1, 1910, HP, 
Box 33, folder 13. 
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the disconnection of Amalgamated power in mid-September, he was justi­
fiably angry with Hauser. 
Gerry wires that the Amalgamated Company have cut 
off over 8,000 HP, and, judging from the notices 
which were sent out recently, in another month all 
the power will be cut off. I understand that the 
Amalgamated gave notice in the early part of August 
to this effect, and I consider it very wrong of 
whoever is responsible for withholding this from 
me, as had I been aware of this fapt, it would have 
been barely possible to have averted what has been 
done.®" 
Seligman blamed the high cost of the third dam (Holter) on the 
power company's problems and suggested that construction at the Wolf 
Creek site be halted. Even with this action, the New York banker anti­
cipated great difficulties in solving the company's problems. Referring 
to negotiations with Amalgamated, he stated, "We cannot afford to dic­
tate terms. 
While Seligman was displeased that he had not been consulted about 
the contract cancellations, he was furious that William A. Clark had 
not been officially told of the terminations. Seligman believed that 
Clark was the man who could save the power company from ruin and that 
Hauser had to be completely honest in conversations with the ex-senator. 
I am dumbfounded at your behavior, for on Sunday 
you had a four hours' interview with the Senator 
and evidently failed to post him as to the true 
condition of affairs. If you are not thoroughly 
candid with the Senator who, in my opinion, is 
60. Letter, Henry Seligman to S. T. Hauser, September 20, 1910, 
HP, Box 30, folder 15. 
61. Ibid. 
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the only man that can bring about a settlement, 
I can see serious trouble staring you in the face. 
Issuing a note of resignation, Seligman added that "I am getting thor­
oughly disgusted with the whole business and am almost prepared to 
quit."63 
M. A. Clark was probably not as unaware of the Amalgamated action 
as Seligman implied. Nonetheless, when he obtained the same telegram 
from M. H. Gerry that Seligman had received, the ex-senator expressed 
complete shock at the disconnections. Of more surprise to Glark was 
Mauser's lack of candor. 
Mr. Gerry stated that no doubt you had advised me 
of this at the meeting I had with you on Saturday. 
If you had this information, I cannot understand 
why you did not give it to me, as you in no wise 
referred to it.64 
Clark stated that the situation was now "quite critical" and that the 
contract cancellations could stop negotiations on the future bond sale 
65 
and cause more financial difficulties. 
Despite Hauser's promotion of the potential need for electric power 
from the United Missouri Company's facilities, Seligman and Clark were 
convinced that the Rainbow Dam plant would destroy their firm. Of 
particular concern to Seligman was Hauser's unwillingness to admit the 
62. Letter, Henry Seligman to S. T. Hauser, September 22, 1910, 
HP, Box 30, folder 15. 
63. Ibid. 
64. Letter, W. A. Clark to S. T. Hauser, September 21, 1910, HP, 
Box 30, folder 10. 
65. Ibid. 
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threat posed by Ryan, Wetmore and Amalgamated. They claimed that 
Hauser's failure to inform either supporter of the United Missouri 
Company's recent setbacks or to manage the company effectively prompted 
them to abandon the threatened power business. By late Septentoer, 1910, 
two of the first supporters of Hauser's Helena Water and Electric Power 
Company has rejected their old friend's unflagging optimism and urged 
a consolidation with Ryan and Wetmore. 
On September 28, 1910, Seligman informed Hauser that the Board of 
Directors at the United Missouri River Power Company had created a new 
Executive Committee. In the future, General Manager M. H. Gerry would 
report directly to the Board and not to Hauser. Although Hauser was 
appointed to the committee, Seligman was "most anxious to have one of 
the Amalgamated on that Committee." Amalgamated, of course, still owned 
66 
stock in the United Missouri River Power Company. 
Formation of this Executive Committee marked the end of Hauser's 
control over the direction of the power companies. His investors had 
acknowledged the increasing demand for industrial electricity in Montana 
and had tolerated the long months of delay and rising costs of the two 
Hauser-sponsored Missouri River dams. Yet, the persistent efforts of 
the Ryan/Wetmore combination broke the personal and financial bond 
between Hauser and his eastern source of capital. The former gover­
nor's insistence that his facilities would eventually share in the 
state's electrical future had little influence with men who had already 
66. Letter, Henry Seligman to S. T. Hauser, September 28, 1910, 
HP, Box 30, folder 15. 
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" 67 
bowed to Amalgamated.: 
In the months that followed the September defection of his finan­
cial support, S. T. Hauser attempted to re-establish his leadership of 
the United Missouri River Power Company. He reaffirmed his previous 
statements that the Ryan/Wetmore combination could not supply all of 
the electrical power demand in Montana. Hauser optimistically pre­
dicted that the Helena-based power companies would eventually garner 
a fair share of the industrial power market in the state.68 Termina­
tion of the Amalgamated contracts and the disconnection of the United 
Missouri Company's transmission lines did not-encourage Hauser's in­
vestors to wait for the inevitable increased demand. 
In March, 1910, Hauser's companies were supplying approximately 
19,000 horsepower of electricity to their customers. Of this load, 
between 6,000 and 10,000 horsepower was supplied by Wetmore under the 
1908 agreement with Hauser. As much as 4,000 horsepower was being 
generated by the expensive Butte steam auxiliary plant owned by the 
69 
United Missouri Company. Following cancellation of the copper 
67. Hauser was correct, of course, in assuming that his plants 
were needed in the total development of hydroelectric power in Montana. 
As noted in the 1908 Cooper and Powelson Report, Hauser's plants were 
an important part of the Missouri River Basin power system. The alli­
ance between Wetmore and Ryan was one of expediency and one that anti­
cipated the eventual assumption of the Hauser-controlled interests. 
68. See various letters, S. T. Hauser to W. A. Clark, October 3, 
1910, HP, Box 33, folder 13; S. T. Hauser to W. A. Clark, October 12, 
1910, HP, Box 30, folder 18; S. T. Hauser to Henry Seligman, January 17, 
1911, HP, Box 33, folder 14. 
69. Hauser continually altered figures for the amount of power 
that Wetmore's firm supplied to United Missouri River customers. In 
one estimate to Henry Seligman in March, 1910, Hauser suggested that 
trust's contracts with Hauser, the aging capitalist's power contracts 
were reduced to a minimal 4,000 horsepower. In early 1911, Hauser 
tried to show his disaffected supporters that projected power sales 
would soon raise the company's distribution to 20,000 constant and 
intermittent horsepower. But the old promoter's principal backers, 
Clark and Seligman, were not encouraged by these extravagant estimates. 
During the late fall and early winter of 1910-1911, Henry Seligman led 
the efforts of the newly-formed Executive Committee to reach an agree­
ment between the Ryan/Wetmore combination and the United Missouri River 
Power Company.^ At Seligman's urging, the Executive Committee halted 
72 
work at Holter Dam near Wolf Creek. 
The defection of old friend William A. Clark was a special blow to 
the aging S. T. Hauser. During the succeeding months, Clark sought the 
counsel of Hauser and kept his co-investor informed of negotiations 
between Seligman, Ryan and the Amalgamated people. Notwithstanding 
these courtesies, Clark had long since abandoned hopes for the survival 
the figure was between 3,000 and 5,000 horsepower. Later that year, he 
indicated that a more accurate figure was between 6,000 and 10,000 
horsepower. It is more likely that the figure for constant horsepower 
was closer to the 6,000 than 10,000 horsepower estimate. See letters, 
S. T. Hauser to Henry Seligman, March 25, 1910, and September 27, 1910, 
HP, Box 33, folder 13. 
70. Letters, S. T. Hauser to Henry Seligman, January 24, 1911, 
and S. T. Hauser to W. A. Clark, March 3, 1911, HP, Box 33, folder 14, 
S. T. Hauser to W. A. Clark, March 10, 1911, HP, Box 33, folder 14. 
71. Letters, W. A. Clark to S. T. Hauser, October 15, 1910, 
October 25, 1910, HP, Box 33, folder 10, and S. T. Hauser to W. A. 
Clark, January 16, 1911, HP, Box 33, folder 14. 
72. Letter, D. P. Robinson to S. T. Hauser, November 29, 1910, 
HP, Box 30, folder 17. 
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of the United Missouri River Power Company under the leadership of 
S. T. Hauser. After September, 1910, the ex-senator openly supported 
attempts by the United Missouri Company's directorate to reach an 
73 accommodation with Ryan and Wetmore. 
During the spring and summer of 1911, Henry Seligman negotiated 
with Ryan and Wetmore for the sale of the United Missouri River Power 
Company. Hauser, meanwhile, futilely worked with Helena newspaperman 
J. S. Neil to effect a reorganization of the company. When that effort 
failed in March, 1911, Hauser could no longer prevent sale of his power 
74 
business. In April, 1911, Hauser finally capitulated to the Butte 
75 
Electric and Power Company. 
73. Clark's exasperation with Hauser is particularly noted in the 
politician's skepticism of Hauser's low power production figures for 
the Great Falls plant. Noting the discrepancies between M. H. Gerry's 
estimates for the facility (11,000 - 14,000 horsepower) and engineer 
Max Hebgen's projections (20,000 horsepower), Clark warned Hauser to 
beware of being misled. 
Somebody is off about this business, and are wrong 
and they have misled you to feel that the United 
Missouri River Power Company was independent of the 
Amalgamated Copper Company and that they would be 
obliged to take our power, then of course they will 
have led you and the rest of us into a hole from 
which it will be difficult for us to extricate 
ourselves. [Letter, W. A. Clark to S. T. Hauser, 
January 18, 1911, HP, Box 30, folder 22.] 
74. After repeated correspondence with Hauser in March, 1910, 
J. S. Neil reported to the United Missouri Company president that his 
"party declines to make investment because my proposition does not 
give him ownership of a majority of the stock." Telegram, J. S. Neil 
to S. T. Hauser, March 25, 1911, HP, Box 30, folder 26. 
75. Telegram, John S. Neil to S. T. Hauser, April 10, 1911, HP, 
Box 30, folder 26. 
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There were changes in personnel at the reorganized United Missouri 
River Power Company in the summer of 1911. William Gower, secretary 
for the company during its long fight with Ryan and Wetmore, was re-
76 
placed in July by R. S. Condit. The following month, M. H. Gerry 
was demoted from general manager to consulting engineer. Max Hebgen, ^ 
formerly of the Butte Electric and Power Company, joined the United 
Missouri River Company as its new general manager. This latter change 
was instigated by John D. Ryan.^ 
S. T. Hauser retained a financial and official interest in the 
United Missouri River Power Company after its sale to the Butte firm. 
At the United Missouri Company's November meeting, Hauser was re­
elected to the presidency of the reorganized business. Despite 
Hauser's title, Albert Strauss, of J. W. Seligman and Company, directed 
the new organization as Chairman of the Reorganization Committee. After 
so long a battle, the seventy-nine-year-old Hauser was in no position 
to challenge Strauss' leadership. Hauser's resignation as a director 
and president of the United Missouri River Power Company on June 19, 
78 
1912, undoubtedly surprised nobody. 
New personnel and leadership at the United Missouri Company wet4? 
precursors to.greater changes. Two weeks prior to Hauser's resignation from 
76. Letter, R. S. Condit to M. H. Gerry, July 24, 1911, HP, 
Box 30, folder 31. 
77. Letter, J. D. Ryan to Max Hebgen, August 14, 1911, PSR, 
exhibit 199. 
78. Letter, S. T. Hauser to Board of Directors, United Missouri 
River Power Company, June 19, 1912, HP, Box 33, folder 15. 
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from the Board of Directors of his old company, holders of notes of the 
79 
United Missouri Company formed the Butte Syndicate. It was this group 
of investors led by C. W. Wetmore and the Butte Electric and Power Com­
pany that joined with John D. Ryan to form the Montana Power Company on 
80 
December 12, 1912. John D. Ryan and C. W. Wetmore had indeed made 
"the young old man a heap of trouble." 
A number pf forces and events combined to trouble S. T. Hauser 
following the collapse of Hauser Dam in April, 1908. Overwhelming 
financial requirements caused by the simultaneous construction of two 
hydroelectric facilites created a severe cash problem for the electric 
power promoter. Constantly rising costs of both major projects forced 
the former Montana governor to make repeated overtures to his supporters 
for additional funds. 
Construction and design problems faced by the Stone and Webster 
Engineering Corporation contributed to the delays and to the resultant 
cost increases. Although Hauser never shared General Manager Gerry's 
distrust of the nationally-known construction firm, he did believe that 
Stone and Webster had poor leadership at the Montana construction sites. 
79. Butte Syndicate, April 24, 1913, HP, Box 62, folder 52. 
80. The Montana Power Company included the Butte Electric and 
Power Company and its three principal subsidiaries: the United Missouri 
River Power Company, the Billings and Eastern Montana Power Company and 
the Madison River Power Company. For a more detailed description of the 
merger, see Douglas Leighton's "The Montana Power Company," passim. 
(Hauser retained some stock in the Montana Power Company through his 
Helena and Livingston Smelting and Refinirw-Gonmato'.*} Letter, J. & W. 
Seligman and Company to S. T. Hauser, Marcn 4, 1913, HP, Box 31, 
folder 11. 
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In a letter to W. A. Clark following the cancellation of /the Amalgamated 
contracts, Hauser stated that: 
Stone and Webster are honorable men, but I believe 
their manager has made a terrible failure (costing 
us hundreds of thousands of dollars), that he has 
become demoralized and is doing what he can to 
hedge out.8' 
Hauser claimed that the demise of the United Missouri River Power Company 
could be laid directly at the feet of the Stone and Webster Company's 
82 
local management. 
S. T. Hauser's character and personal dynamism could have assisted 
him in solving the difficult problems with Hauser~and Holter~dams7 
His past career in banking, in mining, and in hydroelectric development 
evidenced the promoter's ability to align supporters and to surmount 
perplexing financial hurdles. Hauser may have accomplished these entre­
preneurial feats had he not encountered the opposition of John D. Ryan. 
The junior capitalist had such strong corporate support for his hydro­
electric ventures that attempts by the senior Hauser to counter Ryan's 
plans were fruitless. Once John Ryan succeeded to the presidency of 
the Amalgamated Copper Company and had allied with C. W. Wetmore's 
Butte Electric and Power Company, S. T. Hauser's fate was sealed. The 
Amalgamated Company was the major consumer of industrial electricity 
in Montana. The copper trust's conversion to electrical power and its 
assumption of other mining properties in 1906 insured that the power 
81. Letter, S. T. Hauser to W. A. Clark, November 1, 1910, 
HP, Box 33, folder 13. 
82. Ibid. 
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company who served Butte and Anaconda would dominate electrical power 
production in the state. 
Hauser was correct in assuming that his Missouri River properties 
were valuable, if not crucial, to the success of the Ryan/Wetmore power 
combination. Without the control of Canyon Ferry, Hauser, and the 
future Holter Dam, the Butte Syndicate would have been threatened peri-
83 
odically by insufficient water for its generators. Hauser's oldest 
and staunchest supporters, Henry Seligman and W. A. Clark, recognized 
this fact. They also acknowledged the strength of John D. Ryan and 
Amalgamated. Cancellation of power contracts in September, 1910, 
emphasized to Seligman and Clark that S. T. Hauser's United Missouri 
River Power Company was vulnerable and could easily be forced into 
bankruptcy. Their subsequent defection from Hauser caused his financial 
collapse. In the end, S. T. Hauser's promotions had been directed at 
the wrong people. 
83. In October, 1910, the Butte Company's general manager, Max 
Hebgen, wrote to John D. Ryan, warning that if the Hauser Dam flood­
gates were closed "when the Great Falls company is using practically 
the whole flow of the river, they could, for a period of three or four 
days, cut off the flow at Rainbow very materially." Letter, Max Hebgen 
to John D. Ryan, October 17, 1910, PSR, Box 43, exhibit 186. 
EPILOGUE 
THE OPPORTUNITY OF ELECTRIC POWER 
The possibility of making electricity a commercial power source 
offered nineteenth century capitalists a new economic frontier to ex­
ploit. Steam-generated electricity was the first form of the new power 
to be applied to industrial America, since these plants could be 
erected adjacent to manufacturing centers. But George Westinghouse's 
experiments with high-voltage electric transmission in the late 1880s 
convinced most electrical entrepreneurs that a large, central station 
power source was both practical and economically efficient. It was the 
ability to transmit electric current that spurred development of hydro­
electric power plants in the United States. 
Montana, along with her western state neighbors, was particularly 
blessed with water-power sites. And, of all the high mountain rivers 
and streams susceptible to hydroelectric generation, it was the Missouri 
River that offered the greatest prospects for the development of a cen­
tral station power plant. Very early in the twentieth century, Montana 
investors recognized the value of the river and pursued its control and 
harnessing for industrialization. The Missouri presented an opportunity 
that local capitalists could not ignore. Their exploitation of that 
opportunity during the period 1898-1912 left a legacy of combination of 
public utilities and a pattern of development that reflected the strength 
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of the state's mining industry. 
Samuel T. Hauser was but one individual who recognized the potential 
for applying electric power to Montana's mines and smelters. He was one 
of the first individuals to take advantage of long distance electrical 
transmission. The scale of his hydroelectric development was unparal­
leled at the time. Yet, while Hauser was responsible for demonstrating 
the economic possibilities of the new power source, he did not share in 
the long-term benefits of his pioneer efforts. 
The entrance of John D. Ryan and Charles Wetmore, both of whom had 
strong financial support from national industrial firms, interrupted 
Hauser's plans for controlling the hydroelectric potential of the 
Missouri. Nature's hand, in the form of a spring freshet in April, 
1908, aided Wetmore and Ryan in their attempt to destroy Hauser. But, 
the former Montana governor's own financial instability and inability 
to prosecute construction of Holter Dam and Hauser Dam prompted abandon­
ment by his closest financial friends and his eventual loss of control 
of the United Missouri River Power Company. A consummate promoter, an 
aging S. T. Hauser had, perhaps, proceeded too quickly in attempting to 
establish his hydroelectric empire on the upper Missour River. 
The failure of Hauser Dam in 1908 may have encourage Ryan and 
Wetmore to seize that opportunity to combine forces, to rush completion 
of the new Rainbow Dam, and to tighten the competitive squeeze on 
Hauser. Notwithstanding the timing of events, it seems clear that the 
various interests planned a power combination as early as 1904. The 
exact scenario for effecting the formation of the syndicate was not 
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apparent until 1908, but few influential electric power entrepreneurs 
disputed the inevitability of such a monopoly. 
The Amalgamated Copper Company also did not argue with the combina­
tion of power producers. By 1905, the company's chief executive, H. H. 
Rogers, had become convinced of the applicability of electricity to 
Amalgamated's operations—much of this conviction due to the efforts of 
S. T. Hauser. The network of high-voltage transmission lines that ex­
tended towards Butte and Anaconda beginning in 1901 evidenced the copper 
trust's acceptance of the new power. 
There is no conclusive evidence of collusion between John D. Ryan 
and the Amalgamated Copper Company in financing what ultimately became 
the Montana Power Company. Ryan always maintained that he had found 
independent financial support. These protestations, however, do not 
dismiss the questionable nature of Ryan's business connections. 
A federal investigator queried John Ryan in 1921 about the power 
developer's corporate associations during the 1909-1912 period. The 
lawyer wondered if Ryan's presidency of Anaconda Copper Mining Company, 
his later leadership in Amalgamated, and his directorship in the Chicago, 
Milwaukee, St. Paul Railway Company (a company that electrified part of 
its railroad in 1918) did not influence various decisions regarding the 
power business. In response, Ryan explained that his actions benefited 
all of the companies involved in the transactions and that "an honest 
individual can make this determination [of benefit]."^ Despite Ryan's 
1. "Testimony of John D. Ryan Before the Interstate Commerce 
Commission in the Investigation of the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul 
Railway Company," ICC Doc. No. 17021, November 17, 1921, PSR, Box 43, 
exhibit 145. 
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assertions of objectivity, every event in the process that began to un­
fold in 1908 augmented his (Ryan's) personal wealth and influence. 
H. H. Rogers may have agreed to accept electric power from Ryan's com­
pany for the good of Amalgamated following the failure of Hauser Dam in 
1908. Nonetheless, when John Ryan assumed leadership of Amalgamated in 
1909, there could be little doubt that future power development on the 
Missouri would revolve around the interests of the new copper trust 
president. Hauser had always acknowledged the importance of aligning 
with the Amalgamated Company. But he was unable to continue the alli­
ance once H. H. Rogers died and John Ryan moved to New York. 
The combination of John Ryan's and Charles Wetmore's power com­
panies, the bankruptcy of S. T. Hauser's United Missouri River Power 
Company and the formation of the Montana Power Company secured the bond 
between the mining industry and hydroelectric producers in Montana. 
Those events also enabled electric production and distribution in the 
state to be monopolized. Early efforts at electrification in Montana 
had concentrated on supplying power for residential lighting to the 
state's communities. Formation of the Montana Power Company in 1912, 
however, was intended to produce electric power for large industry, not 
small consumers. While the thrust of Montana Power Company's capital 
effort has no doubt allowed numerous small Montana towns to receive the 
benefits of electricity (a point that the Company has never neglected to 
make), the Company was not created on that premise. 
Fears of the effects of monopolization of electric producers in 
Montana and other states surfaced on the national level at an early date. 
132 
In 1912, the U. S. Bureau of Corporations reported on the trend towards 
combination in the industry and the possibility that only a few large 
utility security companies would eventually control all of the electric 
2 
production in the country. This concern prompted Congress to authorize 
a study of electric power development in 1915. A three-part report, 
published in January, 1916, suggests that a monopoly in electric power 
producers was already apparent. In the area of water power development, 
the expansion in western states increased four hundred and fifty-one 
percent between 1902 and 1912 compared to ninety-eight percent for the 
East during the same period. Consolidation of power interests was par-
3 
ticularly evident in this development. The report concludes that inter­
locking directorships among power companies was impossible to determine. 
Yet, the report adds, "these data show potential control, a marked 
tendency toward association or community of interests, particularly be­
tween the principal holding companies, that cannot be viewed without 
4 concern." It was this trend in hydroelectric power development that 
raised congressional interest in regulating the industry and aided 
efforts to pass the Federal Water Power Act of 1920. 
The enactment of this national scenario in Montana did not occur 
without casualties. C. W. Wetmore, who considered himself the architect 
2. Bureau of Corporation, "Report of the Commissioner of Corpora­
tions on Water-Power Development," passim. 
3. U.S. Senate, Electric Power Development in the United States, 
64th Cong., 1st Sess., Senate Doc. No. 316 (1916), pp. 13-15. 
4. Ibid., p. 15. 
133 
of the Butte Syndicate and the Montana Power Company, suffered a nervous 
breakdown in December, 1912. While recuperating in England during the 
winter of 1913, Wetmore learned that the first presidency of the new 
company had been given to John D. Ryan. Angry and distraught, Wetmore 
wrote to Ryan in May, 1913, expressing his outrage at the turn of events. 
1 think you will not be surprised when I say that 
I feel I have been grossly betrayed, humiliated 
and outraged by the men of n\y own group. I created 
the Montana Power Company, and I did it alone.5 
Wetmore recognized that Ryan was in a "difficult position" but urged 
him to accept the contributions that the former Butte Electric and Power 
Company president had made and to restore him (Wetmore) to his proper 
position.6 Wetmore must have been sorely grieved when John Ryan con­
tinued as president of the Montana Power Company. 
Samuel T. Hauser was a second victim of the formation of the 
Montana Power Company. Hauser was one of the first Montanans to attempt 
electric production from water power facilities. Through his promotion, 
the value of that new power source was demonstrated. Always in the 
forefront of activity on Montana's economic frontier, Hauser erected 
the first large hydroelectric power plant in Montana. He also pointed 
the way towards the creation of an industrial market for the new product. 
In his declining years, Hauser could look to these accomplishments of 
his participation in hydroelectric development. At his death in 
November, 1914, however, he could not look with equal pride to his 
5. Letter, C. W. Wetmore to John D. Ryan, May 19, 1913, PSR, 
Box 29(1), exhibit 305. 
6. Ibid. 
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continued involvement in the electric industry. Throughout his long 
career on the Montana frontier, S. T. Hauser had often been the first 
to see the potential of new industry. His economic prescience continued 
into the twentieth century with an endeavor that was destined to be con­
trolled by others. 
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